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ABSTRACT

The primary focus of this study is to explain presidential decision making, specifically
whether to intervene militarily or not in a given circumstance in the Post-Cold War era. First, we
define military intervention as the deployment of troops and weaponry in active military
engagement (not peacekeeping). The cases in which we are interested involve the actual or
intended use of force (“boots on the ground”), in other words, not drone attacks or missile
strikes. Thus, we substantially reduce the number of potential cases by excluding several limited
uses of force against Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan in the 1990s. Given the absence of a
countervailing force or major power to serve as deterrent, such as the Soviet enemy in the Cold
War period, there are potentially two types of military interventions: (1) humanitarian
intervention designed to stop potential genocide and other atrocities and (2) the pre-emptive
reaction to terrorism or other threats, such as under the Bush Doctrine. Therefore, we need to
understand the logic of unipolarity and how the hegemonic power can be drawn into actions,
especially in the absence of a great power rival.
The theoretical puzzle we seek to solve comprises the competing explanations for why a
presidential administration will decide to intervene in one situation and not in another. This is the
normative question on which we focus from the outset in order to solve the theoretical puzzle.
1

Since both the situations and decision makers vary across cases, we need to know precisely what
is driving the outcome. Therefore, our theoretical perspective and goal-driven research objective
are focused on standardized, generalized questions: Why intervene? Why use force or not? Under
what conditions or circumstances are intervention decisions made?
Do outcomes depend primarily on presidents making decisions as the all-important
dynamic versus other variables and different measurements as to what drives the “go” or “no-go”
decisions? Our examination of the phenomena of interest will lead us to a generalized theory as
well as a typology of military intervention in the post-Cold War era.

KEY WORDS: International Relations, United States Foreign Policy, Presidential Decision
Making, Military Intervention.
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CHAPTER 1
U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

INTRODUCTION
The primary focus of this study is to explain presidential decision making, specifically
whether to intervene militarily or not in a given circumstance in the Post-Cold War era. First, we
define military intervention as the deployment of troops and weaponry in active military
engagement (not peacekeeping). The cases in which we are interested involve the actual or
intended use of force (“boots on the ground”), in other words, not drone attacks or missile
strikes. Thus, we substantially reduce the number of potential cases by excluding several limited
uses of force against Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan in the 1990s. Given the absence of a
countervailing force or major power to serve as deterrent, such as the Soviet enemy in the Cold
War period, there are potentially two types of military interventions: (1) humanitarian
intervention designed to stop potential genocide and other atrocities and (2) the pre-emptive
reaction to terrorism or other threats, such as under the Bush Doctrine. Therefore, we need to
understand the logic of unipolarity and how the hegemonic power can be drawn into actions,
especially in the absence of a great power rival. This study has found that interventions are more
likely when international factors (support or pressure from allies and intergovernmental
organizations), momentum from previous interventions, continuity from predecessor
administrations, lessons learned from prior decisions, and an optimistic appraisal of the military
situation are favorable.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The question of U.S. military intervention and the direction (or drift) of American foreign
relations since the end of the Cold War has received considerable attention in recent scholarship.
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Kessler1 finds that past intervention experiences influenced “cognitive constructs” in the
decision-making process; “reasoning by historical analogy” was crucial in the determination of
how and when to intervene; and “past lessons linked perceived interests to policy preferences.”
Peterson’s study2 of U.S. interventions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia finds that piecemeal
application of historical analogies, perceived pressure due to U.S. membership in international
organizations (i.e., NATO, UN), and the tendency to “demonize” individuals or groups involved
in a conflict are key to decisions of armed intervention. Norton3 analyzes the Somalia, Haiti, and
Rwanda decisions during the 1990s, concluding that U.S. involvement was in each case
“nontraditional,” resulting from “intrastate” conflict, and motivated, at least partly, by
“altruistic” aims. Hence, we synthesize the foregoing “list” or “menu” of theoretical reasons for
military intervention suggested by these scholars to construct the larger puzzle that we intend to
solve by looking hard at the chosen cases.
THEORETICAL PUZZLE
The theoretical puzzle we seek to solve comprises the competing explanations for why a
presidential administration will decide to intervene in one situation and not in another. This is the
question on which we focus from the outset in order to solve the theoretical puzzle. On the one
hand, does the president as an individual drive the decision-making process, or is the institutional
presidency key, being his circle of key advisers? Thus, are “personality” and “informal factors”4

1

Kessler, Bart Raymond: Military Intervention: A Cold War Assessment of the “Essence” of Decision. Unpublished
Doctoral Dissertation, Auburn University, Auburn, AL, 2003.
2
Peterson, Shannon: Stories and Past Lessons: Understanding United States Decisions of Armed Humanitarian
Intervention and Nonintervention in the Post-Cold War Era (Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina).
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 2003.
3
Norton, Richard James: Post-Cold War United States National Security Decision-Making: The Cases of Somalia,
Haiti and Rwanda. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford,
MA, 2003.
4
Snyder, Richard C., H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds.: Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the
Study of International Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1962).
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determinative? On the other hand, are decisions reactive or determined by a variety of external
factors (for example, “hard” versus “soft” crises)5: systemic, domestic, institutional, and strategic
variables (for example, the “ornithological” shift of uniformed doves and hawks in three-piece
suits since Persian Gulf War)?6 Are our best explanations based on power defined as influence
projected through presence, as Schelling7 posits, or false optimism or pessimism regarding the
likelihood or easiness of success, as Van Evera8 maintains? By comparison, a “no-go” is likely
when decision-makers see no “upside” to action (e.g., Bush I regarding Bosnia and Haiti, cited in
Halberstam9). Are decisions determined by the leadership (or management) style of the
commander-in-chief, or mostly shaped by the self-motivated players participating in the
decision-making process (i.e., what Condoleezza Rice called the “rarified staff”10)? If the style
and personality of the chief executive are the drivers, should we seek answers in personal
ideology (e.g., “nontraditional” and “altruistic” goals;11 “rhetoric of justice”;12 and “legality”
versus “morality”13), generational experience (e.g., World War II and Vietnam War analogues in
the Persian Gulf War, as noted by Woodward14), and reasoning by historical analogies,15 or, as
Greenstein16 puts it, the president’s “vision of public policy” and “cognitive style”? Conversely,

5

Nye, Joseph S.: Redefining the National Interest. Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999.

6

Bacevich, A.J.: American Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).

7

Schelling, Thomas: Arms and Influence (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966).

8

Van Evera, Stephen: Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1999).
9
Halberstam, David: War in a Time of Peace (New York: Scribner, 2001).
10

Rice, Condoleeza: No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Crown, 2011).

11

Norton, Post-Cold War United States National Security Decision-Making.

12

Butler, M. J.: U.S. Military Intervention in Crisis, 1945-1994: An Empirical Inquiry of Just War Theory. Journal
of Conflict Resolution, April 2003.
13
Atack, I.: Ethical Objections to Humanitarian Intervention. Security Dialogue, September 2002.
14

Woodward, Bob: The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 277, 307.
Kessler, Military Intervention.
16
Greenstein, Fred I.: The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2000).
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is the president’s final action the outcome of the quality of a collegial process, where the quality
of the decision (output) is the result of the quality of advice (input)?17 Since both the situations
and decision makers vary across cases, we need to know precisely what is driving the outcome.
Therefore, our theoretical perspective and goal-driven research objective are focused on
standardized, generalized questions: Why intervene? Why use force or not? Under what
conditions or circumstances are intervention decisions made?
The Persian Gulf War of 1991-1992, as a prototype case, was precipitated by an action
most readily defined as a destabilizing event in the international system, at least regionally,
threatening the equilibrium of order and power.18 In a different vein, Gaddis19 argues that the
second Bush administration designed a “new grand strategy” following the 2001 terrorist attacks,
the Bush Doctrine, based on unilateralism, pre-emptive use of force, and hegemony.
After Eckstein,20 the problem with critical-case studies based on a single instance is that
any political event can be explained by some minimally plausible explanation that is not contrary
to fact. If all determinants are possible or probable, none are proved. Therefore, we employ
several instances of intervention and nonintervention (to be presented below) in solving our
theoretical puzzle.
After Waltz,21 we also consider the systemic environment, wherein the United States
acted as the sole military superpower in the post-Cold War period. According to Waltz, “In

17

Burke, John P., and Fred I. Greenstein: How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965 (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991).
18
Bush, George H. W., and Brent Scowcroft: A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998).

19

Gaddis, John Lewis: Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2004).
20
Eckstein, Harry: Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change (Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1991).
21
Waltz, Kenneth, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
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anarchy, there is no automatic harmony.”22 Thus, without the counterbalancing force of a
competitive superpower, use of force would be less hindered if not inevitable. However, there is
no reason to assume war is inevitable.23 Likewise, in agreement with Stoessinger,24 the system is
motivated by power, order, and perception, the latter often being at odds with reality. Hence, we
consider the other levels of analysis and inform our study by considering systemic, national,
individual, and strategic factors for each case under study. At the national or domestic political
level, we need to weigh the scope and quality of information available to decision makers,25 the
role of institutional players (for example, perceived pressure from Congress)26 and bureaucratic
politics,27 as well as the impact of public opinion, interest groups, and other constituencies.28
Given the unilateralism of Bush II’s key neoconservative advisers, or “Vulcans,”29 which
would suggest “Groupthink,”30 how much did institutions factor into their decisions after 9/11?
Unilateralism and interventionism may go hand in hand with executive decision making without
recourse to Congress and the legal mechanism of the War Powers Resolution.31 To illustrate,
members of Congress may at one point in time be calling for intervention in a particular case, but

22

Ibid., p. 160.
Ibid., p. 186.
24
Stoessinger, John G.: The Might of Nations: World Politics in Our Time (New York: Random House, 1963).
25
Hersh, Seymour M.: Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib. (New York: Harper Collins, 2004).
26
See Peterson, Stories and Past Lessons.
27
Allison, Graham T.: Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1971).
28
See Saunders, Elizabeth Nathan: Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2011); Anderson, Terry H.: Bush’s Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011);
Von Hippel, Karin: Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
29
Mann, James: Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004).
23

30

Janus, Irving L.: Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). See also Janus, Irving L.: Groupthink: Psychological
Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (2nd Ed., New York: Cengage, 1982).
31
U.S. Congress, War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148, 93rd Cong., H. J. Res. 542, November 7, 1973;
see also Prestowitz, Clyde: Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions
(New York: Basic Books, 2003).
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later may join the chorus of opposition. Therefore, while institutions like Congress try to exercise
influence on the chief executive, they probably act mainly as a loose brake rather than a
significant or truly determinative player, notwithstanding the War Powers Resolution of 1974.32
Do outcomes depend primarily on presidents making decisions as the all-important
dynamic versus other variables and different measurements (i.e., U. S. policy is fundamentally
reactive, as Henry Kissinger and others maintain) as to what drives the “go” or “no-go”
decisions? Our examination of the phenomena of interest will lead us to a generalized theory of
military intervention in the post-Cold War era.
METHODOLOGY
After George and Bennett,33 this study employs a structured, focused comparison
method, whereby we ask the same, general questions of each case study and focus on the same,
specific aspects of each case.
First, we identify the class (or subclass) of events we are studying. As we mentioned
above, the phenomena of interest involve the actual or intended use of force (“boots on the
ground”). Second, following George and Bennett,34 we define our research goal as requiring the
comparison of several cases, rather than a single instance. Third, the variables of interest will be
divided into four categories: (I) international or systemic, (II) national or political, (III)
individual, and (IV) strategic or military. These categories are addressed by corresponding
questions regarding the determinants of the decision making. We attempt to answer these

32

Fisher, L.: Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers. St. Louis U. L. J. 43, 1999; Fisher, L.:
Sidestepping Congress: Presidents Acting Under the UN and NATO. Case W. Res. L. Rev. 47, 1996-1997;
Fisher, L.: The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act? American Journal of International
Law, 85, 1995.
33
George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett: Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
34
Ibid.
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questions with respect to each category of variables. Thus, our theoretical focus is maintained by
asking the same set of questions and presenting a common focus for each case.
The set of questions are as follows:
1. Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition),
where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act?
Ideally, in any such case, one would expect success, one would want international
support, and one would want the result to be a more stable situation. As an example, the Persian
Gulf War satisfied these expectations, whereas Bosnia held rather less promise.35 Similarly, did
the perceived failure in Somalia cause the Clinton administration to hesitate in Rwanda, whereas
perhaps the cumulative success of efforts in Haiti may have led Clinton to intervene in the
Kosovo crisis three years later?36
2. Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage?
For example, why did the Clinton White House demur in the wake of political and ethnic
violence in Rwanda, but move to action in Haiti, a human tragedy of notably lesser scale in terms
of the loss of life? If geography counts, perhaps Haiti trumped Rwanda on tangible interests,
while Haiti became hostage to a domestic constituency, led by the Congressional Black Caucus,
something Rwanda lacked. Another factor could be timing, corresponding with the domestic
fallout from Somalia.
3. How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or management
style) have a determinative effect?
Phrased differently, we may ask how much effect individuals have, since they do matter
and always will. As a product of the World War II generation, arguments involving terms such as
35
36

Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed.
Holbrooke, Richard: To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998).
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“aggression” and “appeasement” resonated with Bush I. However, for Clinton and Bush II, the
paradigm may have been formed by “lessons” or “mistakes” of the Vietnam War. Also crucial is
the quality and scope of advice available to, or solicited by, the president.37 Conversely, conflict
and competition among key players can affect results. By way of illustration, George W. Bush’s
jealousy of Secretary of State Colin Powell may have had an effect on decisional outcomes in
addition to leveraging of different players’ preferences, such as those of Vice President Dick
Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza
Rice. Therefore, the number of participants, how wide is the circle of advisers, and the quality of
advice all count as well as the participants’ preferences. Hence, we ask how much the
subordinate players stack the deck in terms of the options presented to the president.
4. How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or nonintervention
scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an administration and from
one presidency to the next?
Bureaucratic politics would suggest faithfulness to the Weinberger-Powell doctrine and
make the military a reluctant intervener. General Wesley Clark might be a key “player” who
pushed or pulled the chief decision-maker, the president, in Kosovo, but the end result was
victory in what was, in Clark’s words, “not, strictly speaking, a war.”38 Likewise, conflicting
goals, unfinished business, and limited resources come into play, such as, for example, the recall
of General Tommy Franks from Afghanistan in late 2002 to start drafting the order of battle for
Iraq. The expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait may have been a necessary correction to the
regional strategic status quo, whereas the Iraq war after 2003 is seen as a “war of choice.”39

37

Greenstein, The Presidential Difference.
Ignatieff, Michael: Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (London: Metropolitan Books, 2000).
39
Haass, Richard, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoire of Two Iraq Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster,
2009).
38
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Our challenge is to measure the weight of each factor against the others. In the end, a
president’s decision may be individually determined, based on his own strong perceptions and
worldview, even if external events, advisers, and the bureaucracy try to push the decision in a
different direction. We hope to solve the puzzle in the process of examining the cases in this
focused, structural manner.
RESEARCH DESIGN: VARIABLES
Following George and Bennett,40 we formulate the objectives, research design
(variables), and structure of our research; we carry out each of our case studies, based on the
available data, according to the structured, focused comparison method; and then we will draw
on our findings to construct a theory and anatomy of presidential decision making in cases of
military intervention since the end of the Cold War. Thus, we identify our puzzle of presidential
decision making as a building block study41 with respect to the phenomena of U.S. military
intervention in the post-Cold War era.
As noted above, the categories of variables are given as follows: (I) International,
systemic, or structural factors; (II) National, domestic, or internal political factors; (III)
Individual, personal, and ideological factors; and (IV) Criteria for the use of force.
I.

International, systemic, or structural factors:
We consider the identification of crises that threaten regional instability, local disorder, or

other undesirable outcomes; crises that present direct or indirect threat to U.S. interests or
hegemony; and crises that pose a physical threat to American territory, property, or citizenry,
either domestically or outside the United States.

40
41

George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett: Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.
Ibid.
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The one constant is the unipolar or sole superpower moment. United States supremacy
holds throughout the post-Cold War era, although the limits of American economic wherewithal
to project such power has become more obvious. The United States still is “the indispensable
nation” in the global environment. Therefore, if Bush I saw Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as a
systemic threat in 1990-1991, did Bush II perceive Iraq the same way after 9/11, armed with the
Bush Doctrine as a guide to action? In other words, how did 9/11 change the way the U.S.
perceived its post-Cold War goals and capacity to achieve them?
Additionally, the structural factors include institutional actors, such as NATO, UN, and
other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that may influence decision makers, even driving
or pulling the commander-in-chief in a different direction from the course preferred by his
domestic or political advisers. An example may have been the policy shift toward diplomatic
(but not military) engagement in Bosnia after the transition from Bush I to Clinton because of
NATO’s influence.42
However, intervention in European crises such as Bosnia and Kosovo arguably were
intended to stop the destabilization of an area of vital interest — in contrast to a reluctance to
intervene in Africa because of its relative geopolitical unimportance. Additionally, so-called
humanitarian intervention has involved other goals and factors. Similarly, actions such as the
invasion of Iraq in 2003 could have had underlying motives related to superpower hegemony.
II.

National, domestic, or internal political:
We consider the influence of the roles of key institutional players, including the chief

executive, specifically, presidential leadership style as a push or pull factor (as a subset of
institutional roles). An example was Clinton’s initial reluctance to play a leadership role in

42

Holbrooke, To End a War.
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Bosnia, thereby affecting the approach of Secretary of State Warren Christopher in his
negotiations with the European allies.43 Public opinion and popular support are decisional factors
as well, including the so-called rally effect, the public’s assumed tolerance for casualties over
time, and the perceived success or failure of the operation.
Bureaucratic politics influences each scenario, where decisions and policy are impacted
by the standing, stature, and influence of intra-governmental actors, including agencies involved
in intelligence, national security, defense, and diplomacy. For example, General Wesley Clark’s
military missions in Kosovo44 may have succeeded despite inter- and intra-agency rivalries.
Institutional, constitutional, and legal factors, such as executive-legislative relations, unified or
divided government, the War Powers Resolution,45 and budgetary issues may have exerted
relative weight in a decisional scenario. Given the long-term budget-busting costs of military
action after 9/11, one wonders how much, if at all, finances constituted any kind of brake. In the
case of Iraq, setting the vote for war just before the 2002 Congressional elections may have been
intended to dampen or mute opposition voices. The examples of Clinton and Bush II illustrate
persistent Congressional deference to presidential decision-making, in effect, turning a blind eye,
to the War Powers Resolution.46 While Congress has not repealed the War Powers Resolution,
that legislation has been ignored since the 1980s, although the GOP actually raised it in a
partisan response to President Obama’s “lead-from-behind” action against Libya in 2011.
III.

Individual, personal, and ideological factors:

43

Christopher, Warren: Chances of a Lifetime (New York: Scribner, 2001); Christopher, Warren: In the Stream of
History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).
44
Clark, Wesley K., Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York: Public Affairs,
2001).
45
U.S. Congress, War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148, 93rd Cong., H. J. Res. 542, November 7, 1973.
46

Hendrickson, Ryan C.: Clinton, Bush, Congress and War Powers (Eastern Illinois University, 2004).
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In addition to psychology, personality, and leadership style, historical reference points,
including historical analogies and interpretation of historical events, are motivators as well as
justifications for actions taken. For example, the appeasement-aggression model derived from
the World War II experience apparently remained compelling for Bush I as a generational
consensus that contributed to his response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the Persian Gulf
War.47 A similarly generationally driven analogue on the issue of Iraqi nuclear, chemical, or
biological weaponry in 2003 with the Cuban Missile Crisis was invoked at one point by George
W. Bush.48 This last point is problematic in that it illustrates the misapplication or
misunderstanding of historical analogies.49 The second war against Saddam Hussein went ahead
without much overt concern about U.S. troops running into WMD casualties. Thus, Bush II’s
team either misread the “lesson” of the Cuban Missile Crisis (and the caution exercised by JFK
and his advisers), or perhaps simply expropriated this historical event to justify an already agreed
upon decision to go into Iraq in 2003.50
IV.

Criteria for the use of force:
Whether or not explicitly stated by decision makers, the Powell Doctrine or Weinberg’s

Rules of Engagement, as applied to each case, are not only a key set of dependent variables, but
also measurements of the relative necessity (or desirability) for deployment of the military option
in a given case.51 The assumed criteria for the use of force are as follows: (1) the first criterion is
that all other options (negotiations, sanctions, etc.) have been ruled out for sufficient reason; (2)

47
48

Bush, George H. W.: Heartbeat: George Bush in His Own Words, Jim McGrath, ed. (New York: Scribner, 2001).
Bush, George W.: Speech, Cincinnati, OH, October 7, 2002.

49

May, Ernest R.: “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (London:
Oxford University Press, 1975).
50
Stern, Sheldon M.: The Wrong Model for the Iraq War. Thinking Peace, Web Site:
http://www.thinkingpeace.com/pages/Articles/Archive1/arts063.html, October 20, 2003.
51
Powell, Colin, with Joseph E. Persico: A Soldier’s Way (London: Hutchings, 1995).
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the political, diplomatic, or military objectives are clear; (3) the military battle plan to be
employed is realistic (“doable”) and the military objectives can be effectively maintained
(“winnable”); (4) there are sufficient resources to go into the situation with “overwhelming
force”; and (5) there must be an exit strategy and timetable in place for the withdrawal of
personnel once the mission’s goals have been accomplished. We may seek evidence of
consistency of criteria from clearly specified objectives through to an exit strategy. However, we
do not presume that our case study scenarios will sustain the usefulness of these ideal criteria.
Rather, the criteria serve as benchmarks for the selected case studies.
The cumulative effect of prior intervention or nonintervention decisions on subsequent
actions can be considered within the life span of an administration, particularly past adjudged
successes or failure. Somalia seems to have impacted Clinton’s Haiti and Rwanda decisions or
non-decisions.52 Somalia is instructive because the mission’s goals and parameters (i.e., limits)
evolved as events unfolded and was ultimately abandoned as a failure—a classic case of
“mission creep.”53 By contrast, Haiti (1994) provides an instructive example of the decisionmaking process because armed intervention against live resistance was avoided by the
unexpected, last-minute success in diplomacy.54
RESEARCH DESIGN: CASE STUDIES
We will analyze six decision-making scenarios – Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Rwanda,
Kosovo, Iran (Iran’s nuclear development), and Iraq – on the basis of four sets of variables and
four corresponding questions from our focused, structured analytical framework , whereby we
52

Lake, Anthony: Six Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 2001).
53
Bowden, Mark: Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999).
54

Shacochis, Bob: The Immaculate Invasion (New York: Viking, 1999).
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ask the same, general questions of each case study and focus on the same, specific aspects of
each case. We devote the subsequent chapters to considering the selected case studies of military
intervention in more depth. The selected cases represent a “go” and “no-go” for each of the
presidents – Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II. For example, the Bush I administration moved
diplomatically, militarily, and politically toward intervention to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait
in the Persian Gulf War and yet the same group of decision-makers declined to participate in
NATO’s action in Bosnia one year later. Rwanda is instructive as a case of nonintervention to
affirm the theoretical assumptions regarding presidential decision making. In contrast to the “nogo” decision for Rwanda, the Clinton team made a “go” decision for Kosovo. The Bush II
administration opted to go into Iraq in 2003 before “finishing the job” begun in Afghanistan in
2001. Among several notable crises during the Bush II administration, 2001-2008 – Georgia,
Darfur, North Korea, and Iran – Iranian development of a nuclear weapon capability was the one
most likely to have been perceived as a regional or systemic threat to U.S. interests. Bush II’s
decision-making team promoted weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the primary casus belli
for the Iraqi intervention, but did little to counter Iran’s or North Korea’s nuclear weapon
development. Selection criteria rule out actions and decisions involving different kinds of
intervention, including retaliatory air raids or economic sanctions.55 A sufficient body of
literature, academic and popular, exists on U.S. military intervention since the end of the Cold
War to provide substantial qualitative information on the selected cases. There is a large body of
congressional, intergovernmental, and organizational reports on all of the cases under study as
well (see Select Bibliography: I. Documents). We will also consider the cases of Panama,
Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan (as well as Libya and Syria during the Obama administration) in

55

See George and Bennett: Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.
20

a broad generalized survey of the question of decisions to intervene or not. Our goal is to build a
generalized anatomy of presidential decision making and typology of U.S. military intervention
in the post-Cold War era.
SUMMARY
The primary focus of this study is to explain presidential decision making, specifically to
intervene militarily or not in a given circumstance in the Post-Cold War era. Why had some
intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition), where decisionmakers came to believe they were compelled to act? For example, why did Bush I choose to stay
out of the Serb-Bosnian conflict, while another president (Clinton) was convinced by staff and
the course of events that he had a moral and political responsibility to act? An example of this
case is to ask why the suspicion of Iraq’s development of weapons of mass destruction led to
full-scale invasion, whereas other nations’ clandestine nuclear weaponry (e.g., North Korea and
Iran) was considered a cause for concern rather than a cause for war. Why did a president decide
to intervene in one case and not in another, or decide differently from another, where his
predecessor or successor may have weighed largely identical considerations in the same
scenarios at a different stage? As an example, why did the Clinton White House demur in the
wake of political and ethnic violence in Rwanda, but move to action in Haiti, a human tragedy of
notably lesser scale in terms of the loss of life? Do individual human factors (psychology,
ideology, worldview, or management style) have a determinative effect? Therefore, we consider
the commander-in-chief’s leadership or management style as well as the so-called lessons of
history or historical reference points, which, in turn, reflect an individual’s worldview, values,
and belief system. Finally, we ask how did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous
intervention or nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of
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an administration and from one presidency to the next? The cumulative effect of successive
intervention actions seems also linked to perceptions of success or failure. Thus, did the
perceived negative outcome (or consequences) of the Mogadishu, Somalia operation factor in the
decisions regarding Haiti and Rwanda in 1994? Hence, did the case of Haiti’s peaceful
intervention present the chance to get a “win,” or was the decision not to intervene to prevent
genocide in Rwanda the result of gun-shyness? To answer these questions leads to an anatomy
and typology of presidential decision making.
The selected case studies are by consensus the most important military interventions
since the end of the cold war. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the question of U.S. military
intervention in the post-Cold War period and our structured, focused comparison framework.
Chapters 2 and 3 cover the Bush I administration’s decision making in the Persian Gulf War and
Bosnia, a “go” and “no-go” decision, respectively. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the Clinton
administration’s “no-go” in the case of Rwanda and “go” decision for Kosovo. Chapters 6 and 7
consider the Bush II administration’s decision to “go” in the case of Iraq and “no-go” in the case
of Iran. Chapter 8 reviews a range of additional cases of US military intervention since the end of
the Cold War, including Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan (as well as the recent cases of
Libya and Syria) in order to build an anatomy and typology of presidential decision making.
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CHAPTER 2
BUSH I: PERSIAN GULF WAR—GO
INTRODUCTION
The Persian Gulf War (January 15—February 28, 1991) was a military intervention
against Iraq by the United States at the head of a 34-nation coalition to expel Iraqi troops from
Kuwait. The intervention was precipitated by Iraq’s invasion and occupation of neighboring
Kuwait in August 1990. The primary actions were air and ground attacks in Kuwait, Iraq, and
Saudi Arabia, resulting in the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and causing Iraq’s leader,
Saddam Hussein, to sue for a ceasefire. The conflict was largely confined to the Kuwaiti, Iraqi,

23

and Saudi border regions, except for Iraq’s Scud missile attacks on Israeli targets as a
diversionary or provocative tactic. U.S. and coalition casualties (145 personnel killed in action)
were minimal and equipment losses were considered insignificant.
What causes war? How do actors prevent conflicts? According to Van Evera, five
conditions lead to the risk of interstate war: (1) false optimism with respect to the outcome; (2)
first-strike capability advantage; (3) fluctuations of relative power among states; (4) one conflict
spilling over into another; and (5) circumstances leading to easy conquest. In the post-Cold War
era, false optimism persists as the salience of the other conditions has diminished.56
The Bush I administration’s decision to intervene in the Persian Gulf War was
overdetermined: several factors contributed to the decision and no single factor was
determinative. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait represented regional destabilization, disrupting the
status quo, a threat to core economic interests (i.e., 10% of the world’s oil supply), and several
breaches of international law and security, including aggression. No formal treaty or obligations
related to international organizations were involved in the Persian Gulf War decision making.
However, the United Nations Security Council approved “all appropriate means” to expel Iraqi
forces from Kuwait. Also contributing to the “go” decision was Bush I’s conclusion that
economic sanctions would not be effective and the proposed military strategy, Operation Left
Hook, involved minimal casualties.
1. Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by
definition), where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act?
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The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the most obviously destabilizing action in the Middle
East since the outbreak of the first Persian Gulf War between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988). The
strategic and economic importance of the region’s oil fields was a clear threat to U.S. global
interests. Hans Morganthau has suggested that states do not behave as rational unitary actors in
the real world.57 Hence, Spanier posits that realism, like utopian idealism, is prescriptive rather
than descriptive, and thus normative in nature.58 However, the Persian Gulf War fits both a
rational and realist scenario of destabilization, where a regional balance of power was disrupted
and said disruption posed a threat to perceived and identified U.S. interests. As Spanier puts it,
“the United States remains at the center of the unstable world.”59 Therefore, the “high politics”
of diplomacy, projected and potential military power, and “core” interests as well as the “low
politics” of economic and business interests, cultural interactions, political culture,
nontraditional and nongovernmental actors drove U.S. military intervention to expel Iraq from
Kuwait in the second Persian Gulf War. As evidence, we cite concerns of national security and
regional stability as well as the economic threat to the region’s most crucial resource, oil, and
principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and aggression.
President of the United States George Bush determined early on that the Iraqi takeover of
Kuwait was “outright aggression.”60 A factor often overlooked is that 3,000 Americans lived and
worked in Kuwait at the time, making an issue of their protection. Most Westerners had been
taken into custody by the Iraqis, but were not considered hostages.61
Preliminary to the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein got into a number of disputes
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with neighbors, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait, over oil prices. Price cuts from the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) led Kuwait, UAE, and others to
overproduce, antagonizing Iraq, which was bound by agreement to the lower OPEC prices.
Despite the fact that the Kuwaitis and Saudis had supported Iraq in its war with Iran, Saddam
Hussein complained to the Arab League, accusing Kuwait of “theft” from the jointly held
Ramaila oil fields, calling it virtually “military aggression.” Also, the Kuwaitis refused to cancel
Iraqi debts.62 National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft was disturbed that key advisors at the
Bush I White House saw Kuwait as the “crisis du jour” rather than considering the long-term
implications of a doctrinal shift in U.S. foreign policy signaled by the largest military operation
since the Vietnam War.63
According to Francisco Parra, the Persian Gulf War was “the first oil war … other motives
were at best secondary.”64 Bush I’s Secretary of State James A. Baker contends “the linkage
between oil and a robust American economy was largely an abstraction: it had been more than a
decade since American consumers had experienced gas lines.”65 Nevertheless, the facts of oil are
compelling, but there is no “smoking gun” (or crumpled memo) that puts oil at the top of the list
of U.S. interests to intervene. Additionally, as Duelfer and Dyson hypothesize, the never-ending
cycle of conflict between the United States and Iraq that began in 1990-1991 was not inevitable
or purposeful.66 As late as July 19, 1990, the United States had little or no interest in the issues
between Iraq and Kuwait.67 President Bush sent special envoy April Glaspie to sit down with the
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Iraqi dictator, July 23-24, 1990, but Parra doubted the veracity of Glaspie’s diplomacy.68 The
bottom line for U.S. national interest was that, by invading and occupying Kuwait, Saddam
seized 94 billion barrels or 10 percent of the world’s “proved oil reserves.”69 The core point is
that the intervention was over-determined (i.e., there were many compelling reasons to do it, any
one of which would have been sufficient on its own). Secretary of State Baker reflected that once
the Bush I inner circle determined their efforts to moderate and accommodate Saddam Hussein
had failed, Baker saw armed intervention as the likely outcome.70
2. Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage?
There is a weak comparison to Reagan’s decision to intervene with air and naval forces
on behalf of Iraq against Iran in the first Persian Gulf War, where the absence of “boots on the
ground” looks like a half-way attempt to interfere without intervening. The reasons why the
United States backed Iraq against Iran during Reagan’s administration after having “tilted”
toward the Iranians earlier are complex and beyond the scope of the present study. Later actions
taken by the Clinton administration against Iraq for violations of the no-fly zone, gassing the
Kurds, and the Bush I assassination plot were limited uses of force, or non-interventions by our
definition.71 A fair comparison is the Obama administration’s intervention in Libya in 2011.
While there was no use of ground troops, the goal of the “lift and strike” strategy (to lift an arms
embargo to supply rebels and to launch air and naval strikes) was to empower opposition forces
to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi’s regime.
The Persian Gulf was not one of the Bush I administration’s major areas of concern at
68
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first, although American policy makers had worried about the security and stability of the region
since the British withdrew from the area at the end of the 1960s. The Bush I administration’s
policy review (NSR-10) raised some concerns about Saddam Hussein’s regime. They possessed
intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), were suspected to be working on developing a
nuclear weapon capability, and they had used chemical weapons on Iranians and Kurds.72
Intelligence reports indicated Iraq was acquiring “nuclear triggering devices,” “long-barreled
‘super gun’ artillery piece,” and “special tungsten furnaces” in connection with its apparent
nuclear weapon development.73 These unpleasant findings were not themselves sufficient
triggers for considering U.S. intervention until Saddam Hussein’s incursion into Kuwait, which
suggested Iraq had gone rogue and turned into an aggressor, threatening the pre-existing regional
status quo. Hence, President Bush was convinced of the inevitability of force once the
circumstances became clear. Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney soon came to the same
conclusion, whereas Secretary of State Baker was cautious. General Colin Powell, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, demanded sufficient force and freedom of action.74 Until a viable plan
was on the table, Powell worried that no one was advising the commander-in-chief to be cautious
before embarking on the most ambitious U.S. military operation in almost twenty years.75
Thus, the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait was perceived as different in kind
from previous crises in the Persian Gulf region, such as the Iran-Iraq war, because it involved a
destabilization of the status quo and threatened core economic interests (i.e., oil). As mentioned
above, the Bush I administration earlier saw the potential for a rapprochement with Iraq as a
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bulwark against Iran.76 Later scenarios did not rise to the same threatening level of
destabilization because of Iraq’s subsequently weakened capability. Although the fear of Saddam
accumulating more power and greater control over oil, not to mention WMDs, caused some
concern. Nevertheless, Clinton followed Bush I and the new administration had little or no
enthusiasm for military adventures abroad. 77
3. How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or
management style) have a determinative effect?
The decision-making style of the Bush I administration was characterized by the
president predetermining his position and then working to bring his key players in line. President
Bush announced the deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia and once they were already in
place made World War II analogies and referred to the operation as a “principled moral crusade.”
Bush said, Saddam Hussein’s forces “stormed in blitzkrieg fashion” and “appeasement does not
work.”78 Bush further analogized the mistakes or lessons of the Vietnam War. Defense Secretary
Cheney shared Bush’s Vietnam War lesson: to give the military sufficient force and not to tie
their hands. Cheney said, “the president belongs to what I call the ‘don’t screw around’ school of
military strategy.”79 Within twenty-four hours of the Kuwait invasion, Bush called a National
Security Council meeting, talked to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and put United
Nations Ambassador Thomas Pickering to work to get the United Nations Security Council to
convene an emergency meeting.80 Nevertheless, a considerable amount of time elapsed before
the president clarified what the nature of U.S. action would be, leaving key decision makers to
76
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cull hints from nuances. General Powell pored over Bush’s public remarks. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs sifted through the Commander-in-Chief’s words, even as he was preparing a plan of
action. Powell’s operations chief, Thomas W. Kelly, wondered what they were supposed to be
planning! Was it retaliation against Iraq? Was it to liberate Kuwait? Was it to defend allied Arab
states?81
Even when Bush publically played the diplomatic card by enlisting the offices of
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Jordanian King Hussein, the president’s real intention or
expectation seems to have been that the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis was headed toward a “live”
intervention. Powell surmised as much from the Aspen statement (August 2, 1990) issued by
Bush, Mubarak, and Hussein, calling for Arab League mediation, describing the president’s
words as “measured.”82 Although Bush and Scowcroft do not say so in their memoire, the
president seems to be getting the diplomacy out of the way, expecting failure, so that they could
move ahead to the next step.83 Meanwhile, in Washington, the Defense Secretary was sending
staffers to excavate files of all four services for plans that might be useful and pitched to the
president as military contingencies. This is what Cheney called “pulsing the system.” Cheney
knew Powell had always sampled the various services for their ideas and used informal ties to
forge alliances and get to a consensus. The Secretary of Defense did not want to be
outmaneuvered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Chairman.84 Cheney and Powell in different
roles would later clash in the Bush II administration during the advent of the next war with Iraq
(see Chapter 6). Their differences were not so much over speed, objectives, duration, or allies,
but rather turf. Cheney told Powell his job was to provide a range of military options, not to
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analyze or recommend policy.85 Therefore, competition among key players and bureaucratic
rivalry spurred information gathering and may well have enhanced the quality of subsequent
decision making. Nevertheless, Colin Powell could not pinpoint when Bush decided a major
deployment of troops was the way to go.86
Hence, the core question this section answers is whether another president would have
done the same thing. From a generational context, the confluence of applying the lessons of
World War II regarding appeasement of aggression and “kicking the Vietnam Syndrome” makes
it hard to imagine a Kennedy, Nixon, or Reagan deciding differently. However, Powell and
Cheney, two products of the Vietnam generational experience, held contrasting views with
respect to the mistakes of the Vietnam War. Thus, Cheney was one of the first key players to
align himself with the president’s push toward intervention, whereas Powell, in league with
Secretary Baker, advocated caution even as he supervised the preparations for war.87
4. How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or
nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an
administration and from one presidency to the next?
It seems the U.S. invasion of Panama, December 20, 1989 to January 3, 1990, was a test
case for a more active role for the military and less restraint on the use of intervention as a tool of
foreign policy. However, one might be hard-pressed to identify the national interests at stake in
the use of combat forces to grab a foreign political leader and bring him to trial on criminal
charges in the United States. There is no indication a similar apprehension was planned for
Saddam Hussein. According to Richard C. Clarke, “as troops swept Panama looking for Manuel
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Noriega … he had eluded our operations for days.”88 Congressman John Murtha observed that
President Bush referred to the inability to corral Noriega as a likely precursor to hunting down
Saddam Hussein if coalition forces had continued toward Baghdad in 1991.89 Therefore, the
lesson learned from “Operation Just Cause,” as the Panama invasion was dubbed, was that U.S.
armed forces could go in, quickly achieve the objective, and exit.90 Whereas Saddam Hussein’s
Iraqi military was much stronger than the Panamanian National Guard, there were, in fact, more
resistance, casualties, and days spent on the Panamanian operation than planned for. However,
the overall judgement was that the invasion of Panama was quick and easy, and could be viewed
as a model for future action.
I.

International, systemic, or structural factors:
“The motive driving international theorizing,” according to Spanier, “was to avoid

another war.” (Spanier, p. 10) Therefore, we ask why states opt for war. We seek answers in
actions that disturb the equilibrium or status quo. That Iraq’s action against Kuwait was
destabilizing in the region was a necessary condition for the United States to react with force, but
not sufficient to explain the decision. There were no formal, written treaties, agreements, or
understandings that compelled the United States to aid the Kuwaitis, according to Defense
Secretary Richard B. Cheney. Nevertheless, Cheney was a key decision maker and he expressed
a hard line from the outset: the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was itself a threat to U.S. interests and
the president should be able to consider a wide range of options, including the use of military
force.91
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The most likely restraint on United States military action would have been the counter
force of the USSR. However, the Soviet Union failed to oppose U.S. intentions, as would have
been the case during the Cold War. While Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev lent diplomatic
and political support, effectively spurning their Cold War client, the Soviets did not join,
participate, or contribute directly to the operation. The USSR supported UN Security Council
resolutions against Iraq and cut off weapons shipments, and Eastern European “creditors”
contributed humanitarian assistance and allowed “coalition” overflights.92 Thus, U.S. freedom of
action is evidently due to the change in relative power in the international system, as illustrated
by the Persian Gulf War. If looked at a bit differently, the second Gulf War was made possible,
or U.S. military intervention was made feasible, due to a changed balance of actual or projected
power between the United States and USSR.
Also, the Bush I administration saw the Iraqi move against Kuwait as a threat to Saudi
Arabia as well. The United States commitment to Saudi security was given as “a word of honor”
by President Bush to Saudi Ambassador, Sheik Bandar bin Sultan.93 Early in the crisis, in August
1990, Bush said, “This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.” According to Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, the president’s quote equaled a “declaration of war,”
but Bush didn’t think so.94 Rather than appearing to be acting unilaterally, the Bush I
administration put together a “coalition of the willing” and built a bridge between the two
superpowers. A joint U.S.-Soviet declaration was issued by Secretary of State James Baker and
Foreign Minister Edouard Shevardnadze “condemning” the Iraqis’ invasion of Kuwait. Britain,
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France, Germany, Japan, and Turkey were all agreed.95 In October 1990, Schevardnadze offered
Soviet mediation to Iraq, but Saddam refused. Thus, the Soviet Union gave full support for the
United States to go to the UN Security Council. Resolution 556 (given a 13-0-2 vote) approved
“all appropriate measures” to enforce interdiction through a naval blockade.96 United States
envoys Haass and Kimmitt put together support at the UN for an independent coalition, deriving
jurisdiction from Article 51 of the UN Charter on “Aggression.”97 On November 29, 1990, the
Security Council set January 15, 1991 as Iraq’s deadline for compliance and authorized the U.S.led coalition to use “all means necessary.”98 “Soviet help in particular was key,” according to
Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft.99
The Bush I administration was meticulous in its efforts to build a coalition of support—
including the USSR, NATO allies, Japan, South Korea, Arab friends, and others plus Japanese
and German financial support—before acting.100 The president sent the Defense Secretary to
Saudi Arabia to convince the king to accept U.S. troops on his territory, a controversial and risky
move.101 Apparently, Cheney convinced King Fahd to let coalition forces on Saudi soil over the
objections of key royal advisors.102 The leading coalition partners were Britain, France, Spain,
Italy, Germany, and Turkey. Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu wanted to send “non-lethal
military assistance,” but faced opposition at home.103 Therefore, the foregoing illustrates how
Bush I’s intervention flowed from an array of international activities with alliance partners as
well as the United States’ erstwhile primary opponent.
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II.

National, domestic, or internal political:
In 1989, President George Bush issued a directive on United States policy toward

Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (NSD-26): “Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would
serve our long-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East … [We
recommend] economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and increase our
influence with Iraq.”104 Military intervention in the post-Cold War era has been characterized by
“nontraditional” and “altruistic” goals,105 involving “rhetoric of justice”106 and arguments of
“legality versus morality.”107 While the Persian Gulf War could be argued on the basis of
international security and the threat to core interests, the Bush I administration fell back on the
language of justice and morality in its efforts to persuade the public and Congress to support its
preferred course of action.
According to the War Powers Resolution (1973),108 only under very special
circumstances can the President of the United States use force without Congressional approval.
The president must get Congressional authorization for any deployment of thirty days or more
and either the House or Senate may terminate an operation by cutting off funds after an
additional thirty days. The president as commander-in-chief may use force to enforce treaties,
multilateral security agreements, or support NATO and UN operations. The history of most
presidential administrations contradicts the legislative history of the War Powers Resolution.109
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Congressional support for an offensive plan was decisive. A resolution to continue sanctions
narrowly passed the Senate 52-47, and the House 250-183. Congressional opponents may have
been convinced by Iraqi intransigence.110 However, Bush and Baker maintained the president
need not get a declaration of support from Congress because of the UN resolution, but then
belatedly sought that support.111

The invasions of Grenada and Panama ostensibly required “secrecy” and the news media
were largely “kept in the dark,” but during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Pentagon made
daily announcements and news crews were invited to photograph military dependents. There was
also a propaganda blitz, for example, reporting on the “formidable force” amassed against
Iraq.112 For the Bush I administration, taking the pulse of public opinion was a vital check on
another coalition partner, the American people. However, the president thought the “magnitude”
of the Persian Gulf crisis was not being covered sufficiently in the press and media.113 Issues of
cost were also raised in Congress.114

Meanwhile, the Secretary of State worried about opposition in Congress moving toward
impeachment if Bush I went to war over Kuwait without a formal declaration of war.115 Bush
decided on a major deployment at the end of October 1990, but waited until after the mid-term
elections, November 7th, to make an announcement. In Baker’s view, “Even with advance notice,
many members would have opposed the decision.”116 Baker’s opinion was: “The stronger the
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coalition, the easier it was to get consensus at home.”117 However, the Secretary of State believed
legislators preferred the “politically easier, let-sanctions-work approach.”118 Baker recalled key
leaders, such as Sam Nunn in the Senate and Les Aspin in the House felt “blindsided.” 119
Another danger would be unacceptably high casualties. Bush I administration estimates
ranged from 10,000 to 15,000, General Norman Schwarzkopf estimated 5,000, and Chairman
Powell estimated 3,000.120 Thankfully, those numbers were wildly inaccurate. By the same
token, James Baker miscalculated the popularity of the second Persian Gulf War. Nothing
succeeds like success. However, while Secretary Baker was cautious, President Bush bragged
about “kicking the Vietnam Syndrome.”121
III.

Individual, personal, and ideological factors:
Foreign policy decision makers are susceptible to “reasoning by historical analogies.”122

Vietnam War and World War II analogies pervaded Persian Gulf War decision making.123 The
president, a former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, was “optimistic,” but uncertain about the
prospects for decisiveness from the UN Security Council, where a Cold War “stalemate”
persisted for years.124 “We should not repeat the mistakes made at the beginning of World War
II,” stated President Bush, which he understood to mean “appeasement of aggression.”125 After
all, Bush was a very young enlistee in June 1942, citing then Secretary of War Henry L.
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Stimson’s commencement speech at Phillips Andover Academy as an inspiration.126 Chairman
Colin Powell, a Vietnam-era veteran, referred to “mistakes” or “lessons” of the Vietnam War,
which ran the gamut from inadequate resources and mission creep (or “escalation”) to public
opinion and political opposition.127

Other important players also drew on historical analogues and first-hand experience.
Saudi Ambassador Bandar asked if the United States would help if Saddam attacked Saudi
Arabia. If so, how and what kind of help would come? Would the United States give the Saudis
weapons? President Bush and National Security Advisor Scowcroft said they could not answer,
but Secretary Cheney and General Powell would. Bandar responded with a sarcastic reference to
former President Jimmy Carter sending unarmed jet fighter planes to the Saudis.128 In the
aforementioned discussion with the Saudi ambassador, the President of the United States
delivered a military security commitment in the form of a personal promise. “I give you my word
of honor,” Bush told Bandar, as if there were no impediments on his ability to deliver.129
Bureaucratic infighting was minimized when the Secretary of Defense met the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs in a “come-to-Jesus meeting” for giving military options to the president as
the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis unfolded. Cheney does not seem to have ever questioned the wisdom or
likely effectiveness of an offensive operation, while Powell was cautious. There was a rivalry for
the president’s ear as well as a suspicion between the uniformed and civilian bureaucracies
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Powell and Cheney led. “The tension soon drained away. Both men knew that they needed each
other.”130

IV.

Criteria for the use of force:
United States intervention in the Persian Gulf War might be the sole case study where the

criteria of the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine were fully engaged: diplomacy; clear-cut political
objectives; sufficient resources, money, and personnel; doable strategy and tactics; and an
activated exit plan. Ironically, the last criterion is often criticized for leaving Saddam Hussein in
power in Iraq as what some critics saw as “unfinished business.”
The progression of events leading to the Desert Shield and Desert Storm seems at once
inexorable and cautious. One day after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait (August 2, 1990), Rear
Admiral William A. Owens, Defense Secretary Cheney’s aide, was culling “surgical-strike
plans” for Iraq at Cheney’s request. Even though Colin Powell did not know Owens was acting
under Cheney’s orders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff admonished Owens: “The last
thing I want is to execute something someone dreamed up that I just heard of.”131 General Powell
had a philosophical and semantic objection to the “surgical” concept, considering its efficacy to
be “illusion” and “fantasy.”132 The first deployment of troops authorized by President Bush on
August 6, 1990, and the buildup continued for three months. The concentration of forces started
out as a “trip-wire force” so that Iraq would have to confront U.S. troops in order to attack Saudi
Arabia. Secretary Cheney and General Powell had their first meeting with Bush I in the “tank”
(White House war room) regarding troop deployments. Powell was nervous about where the
deployment was heading. What was the mission? Was it to defend the Saudis or expel the Iraqis
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from Kuwait? How much more personnel would be needed? Powell wasn’t looking for a new
mission, but a clarification of the present mission in the Persian Gulf.133 As late as the end of
September, Powell favored “containment” or “strangulation.” The economic embargo was
already underway and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz, thought it was
effective. However, Cheney seemed uninterested and so Powell went to Secretary of State James
Baker, who also preferred a diplomatic track. The idea of “containment” would give the
president a wide range of options from which to choose, but Powell thought the idea was never
given a chance.134 By September 1990, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated
economic sanctions and blockade would not be sufficient to force Iraq out of Kuwait.135 After
being given short notice to prepare an offensive war plan, General Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S.
commander in the field, was angry. His superior, Powell, told Schwarzkopf he still did not have a
go-ahead on an offensive mission from the president, but they had to draw up a plan anyway.136
By October 1990, Schwarzkopf and Powell knew they would need about twice as many forces as
they had and they had to make sure they got them.137 Gulf War strategy was called “Operation
Left Hook”: to outflank Iraqi forces with a quick finish, overwhelming force, and decisive
action. Plans for the additional 200,000 troops Powell and Schwarzkopf wanted were approved
by George Bush, October 30, 1990. Thus, the U.S.-led coalition operation expanded from
defense (of Saudi Arabia) to offense.138 President Bush finally outlined his objectives, November
8, 1990: (1) complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces; (2) restoration of Kuwait’s
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“legitimate” government; (3) guarantee Saudi Arabian security; and (4) safety of U.S. citizens in
the region.139
It is interesting to note the Bush I policy-making circle had no respect whatsoever for
Iraqi intelligence and communication capabilities.140 A critical period ensued from midDecember 1990. Colin Powell still believed George Bush would opt for a negotiated settlement
if he could get one. Powell furthermore believed Saddam Hussein did not think the United States
would attack and thought Saddam might pull out at the last minute once he realized the U.S.
threat was for real. However, Secretary Cheney thought that was “wishful thinking.”141
President Bush gave orders to go in four days, January 11, 1991. Air Force launched
attacks, January 16, 1991; the Normandy helicopter task force moved at 2:20 a.m. eliminating
Iraqi offshore radar facilities and their “early warning” capacity; and the main attack began at
3:00 a.m. In the final phase of combat, Iraqis were “bewildered” and “routed, fled, and
surrendered,” by February 28, 1991.142 The Bush I administration tried diplomacy, through
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and stated Iraq’s disputes (over oil) with Kuwait can only be solved by
peaceful means.143 Scowcroft argued to use oil as a weapon to cut off Iraqi pipelines from Saudi
Arabia and Turkey against Powell’s and Schwarzkopf’s “rehearsed plan for defending Saudi oil
region” to use air strikes, naval strikes, and deploy troops to defend the Saudis, which would take
twenty days.144 Scowcroft was “frankly appalled” that some key advisors saw Saddam Hussein’s
invasion of Kuwait as “a fait accompli.”145 According to General Schwarzkopf, Iraqi weaknesses
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were command and control, dependence on foreign spare parts, and “lack of offensive
experience.” Schwarzkopf estimated the overall U.S. plan of attack would take four months.146
The plan was heavily based on air power. Secretary of Defense Cheney was a skeptic: “The
history of air campaigns suggests that they are not terribly successful.” Scowcroft conveyed the
Saudis’ worry that without combat troops our commitment could be seen as thin. Schwarzkopf
said he was “not an advocate of air power alone,” but circumstances favored it. The IraqiKuwaiti borderlands offered a “target-rich environment,” there was “no cover at night” in the
desert, the Iraqi forces had no experience under such an attack, and the United States had
“sophisticated munitions,” i.e., fire power.147 Combat on the ground followed Bush I’s last
ultimatum (February 22, 1991, 8:00 p.m.) and lasted five days (February 23-28, 1991).
Where the Bush I administration fell short was in the area of post-war objectives, as
outlined by Secretary of State James Baker.148 Downright unrealistic plans comprised:
rebuilding Kuwait; establishing new Persian Gulf security arrangements to include Iraq and Iran;
withdrawing U.S. troops to be replaced by some sort of regional peacekeeping force; and
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.149 Unresolved issues included Iraq being left intact
under the pre-existing regime and sanctions were imposed, but they were “leaky.” An additional
consideration is the “unprecedented status” of Iraq following its conditional capitulation, which
was not a “surrender,” but had external sanctions and internal controls imposed, including
peacekeepers in Kurdish areas, no-fly zones, and embargoes on arms purchases and oil sales.150
Could the United States have overthrown the regime and gotten out? Should the United States
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have encouraged Shiite and Kurdish revolts? Would an even worse regime, most likely Islamist,
have replaced it? Regime change might have provoked Russian and Saudi objections and the
situation would not have been preferable to what actually transpired.151
Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm seems to have touched all the bases of the
Powell Doctrine: all other options explored and exhausted (international sanctions and backchannel diplomacy); clear-cut objectives (Iraqi expulsion from Kuwait), a winnable strategy
(Operation Left Hook); sufficient commitment of resources, including overwhelming force (half
a million troops in arms); and an exit strategy to avoid “mission creep.”
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
The decision to use military force in the case of the Persian Gulf War was overdetermined, whereby a number of factors constituted sufficient justification in and of themselves:
disruption of the international oil sector, regional stability, the territorial integrity of a sovereign
state, and to take action against aggression, a crime in violation of the United Nations Charter.
Moreover, Bush I diligently labored to build a broadly based coalition of allies, including the
Saudis and Israelis, while courting Congressional and public support at home. Importantly, Bush
I implemented a battle plan that was sufficient and clearly delineated to avoid a “quagmire,” thus
avoiding the ghosts of Vietnam. Consequently, George H. W. Bush would consider the Persian
Gulf War an unqualified success, marking the death of the so-called Vietnam Syndrome for U.S.
policy makers. However, critics would view the decision to allow Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist
regime to remain in power to be a mistake in light of the ten troublesome years to come, leaving
“unfinished business” for George W. Bush in the next war with Iraq.
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CHAPTER 3
BUSH I: BOSNIA—NO-GO
INTRODUCTION
The Bush I administration’s “no-go” decision in Bosnia was determined by the consensus
among the key players—Bush, Baker, Scowcroft, and Eagleburger—that there was no payoff in
becoming bogged down in a Balkan quagmire. This viewpoint derived from Bush I’s worldview
and management style (see Category III below). Although the Bosnian civil war would later be
judged an international crisis and a human rights disaster entailing ethnic cleansing and other
atrocities, the Bush I White House considered this case a European problem that should be
handled within the region, without U.S. intervention.

Following the liberal democratic revolutions sweeping Eastern Europe in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, four of the six states of Yugoslavia, an artificial nation-state cobbled together
after World War I, sought to break away from the formerly communist confederation. In June
1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic
offered minimal opposition to the Slovenian action, but directly supported an uprising of ethnic
Serbs in Croatia, triggering a brief and bloody civil war. In December 1991, Germany
44

recognized the new Slovenian and Croatian governments, followed by the European Community
(EC) and the United States. As for a more active U.S. role, James A. Baker, the Secretary of
State during the Bush I administration, famously declared: “we don't have a dog in this fight.”152
Macedonia was allowed to secede from the confederation, but after Bosnian Muslims (known as
Bosniaks) participated in an independence referendum in multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina that
was boycotted by Bosnian Serbs, warfare erupted against the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks
carried out by the Serbs, commencing in March-April 1992. The Bosnian Serbs were
enthusiastically supported by Milosevic and their militia initiated a systematic “ethnic cleansing
campaign” intended to redesign the republic’s borders, thereby isolating its Bosniak
population.153
“Ethnic cleansing” was a new term, though not a new idea in history, which became part
of public discourse as the Serb war on Bosnia got underway. However, the term itself was first
coined by Serbians with respect to their forced removal from Kosovo in the 1980s.154
According to Von Hippel, the Western European community was unable to exercise
effective influence over the rapidly deteriorating chaos in the former Yugoslav confederacy. The
inability of the NATO allies, including the United States, to come to agreement on policy
seriously undermined the credibility of the alliance itself. The UN position was that the breakup
of Yugoslavia was a European regional crisis, but the institution was forced to play a bigger role
when European diplomacy failed to put the brakes on escalating ethnic violence.155
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The United Nations became actively involved in the Yugoslav crisis in September 1991,
calling for “a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment
to Yugoslavia.”156 The next month UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar appointed
Cyrus Vance, former U.S. Secretary of State, to be in “constant contact” with all interested
parties, including the UN, EC, and NATO.157 Subsequent resolutions provided for conditional
implementation of a peacekeeping force, approved the Secretary General’s implementation plan,
and authorized full deployment of the peacekeeping force (United Nations Protection Force,
UNPROFOR) in five of the former constituent republics.158 The subsequent situation in Bosnia
by May 1992 in the face of escalating violence led to withdrawal of all except a handful of
observers, military personnel, and civilian staff. The “run and hide” response to hostilities is in
the nature of objective peacekeeping, indeed its inbred defect. Hence, the Serbian-Bosnian war
deteriorated in designated “no-fly zones,” “safe areas,” and border regions by the end of Bush I’s
tenure in January 1993.159
1.Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition),
where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act?
Realist arguments are strong explanations for international conflict.160 Thus, we seek an
explanation based on core national interests. Additionally, United States military interventions in
the post-Cold War era have been characterized by “multilateralism.”161 However, after the end of
the Cold War there ensued a broader debate on national interests to incorporate new issues,
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including environmental threats, cross-border migration, and cyber-terrorism. Hence, U.S. forces
were dispatched to several “complex humanitarian emergencies,” “military operations other than
war,” and “non-traditional missions” as opposed to “traditional”’ military operations. These
deployments did not involve a direct threat to the United States and there was no “large peer
competitor,” as the Soviets had been during the Cold War days.162 Indeed, these crises were
“intra-state conflicts” and U.S. motivation was seemingly partly “altruistic.”163

On June 21, 1991, Secretary of State Baker told Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic that the
United States supported “the unity and territorial integrity” of Yugoslavia. The statement gave
Milosevic a stamp of legitimacy when he sent his troops into Slovenia and Croatia to prevent
secession. Nevertheless, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence a few days later.164 The
rationale for the shift in U.S. policy is not readily apparent. However, Baker’s position was that
only a policy on which the Western allies agreed could succeed. Slovenia and Croatia declared
independence in December 1991, Germany recognized the new states almost immediately, and
the other Western European governments (through the aegis of the EC) extended diplomatic
recognition January 1992. The United States recognized all three secessionist republics in April
1992, followed by their being granted UN membership in May 1992. Ironically, Serbiandominated Yugoslavia was denied member status by the United Nations.

Regardless of the change of thinking in Washington, the Bush I administration’s policy
fell in line with that of its institutional partners—UN, EC, and NATO.165 Indeed, that was the
162
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intention. The Secretary of State convinced the president of the necessity of a “unified Western
position on recognition of individual Yugoslav republics.”166

At the outset, the Bush I administration did not consider the intra-state conflict in Bosnia
to be a destabilizing international event, nor one that threatened U.S. alliance partners; rather, the
Bush I decision makers saw the Bosnian conflict as a European regional problem. Warren
Zimmerman, U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, admits the United States made “damaging
mistakes” and in Bush I’s first year there was “surprisingly little concern” about Yugoslavia
among the U.S. diplomatic corps.167 Zimmerman relates how President Bush asked Yugoslav
Prime Minister Ante Markovic for his take on the breakup of the Soviet Union during a brief
visit to Washington rather than discussing the emerging threat of nationalistic secessionism in
Yugoslavia.168
Brent Scowcroft at the National Security Council (NSC) and Lawrence Eagleburger of
the State Department were the most influential decision makers, after Bush and Baker, and had
the most first-hand experience in Yugoslavia. The two were pessimistic about preventing war
through any diplomatic means by May 1991.169 They agreed Yugoslavia was a “hopeless
quagmire” and Eagleburger, a former ambassador to Yugoslavia, was “reluctant to invest the
United States too deeply in Balkan affairs.”170
2.Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage?
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The Bush I administration, while recognizing the independence of a Muslim-led Bosnia,
maintained that the Balkans constituted a European problem and refused to send U.S. forces
there as part of a UN “peacekeeping” operation, even though several members of NATO did
so.171
Therefore, the Bush I administration was not moved to act in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the
basis of humanitarian or altruistic objectives. Said issues might have been contributing factors if
there were necessary and sufficient conditions for intervention, such as a threat to U.S. citizens,
property, long-term U.S. economic interests, or an actual attack. We may speculate Bush I did
not perceive the Serbian-Bosniak conflagration as a threat to the international or regional status
quo or U.S. economic interests. However, the subsequent campaign of violence and genocide in
Bosnia was only one of four outbreaks of war in the ethnically fractured confederation in 1991
and 1992. Serbia, using militias and the Yugoslav army (known by the acronym JVA), waged
war on the secessionist republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia as well as Bosnia. In fact,
the Secretary of State saw the Macedonian conflict as most critical because of its potential to
spill over the border of a NATO partner, Greece. According to Ambassador Zimmerman,
Secretary Baker’s well intentioned efforts to keep Yugoslavia’s constituent parts together were
doomed by the “collision course” of events, propelled by “top-down” nationalism.172 Baker’s
goals were (1) a peaceful, consensual settlement, (2) human rights for the various ethnicities, (3)
constitutional power sharing, and (4) economic development propped up by U.S. and European
aid.173
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A rational, though misdirected, assumption that an economic solution could work was
shared by Prime Minister Markovic, whose economic policies were moderately successful, 19891990, but failed to affect the course driven by Milosevic’s Serbia.174 Perhaps undermining the
U.S. position, Baker told Markovic: “If you force the United States to choose between unity and
democracy, we will always choose democracy,” but the United States would not use force to do
so.175

3.How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or management
style) have a determinative effect?
President Bush and Secretary of State Baker controlled a non-intervention policy with
regard to Bosnia. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and National Security
Adviser Brent Scowcroft agreed, despite the horrific turn of events in the former Yugoslavia,
where Serb paramilitary guerrillas pursued a campaign of “ethnic cleansing,” including forced
removal and relocation, deliberate rape and impregnation of Bosniak women, and outright
murder of unarmed civilians.176 The president repeatedly asked, “Tell me what this is about.”177
In other words, Bush saw no “payoff” in the United States getting sucked into a “Balkan
quagmire.”178 Nevertheless, the Bush I team backed economic sanctions and an arms embargo
against Yugoslavia (i.e., the formal union of Serbia and Montenegro).179
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For President Bush, “personal alliances were everything.”180 Yet the president was
“secretive” and prone to “compartment” information such that only he knew the totality of a
particular puzzle, deliberately withholding pieces from key players.181 Bush’s most important
foreign policy confidants were National Security Adviser Scowcroft and Secretary of State
Baker. Both men concurred with the president that Bosnia-Herzegovina was a regional problem
requiring a European resolution and not one necessitating direct U.S. involvement. There were
no advocates close to Bush countering that viewpoint. Importantly, the definition of direct
involvement meant introduction of combat forces and thus did not preclude an array of other
options, including diplomacy and granting or denial of economic aid.
Scholars have given Scowcroft high grades for his leadership as National Security
Adviser, even while criticizing the outcomes.182 Therefore, the decision-making process in the
Bush I administration was highly consensual and cooperative with Scowcroft often presenting
other people’s views as succinctly as his own. Of crucial import, however, was the National
Security Adviser’s “unbreakable relationship” with Bush I and the two men’s “shared
perspective” of key lessons of history, such as the Vietnam War experience.183 By contrast,
Bacevich takes the Bush I team to task for being “morally obtuse” and trying to do “business as
usual,” thereby neglecting the Bosnian Muslims.184 In a similar vein, former Defense Secretary
James Schlesinger said the Bush I administration was “lost without its Cold War map.”185
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However, there was an ideological undercurrent among mid-level players in the Bush I
administration that articulated a divergent viewpoint. William Krystol, who was the VicePresident’s chief of staff and as such had little direct input in foreign policy, points to Paul
Wolfowitz’s authorship of the Defense Planning Guidance. In Krystol’s mind, “Wolfowitz saw
very early that the fundamental choice was American leadership, or increasing chaos and
danger.” The document, which was leaked to the New York Times and subsequently published in
a much watered down form, did not fit the cautious mooring of Bush I’s foreign policy.186
Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of Defense, envisioned several scenarios in which the United
States might have to fight two large regional wars at one time. 187 Wolfowitz was attempting to
articulate a post-Cold War strategic vision, but there was some indication he was partly
motivated by humanitarian concern. Albert Wohlstetter, Wolfowitz’s academic mentor, criticized
the Western allies for prohibiting the victims of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia from arming
themselves. In a Wall Street Journal article, Wohlstetter took Bush I to task, linking the Persian
Gulf War’s outcome to the Yugoslav civil war: “The successful coalition in the Gulf War
stopped too soon and ... told Slobodan Milosevic, who is not a slow learner, that the West would
be even less likely, four months later, to stop his own overt use of the Yugoslav Federal Army to
create a Greater Serbia purged of non-Serbs.”188 Richard Perle, another Wohlstetter protégé, was
even more assertive from a human rights perspective: “We have become a party, in a very real
sense, to attacks on civilians that approach genocidal proportions because we are enforcing an
embargo that prevents Bosnians from defending themselves … then if we can be said to have
contributed to that genocide.”189 Perle did not hold an official title in the Bush I administration,
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but he was an important insider-outsider, an influential fellow traveler of neo-conservatives such
as Douglas Feith, Wolfowitz, and Krystol. Significantly, Perle held both the EC and UN in
disdain.190 The paradigm shift the neo-conservatives preferred was clearly based on unilateralism
and U.S. hegemony. Gibbs argues that a “closely related” strategic policy goal was to define a
new role for NATO as “a key instrument of U.S. hegemony.”191 Hence, Yugoslavia became the
theatre where the United States and EU could put their capabilities and power into action.192
4.How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or
nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an
administration and from one presidency to the next?
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote in his memoirs, “When ancient ethnic
rivalries reignited in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 and well-meaning Americans thought we
should ‘do something’ in Bosnia, the shattered bodies of the Marines at Beirut airport [in 1983]
were never far from my mind in arguing for caution.”193 General Colin Powell’s cautious
position was pilloried as a “no-can-do” attitude by a New York Times editorial.194 In an op-ed
piece published in the Times, Powell wrote that successful policy outcomes derived from a clearcut set of objectives, as in the Persian Gulf War and Panama, but when the goals were “murky or
nonexistent,” the result was “disaster.”195 The Vietnam Syndrome is clearly operating in
Powell’s thought. The Powell Doctrine offers only one answer: “We do deserts; we don’t do
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mountains.”196 However, another viewpoint is that the Powell Doctrine has more to do with how
to use force rather than whether to use force.197

Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney was another key player in the Bush I
administration who may have feared entrapment in a Balkan quagmire. Cheney came out firmly
against participation of U.S. combat personnel in UNPROFOR in April 1992.198
An intriguing question is how differently Bush I or any other administration would have
perceived the crisis in Bosnia in an environment of bipolarity. The competition between
superpowers might have attracted U.S. attention as an opportunity to undermine the rival Soviet
Union’s influence in southeastern Europe. After the Cold War, the Balkan crisis did not seem to
hold a compelling interest for the United States.

I.

International, systemic, or structural factors:

United States military intervention decisions appear linked to “perceived pressure” due to
U.S. “membership in international organizations,” such as UN and NATO.199 We will try to
avoid conflating what came later under Clinton’s watch with Bush I’s “no-go” decision.
However, considering the splintering of Yugoslavia occurred in the moment of the emergent
unipolar hegemony of the United States, one might assume the sole superpower would have had
complete freedom of action. However, the United States could not act in a vacuum. UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, reporting in 1999 on the Srebrenica massacre, warned that “the
tragedy will haunt our history forever. A deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize, expel, or
196
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murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary means and with the political
will to carry the policy through to its logical conclusion.” Given that his commentary benefitted
from hindsight following the Bosnian bloodbath and other unintended consequences, Annan
implied the major responsibility for providing “political will” rested with the United States.200
Nevertheless, the UN’s institutional impotence comes into play. In the words of one analyst, the
United Nations Security Council “experimented with almost every available form of coercion
short of war.”201 The unsuccessful UNPROFOR military operation “only pushed the
international community deeper into the quagmire.”202 UNPROFR’s mission was intended to be
neutral, but even the Secretary General recognized the combination of peacekeeping and
enforcement of UN resolutions contradicted such objectivity.203 Also, coordinated international
reaction time is slow; four years passed between the introduction of UN peacekeepers in 1991
and commencement of NATO’s bombing campaign in 1995.204
In November 1991, NATO heads of state and government addressed the Yugoslav crisis
and issued a statement calling for “peaceful resolution,” “self-determination,” and the “prospect
of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it.”205 A year later, speaking
collectively, the NATO alliance partners were “profoundly disturbed by the deteriorating
situation … [which is a] serious threat to international peace, security, and stability … [and] the
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present leadership of Serbia and of the Bosnian Serbs … [is responsible for] terrible gains by
force and engaging gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.”206
According to Ambassador Zimmerman, Secretary Baker’s failure to stop Slovenia’s and
Croatia’s declarations of independence “cooled Western European ardor … for propelling the
United States into the deepening crisis.”207 In the spring of 1991, Baker was more frustrated by
Macedonia, where Greece, a NATO partner, placed major roadblocks for cultural and historical
reasons.208 Throughout 1992, the government of Slobodan Milosevic contended that Serbia had
nothing to do with Bosnia-Herzegovina, meaning Bosnian Serbs were operating on their own
initiative, outside of Yugoslavian control. As reports of horrific violence reached Washington,
the Secretary of State worked toward expelling “Yugoslavia” (in effect, Serbia and Montenegro)
from the United Nations.209 Baker saw fatal shortcomings in Western coordination, the EC was
incapable of reaching consensus or unanimity, and ancient relationships (for example, Croatia
with Germany and Italy, Serbia with France and Britain) allowed the Balkan factions to play off
the Western allies against each other.210 Another reservation was expressed by the most reliable
U.S. ally. British Prime Minister John Major asked, “Once in, where does it end.”211 Bush,
Baker, and Scowcroft shared similar skepticism regarding an exit strategy.
However, the Balkan crisis of the early 1990s was characterized by a lack of consistency
and coherence among the United States and the Western European allies. As late as May 1991,
the United States tried to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia by withholding trade and aid,
whereas the European Community offered additional aid and trade as a reward for unity. Of
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course, neither approach prevented Slovenia and Croatia from breaking away. The EC withdrew
economic and financial assistance in June 1991 when Serb (Yugoslav) troops used force against
Slovenia. From July to December 1991, the United States joined the EC to impose aid and trade
sanctions, followed by the UN at the end of the year. The U.S., UN, NATO, and EC tightened
sanctions as the Serb-Bosniak war worsened and only after November 1992 did the sanctions
reach the level of “classic embargo” as a diplomatic weapon.212
Why did the United States and the Western allies opt for sanctions? Simply, according to
a commonsense rationale, they were loathe to use force. At the same time, the logic of the
alliance’s policy led to identifying Serbs and Bosnian Serbs as aggressors if Serbia used military
force to prevent Slovenian, Croatian, and Bosnian secession. As the breakup of Yugoslavia
devolved into civil war and genocide, the UN, EC, and NATO as institutions ran the risk of
appearing ineffectual if their collective efforts failed.213 Moreover, the United States had to prove
its leadership was not only still needed, but even credible.214

To say diplomacy failed in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a gross
understatement. The European Community held a peace conference in February 1992 and
charged Lord Peter Carrington, former British Foreign Secretary and NATO Secretary General,
and Portuguese Ambassador José Cutileiro with drafting a peace plan for Bosnia. The result was
a proposal for a decentralized confederation, whereby local communities would be designated as
Muslim, Serb, or Croat. All three warring factions signed the agreement in March 1992, but the
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Bosnian Muslims reneged just ten days later.215 Carrington was replaced as EC representative by
David Owen, a fellow former Foreign Secretary, and he collaborated with UN Special Envoy
Cyrus Vance on a new plan. The Vance-Owen plan divided Bosnia into ten ethno-regional
“cantons” and was announced in January 1993.216 This time it was the Bosnian Serbs who
rejected the proposed settlement in May 1993, following a referendum in which Bosnian Serbs
lopsidedly voted down the plan.217 Vance had already resigned in April and Owen declared the
Vance-Owen peace plan “dead” in June, by which time the Serb and Croat “ethnic cleansing”
had proceeded apace, rendering the previous ethno-geographic map irrelevant.218

II.

National, domestic, or internal political:
A powerful stimulus to intervention is “perceived domestic pressure.”219 There seems not

to have been much interest in Bosnia or Yugoslavia on the part of the American public, from
1990 to 1992. To the extent the American public followed events in the disintegrating former
Yugoslavia, the predominant theme in Western news media was the victimization of the Bosniak
population and the portrayal of the crisis as a genocidal anti-Muslim campaign that invited
eventual U.S. or multilateral intervention to save the lives of Bosnian Muslims.220 A further
proposition is that the elite media, particularly the New York Times and Washington Post may
have influenced public opinion and hence policy makers by framing the Bosnian crisis in terms
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of both humanitarianism and security interests.221 The so-called “CNN effect” played a crucial
role in the way the Bosnian drama played out. International dialogue was stimulated by televised
coverage of Serb atrocities as U.S. and European public opinion pushed the Western allies in the
direction of support for the NATO air strikes and establishing an International War Crimes
Tribunal.222

The Bush I administration’s non-intervention decision for Bosnia was in line with the
current mood of public opinion. Some observers saw a re-emerging isolationism, while others
asserted the American public would support interventions if the United States went in to win,
with clearly defined goals, and avoided getting bogged down in other countries’ politics.223
Although the initial “no-go” decision preceded Panama, the Persian Gulf War, and Somalia,
where the Bush I administration sent peacekeepers in December 1992, a certain level of
intervention fatigue might have set in.224

Since August 1992, when George H. W. Bush was in office, most polls showed a
majority, plurality, or relatively even split in approval of the president’s handling of the Bosnia
situation. Specifically, an NBC poll conducted in Bush I’s last month in power showed only 34%
of respondents supported “the United States sending troops to Yugoslavia to try to help stop the
civil war there,” while 54% opposed and 12% didn’t know.225
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Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina may have foundered on the banks of a hostile
Democratic Congress if proposed by Republican Bush in the politicized election season of 1992.
While expressing support for humanitarian interventions, Congress failed to appropriate money
for UN peacekeeping in the Defense Department (DOD) budget and attached a series of concerns
and stipulations to funds for peacekeeping operations supported by the State Department budget
for FY 1993.226 The reservations expressed by mostly unfriendly Democratic members of
Congress suggested a combination of intervention fatigue and skepticism about the value of
peacekeeping in general.227 Initially, there was expressed and implied resistance to U.S.
involvement in the failing state. One prominent Democratic leader on foreign policy in the U.S.
Senate, Joe Biden, supported the “lift and strike” idea. Candidate Bill Clinton adopted the idea
after previously opposing it, as a policy alternative to Bush I in the presidential campaign.228
Democratic leader George Mitchell and Republican leader Bob Dole endorsed the Bush I
administration’s support for NATO airstrikes, but could not persuade a majority of the Senate.
Resistance was led by Democrats such as Patrick Leahy and Republicans such as John McCain,
who insisted the NATO mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina had “no clear-cut military objectives.”229
In the Bush I White House, Baker, Scowcroft, and Eagleburger concluded intrastate war
in Yugoslavia was unavoidable. Nevertheless, they were unconvinced as to what part the United
States should take to influence events there. “Once in, where does it end?” was the way British
Prime Minister John Major put it.230 Baker worried the American public would balk at sending
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combat troops, “particularly having just fought another major war—this one in the Gulf.”231 As a
result, the President was sanguine about the European allies shouldering the responsibility.
Simply put by Baker, “our vital interests were not at stake.”232 Moreover, the level of threat
posed by Milosevic’s Serbian irredentism and military capability were adjudged lesser than those
of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Additionally, Secretary Baker alluded to the U.S. need to be
“engaged” in a redefined relationship with Europe. While Baker and Bush were of one mind in
that it was time for the Europeans to show they were capable of leadership, a “diminished U.S.
role” was not in America’s interests.233

III.

Individual, personal, and ideological factors:
Top decision makers in the Bush I administration used a “story model” mode of problem

representation in “armed humanitarian intervention” in Bosnia, according to Peterson.234 In
addition, international crises invite the tendency on behalf of elite decision makers to demonize
one actor or groups in those conflict situations.”235 In the Bosnian crisis, the villain of choice was
Milosevic.236 The problem with such demonization as a policy motivator or propaganda tool for
rallying public opinion is the obvious extension to a logical resolution: if this leader is the
problem, then get rid of him. Instead, the villain Milosevic was his state’s negotiator and
signatory of the subsequent Dayton peace accords.

The conventional wisdom is that the former Yugoslavia splintered after 1989 because of
age-old ethnic rivalries, cosmetically plastered over during the long reign of Josef Broz Tito.
Richard Holbrooke, former Assistant Secretary of State, disagreed. Holbrooke stated,
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“Yugoslavia’s tragedy was not foreordained. It was the product of bad, even criminal political
leaders …”237 Secretary of State James Baker said, “It seems to me that the U.S. can lead without
having to fight its fourth war in history, in this century, on the ground in Europe.”238 Baker was a
key player and Bush trusted his judgment; therefore, it is important to understand why he was so
cautious on Bosnia. Consensus or unity among the NATO allies, promotion of democracy, a
peaceful resolution of the conflict, and a firm belief that American public opinion would not
stand for the use of combat troops in the Balkans were Baker’s priorities or decisional guidelines.

The first priority of Western unity or consensus “came for naught,” as Baker himself
phrased it, when Germany recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia in December
1991 and the European Community did likewise in January 1992. Thus, U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the secessionist republics and support for an intact state was marginalized and
irrelevant.239 The key point became moot by the time of the independence referendum in BosniaHerzegovina in March 1992, when Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles sketched out five
policy options for the Bush I decision makers and each one assumed recognition of Bosnian
independence.240 Ambassador Zimmerman hoped U.S. recognition of Bosnia would deter
Serbian aggression.241 In Washington, Eagleburger warned against a “halfway policy” of
granting recognition to Slovenia and Croatia, but not recognizing Bosnia or Macedonia,
especially since the latter two states were considered more democratically inclined. Eagleburger

237

Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 322.
Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 478-479.
239
Ibid., pp. 638-639.
240
Ibid., p. 640.
241
Ibid., p. 641.

238

62

convinced Baker; UN envoy Cyrus Vance and EC envoy Lord Carrington also agreed Bosnian
recognition was necessary.242

We can assert with some confidence that another administration would have decided
differently from the Bush I team, since the successor Clinton administration eventually did so.
The presence on the Clinton team of key players, such as Secretary of State Warren Christopher,
National Security Adviser Lake, UN Ambassador Albright, Chairman Shalikashvili, and
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, constituted an assembled cast infused with an ideology of
messianic democracy, American exceptionalism, and the United States being the “indispensable
nation.” By contrast, the top Bush I aides—Baker, Eagleburger, and Scowcroft—shared the
President’s more cautious and traditionally realist worldview. Lieutenant General Brent
Scowcroft was the President’s alter ego in foreign policy. Scowcroft’s diplomacy has been
labeled “conservative realism,” but his conservatism was less ideological than simply
cautious.243 In his words, quoting John Quincy Adams, “We are the well-wishers of all who seek
freedom. We are the guarantors only of our own.”244 Thus, the Bush I administration’s guiding
viewpoint was quite distinct from the liberal idealism of its successor.

IV.

Criteria for the use of force:

Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 satisfied none of the criteria of the Powell
Doctrine. Von Hippel identifies three critical issues pertinent to Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early
1990s. First, military intervention and use of force; second, peace support operations; and third,
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nation-building.245 If any one of these factors were to fail, the mission would fail. Additionally,
Von Hippel informs us that inconsistent policy precedes intervention.246 The sources indicate
repeated U.S. warnings were delivered personally, publically, or through diplomats to Milosevic,
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, and other principals.247 Despite sincere and honest
intentions, these warnings had little effect on events or actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
therefore it is hard to give praise to Bush I’s efforts in this case.
According to Secretary of State Baker, critical U.S. interests in the Balkans were
“peaceful settlement,” human rights, political power sharing among the ethnic communities, and
the provision of economic assistance directed toward nurturing a free-market regional
economy.248 The more experienced Balkan hands in the Bush I White House were Eagleburger
and Scowcroft and their view was pessimistic about any prospect of the United States, United
Nations, or NATO influencing or redirecting events in Bosnia-Herzegovina.249
First, there were no vital interests or direct threats in play in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
contrast to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis.250 Second, nonmilitary options were being explored and the
Bush I team was perfectly happy to let the European Union take the leading role in the
Balkans.251 Moreover, the European governments participating in the peacekeeping operations in
the former Yugoslavia preferred a diplomatic settlement to an all-out ground war.252 Third, the
calls for the United States to “do something” in Bosnia were not necessarily backed up by an
expectation of a sufficient commitment of money and manpower. As understood by Powell, any

245

Von Hippel, Democracy by Force, p. 168.
Ibid., p. 169.
247
See Baker, op.cit., Zimmerman, op. cit., and Clarke, op.cit. Note Bush and Scowcroft’s collaboration does not
discuss Yugoslavia.
248
Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 480.
249
Ibid., p. 635
250
Ibid., p. 636.
251
Ibid.
252
Powell, My American Journey, p. 576
246

64

action in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be “limited.” Here Powell reflected the military’s
institutional memory of Vietnam; a limited war spelled disaster.253 Powell further recalled the ill
defined objectives in the Lebanon peacekeeping mission that climaxed in more than two hundred
“shattered bodies” of U.S. Marines in 1983 whenever he heard the “well meaning” urgings to
intervene in such bloody scenarios.254 Fourth, the strategic options were (1) air strikes around
Sarajevo, (2) more widespread bombing of Serbian targets throughout the area, and (3) troops in
ground combat.255 Powell’s opinion was that only the latter option could force the Serbians to
quit in the absence of any other clear-cut objectives. The only preferable outcome seems to have
been simply to stop the fighting. The Pentagon had little faith in the “lift and strike” strategy,
proposed in early 1993, whereby the arms embargo against supplying the Bosniaks would be
lifted to allow them to defend themselves in concert with “surgical” air strikes against Serb
defensive and infrastructure targets. This is exactly the approach adopted by the UN and NATO
in 1994 and 1995. What transpired were effective military countermeasures by the Serbians.256 In
the end, Milosevic’s regime survived to broker a win at the negotiating table.

SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
In subsequent years, the Clinton administration, led by National Security Adviser
Anthony Lake and United Nations Ambassador Madeleine Albright, argued that the United
States should lift the UN arms embargo and initiate air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions.
Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dismissed the “lift and strike” option,
whereas Britain and France argued that their peacekeeping troops on the ground would be targets
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of Serb retaliation.257 Initially, despite the worst fighting in Europe in half a century, the Clinton
administration continued the Bush I administration’s non-intervention policy until August 1995,
when reports of the heinous slaughter of Muslim civilians in Srebrenica and five days of NATO
bombing of Serbian targets brought the warring factions to the negotiations in Dayton, Ohio.
Ultimately, U.S. troops participated in NATO peacekeeping in Bosnia, starting in 1995.
In response to pressure from members of Congress, President Bill Clinton announced U.S. forces
would be there for only a year, but those troops were still in place during the 2000 presidential
campaign when George W. Bush and his advisers suggested the Balkans should be policed by
Europeans.258
Ambassador Zimmerman speaks of the EC’s “irresponsibility” and U.S. “passivity” in
the Yugoslav crises.259 Ultimately, he asked rhetorically, who killed Yugoslavia? Zimmerman
identifies Slobodan Milosevic’s repression of Bosnia as the decisive factor, ironically aimed at
unity.260 Thus, U.S. policy was just plain ineffective due to the disinclination of key players in
the Bush I administration to see any gain from deeper involvement (Category 3, individual
factors). The President, Secretaries of State and Defense, National Security Adviser, and
chairman of the Joint Chiefs held diverse but equally pessimistic views on the Bosnian case.
Hence, Bush I left Bosnia as a mess for Clinton’s administration to clean up.
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CHAPTER 4
CLINTON: RWANDA—NO-GO

INTRODUCTION
Rwanda, called Mille Collines (“Land of a Thousand Hills”), is renowned for its beauty,
its temperate climate, and its most lucrative exports, coffee and tea. However, Rwanda is
landlocked, densely populated with few natural resources and minimal industry, and most of its
people rely on subsistence agriculture to live. In 1990 the predominantly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) began a civil war against the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda. The 1994
genocide took an estimated 800,000 lives, and destroyed the country’s economy, governance,
and social fabric.261
A variety of factors contributed to Clinton’s “no-go” decision in Rwanda. Internationally,
the civil warfare seemed all too commonplace in Africa and was not considered even as
troublesome as the situation in neighboring Burundi (see Category I). Unlike European or
Middle Eastern crises, African affairs lack a domestic interest-group constituency and fail to stir
the public’s attention (see Category II). The decision-making hierarchy did not respond to the
questions raise by middle-level personnel and the policy makers tended to follow a pattern of
“cognitive closure,” blindly adhering to a preferred policy line until reality undermined its logic
(see Category III). Lastly, there was no consensus on a military strategy that could accomplish
261
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the goals of preventing or stopping the genocide and ending the civil war. The operational plan
proposed by the United States only sheltered refugees in camps, whereas the United Nations
commander in the field sought sufficient force to bring the violence to an end (see Category IV).
1.Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by
definition), where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act?
The 1994 genocide was not a spontaneous uprising, but rather a calculated and systematic
program of violence carried out by Hutu government and military officials against Tutsis and
moderate Hutus.262 Evident in most accounts is a tendency to paint events in simplistic goodguy/bad-guy terms. To the contrary, the final stages of bloodshed witnessed a number of
innocent Hutus killed by Tutsi rebels in retaliation. Moreover, the ethnic civil war was neither
inevitable nor unavoidable, as pointed out by the commander of the United Nations
peacekeeping mission, Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire of Canada.263 On April 28, 1994, the
nongovernmental charity organization, Oxfam, publically confirmed that a genocide of an
estimated half million Tutsis was occurring in Rwanda.264 The tripwire had been set off three
weeks earlier, on April 6, 1994, as Rwanda’s President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundi’s
President Cyprien Ntaryamira were assassinated when their plane was shot down. Habyarimana
and Ntaryamira were both Hutu. To illustrate the confusing ethnic politics of the two former
Belgian colonies, Burundi had recently replaced a Tutsi military dictatorship with a
democratically elected Hutu regime, whereas insurgent Tutsi forces aimed at overthrowing a
Hutu government in Rwanda. A matter of hours following the dual assassination, armed
Rwandan soldiers and Hutu militia targeted supporters of a brokered peace settlement (the
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Arusha accord), most prominently Rwanda’s female prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana,265
and within twenty-four hours “carefully planned” killings of targeted lists of victims began.266
According to Samantha Power, the “fastest, most efficient killing spree of the 20th century” took
800,000 lives in 100 days (from April 4 to July 14, 1994) and the “United States did almost
nothing.” 267
Traditional U.S. security interests were not involved in Rwanda.268 The Pentagon saw
Rwanda as another “Somalia waiting to happen”269 (see further discussion below). The U.S.
State Department speculated the Rwandan “succession question will be difficult … the military
intended to take over power temporarily.”270 Even after it became evident that the situation was
more serious than a military coup, the “muted response” of the Clinton administration avoided
the word “genocide” to sidestep the perception that the United States was refusing to send troops
on a humanitarian mission.271 Arguably, the United States had a legal obligation if genocide were
occurring. As policy analyst Milton Leitenberg contends, “the world’s indifference allowed mass
murder.” There were 1,200 UN peacekeepers in the country before the slaughter began, but the
United Nations’ response was to withdraw, as participating governments shied away from a
combat operation.272 Brookings fellow Bruce Jones holds that the United States, United Nations,
and world community erroneously and wishfully believed the situation in Rwanda could be
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easily solved because the two sides would quickly agree to a ceasefire in advance of a brokered
settlement.273

At the State Department, the Rwanda desk officer, Kevin Aiston, was the first to learn of
the presidents’ plane being shot down. The UN peacekeeping mission’s command confirmed the
reports within an hour. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Prudence
Bushnell drafted an urgent memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Bushnell was
concerned about violence breaking out in both Burundi and Rwanda. She wrote, “Our strategy is
to appeal for calm in both countries, both through public statements and in other ways.” Bushnell
later acknowledged she never received a response from Christopher.274

How was the Rwandan crisis viewed from Washington in 1994? According to George
Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, “It’s ironic, in a way, that the
preoccupation at the time in that part of the continent was not Rwanda; it was Burundi … I think
it’s important to understand there were a lot of other things going on at the time …” 275 Moose
adds, however, the United States was committed to a diplomatic settlement as demonstrated by
his personal meeting with RPF rebel leader Paul Kagame just one day before the presidents’
deaths.276 Power reports Romeo Dallaire began to employ the term “ethnic cleansing,” which had
become part of the popular lexicon due to events in the former Yugoslavia, at this point hesitant
to say “genocide” until he literally looked up the appropriate conventions and definitions in
international law. By April 30, the UN commander labeled the calculated killings “genocide”
and in so doing ought to have elevated the Rwandan conflict to the highest level of U.S. and
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international concern.277 Washington’s view had been that Rwanda was just one of several
African trouble spots, not meriting special attention other than continuing diplomatic efforts.

2.Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage?
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake notes: “I wish I could say [Rwanda] had even
become an abstraction. I think the problem here for me, for the president, for most of us at senior
levels, was that it never became a serious issue. We were focusing on the edges of the problem.
We were focusing on what we could do, for example, in putting on the radio the names of some
of those who were responsible for the killings in an effort to diminish it. We were concentrating
on getting a peace process going, which became, in my view, a diversion from dealing with the
underlying problems. We were focusing on and made a proposal on how to deal with some of the
refugees and those most at risk.”278

Rwanda and Burundi were barely blips on the Bush I administration’s radar, apart from
perfunctory support for diplomacy and paying the U.S. portion (33%) of the UN’s peacekeeping
tab. Once the reality of genocide in Rwanda was confirmed, however, President Clinton and his
chief advisers seem to have been at a loss as to what to do. Power’s straightforward analysis for
the Clinton administration’s lack of attention and concern is that acknowledging genocide by
name would compel action by the United States as a permanent member of the UN Security
Council and signatory of the 1948 Genocide Convention.279 Washington’s paralysis was due to
an apparent desire to avoid being obliged to take action. Halberstam’s journalistic explanation
proceeds thusly: “In the United States, in the months right after Somalia, a deliberate attempt
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was made to suppress the issue [of genocide in Rwanda] at the higher level so that the president
would not be seen rejecting any option that included sending troops on an errand of mercy. Even
the word genocide was to be muted in all public discussions …”280

In hindsight, a major military mission by the United Nations or United States might have
saved only a few of those killed, depending on how quickly the forces moved.281 According to
Lake, “But we never came to grips with what in retrospect should have been a central issue—do
we do much more to insist that the international community intervene and go out and find the
troops that are necessary, or even contemplate an American intervention itself? That issue just
never arose.”282 Following the genocide, the United States supported creation of an international
tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the Rwandan genocide.283 Power writes, “American
officials did not conspire to allow genocide, yet they ignored the warnings and the massacre
itself. Competing and conflicting U.S. interests led to inaction despite U.S. ideals.”284 However,
what those “conflicting” interests were is unclear, besides an inability to recognize the severity
of the Rwandan crisis, a resistance to direct involvement in Rwanda in particular, and a
reluctance to participate in peacekeeping missions in general as a result of the recent Mogadishu,
Somalia fiasco. The record indicates the Clinton administration ignored warnings, refused to
commit combat forces, and referred to defunct peace negotiations as if they were viable.285 The
Clinton administration “rarely condemned the slaughter” and failed to take other simple actions,
such as jamming Hutu agitation and propaganda via Radio Mille Collines or expelling Rwanda’s
UN ambassador. Instead of a policy directed at ending the conflict, the Clinton White House
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called for UN peacekeepers to pull out without reinforcements, even though there were U.S. and
French troops available in the region.286 The United States dispatched Prudence Bushnell and
Arlene Render, Director of the Central African Office at the State Department, to Rwanda in late
March 1994, prior to the outbreak of the genocide.287 Bushnell met with President Habyarimana
and RPF General Kagame, but no apparent progress resulted.288 Regardless, any understandings
reached were moot, since the Hutu president would be dead and the Tutsi rebel leader would face
a horrific new reality in a matter of days.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Bushnell later talked of “theatre” at her meetings with
Rwandan military and government personnel, who claimed fidelity to the Arusha peace process
while, in all likelihood, drawing up lists of enemies to be killed.289 Bushnell recollected, “We
had put hope in the Arusha peace process. That was our winning horse … but I think there were
fifteen peacekeeping endeavors going on around the world, five of which were in Africa … After
the Somalia debacle, we didn't want to put money in something that was not going to be a
success, both politically for President Clinton, and for the United States and the UN as a
whole.”290 What Clinton and Christopher were thinking and hearing is not altogether clear from
their memoirs. A reasonable assumption would be that the Secretary of State drove the policy.
As Christopher put it himself, Clinton’s management style was: “To lay guidelines, then give
broad authority to implement them. He wants to know what’s going on but not micromanage.”291

Bushnell explained U.S. policy was influenced by the Rwandans’ apparently sincere
interest in the Arusha accord and the expressed desire of the UN Security Council, led by France,
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for the diplomatic process to be successful.292 Bushnell explained, “Tony Lake had a keen
interest in Africa, and so there was not significant push back from the White House, as long as it
met the criteria for a successful peacekeeping operation …”293 Lake later spoke about this: “I’m
hardly an African expert, and I did not know a whole lot about what was going on in Rwanda. I
should have insisted that I knew …”294 Bushnell concedes U.S. policy makers overestimated the
efficacy of peacekeeping, negotiation, and a transitional government followed by democratic
elections. United States policy priorities were divided on African issues, according to Bushnell,
whereby Rwanda was only one issue of conflict competing for policy makers’ attention.295 The
Deputy Assistant Secretary’s trip to Rwanda was intended to cajole the opposing factions to iron
out their differences and set up a transitional government. Bushnell noted only minor issues and
the Tutsi RPF seemed to think they could be easily negotiated. She told Rwandan President
Habyarimana, “this chapter of Rwandan history has your name in it. It can be a chapter of great
glory, or it can be a chapter of great tragedy.”296 Ironically, Bushnell received a posthumous
letter from Habyarimana: “I’m really sorry I didn’t implement the peace accords, but I’m going
to do it.” Habyarimana could not deliver on his promise because he was dead.297 Bushnell also
met with Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the UN special representative, other diplomats in the
country, RPF representatives, and Rwandan officials. However, the Hutu government was
French-speaking, the Tutsi RPF was English-speaking, and neither the American Bushnell nor
the Cameroonian Booh-Booh spoke the indigenous language, Kinyarwanda.298 The meeting
became a futile diplomatic minuet, an unfortunate distraction on the eve of the genocide. The
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U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, expressed concern that there were lists of people
targeted on both sides. The killing started within days of Prudence Bushnell’s departure from
Rwanda. The hope was an interim government would be capable of stopping these killings.
Bushnell admits such hope was “naïve,” but American diplomatic personnel in Rwanda were
heavily invested in the Arusha accords, and added, “once you become energized with one
solution, it’s very, very hard to let go and even consider something else.”299 Lebow informs us
about the phenomenon of “cognitive closure,” a kind of gross simplification of problem
representation where individuals remained committed to an action plan, even after it ceased to
make sense.300 Moreover, Bushnell acknowledges, “the greater concern at that time was in
Burundi, right next door, where I was also heading, and where there [was] killing on a larger
scale going on …”301 Bushnell’s take on the situation before the violence commenced only
seemed naïve in hindsight.

Hence, when Rwanda’s bloody apocalypse unfolded, the priority in Washington was the
evacuation of American diplomats and civilians from the country. According to Bushnell, the
order to evacuate Kigali came from the Secretary of State, not President Clinton, despite
protestations from the UN commander not to abandon innocents in the face of slaughter. Unless
the United States and other countries left a few people behind, Dallaire believed they had no risk
at stake in the Rwandan situation.302 This is an intriguing proposition, since there is a tradition in
American diplomacy for the ambassador to stay behind, such as James Madison in Paris during
the Reign of Terror in 1792 and William Bullitt in Paris after the fall of France in 1940.
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A task force in Washington directed the successful evacuation and the Secretary,
President, and First Lady personally visited the State Department to thank the staff for their
efforts, according to Bushnell.303 Thus, President Bill Clinton’s sole concern was getting U.S.
citizens out of harm’s way. There was no additional deployment of troops, even though there
were 300 U.S. Marines in Burundi.304 As 4,000 Americans and other foreigners were flown out
of Rwanda, some 200,000 Rwandans died in a three-day period.305 Marines carried out a one-day
rescue operation in Kigali and observed large-scale killings,306 and the Defense Intelligence
Agency reported: “organized parallel effort of genocide.”307 Therefore, the U.S. failure to
respond to the palaver, rather than just rescuing one’s own people, was not owing to a lack of
information. However, the slaughter of 200,000 Rwandans occurred in three days (April 1994),
which did not allow time to organize any sort of larger operation. Thus, saving U.S. personnel
became almost axiomatic (i.e., self-evident) in such a situation.
3.How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or
management style) have a determinative effect?
In January 1994, an intelligence analyst predicted 500,000 Rwandans would be killed in
“the worst-case scenario.”308 Earlier, in October 1993, the United States refused to deploy troops
in the UN peacekeeping mission and approved paying for 2,500 peacekeepers, half the number
Dallaire wanted.309 Prudence Bushnell wrote a memorandum to Secretary Warren Christopher
regarding the violence in both Rwanda and Burundi.310 Lieutenant General Wesley Clark,
director of strategic policy and planning for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confessed to being
303
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unschooled in the “ethnic dimensions” of Rwanda, which he described as “marginal” at the
time.311 Presidential Decision Directive 25, (PDD-25), authored by Richard C. Clarke of the
National Security Council, May 3, 1994, set conditions amounting to low-risk peacekeeping.
Member of Congress David Obey said PDD-25 laid out “zero degree of involvement, zero
degree of risk, and zero degree of pain and confusion.”312 According to Clarke, however,
“peacekeeping was almost dead.” Thus, the minimalist approach saved the peacekeeping concept
in Clarke’s view. Regardless of the lack of U.S. participation in the UN mission, when Romeo
Dallaire was in New York at United Nations headquarters for three weeks in March 1994, the
State Department’s attitude was that the United States ought to withdraw its support if no
progress were made toward a transitional government.313 This was before the killing began and
hence should not be confused with a misdirection of policy in the midst of the one hundred days
of slaughter.

Susan Rice was director for international organization and peacekeeping and worked for
Clarke, as coordinator of the NSC’s counterterrorism group, when the Rwandan genocide broke
out in April 1994. UN Ambassador Madeline K. Albright “was instructed,” presumably by
Christopher or Clinton, to support withdrawal of UN peacekeepers. Albright wanted an
alternative proposal and asked NSC to come up with something. However, Rice and Clarke did
not argue against withdrawal. “Observers recall blowout fights.” Rice asked, what if the U.S.
used the “g-word” and did nothing?314 Rice visited Rwanda after the killing season and regretted
that U.S. policy steered clear of taking action. “What we did most wrong in the U.S. government
was that we never even actively considered or debated whether we should do anything to stop the
311
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genocide … [i.e.,] intervention … But we never debated it … and it wasn’t debated in
Congress.”315 By intervention she meant combat troops on the ground, but that option was not on
the table.
Prudence Bushnell’s Rwanda task force at State was “implementing a policy of nonintervention.” The task force discussed ideas such as encouraging journalists to shoot video in
Kigali in the hope that the militia commandos were not so shameless as to carry out the genocide
on camera. Yet any commitment of U.S. government resources required senior-level approval.
According to Bushnell’s account, she never considered appealing to Warren Christopher, much
less pressuring him to change the U.S. policy commitment.316 In his memoir, Christopher states
(somewhat clinically) that “depleted resources and swollen population exacerbated the political
and economic pressures.”317 Unfortunately, the solution was not to restate the problem. Bushnell
confessed to being captive to the bureaucratic culture. She and Assistant Secretary George
Moose briefed the Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, “but we are a
very hierarchical organization … Somebody of a deputy assistant secretary level doesn’t get on
the telephone to [give] her opinion to the Secretary of State or the Director of the NSC,
especially since we knew they were getting information.”318 Certainly in retrospect, Bushnell
expressed regret at her inability to take a risk and tell her superiors their course of action was
wrong.”319

Joyce Leader, the second-in-command at the U.S. embassy in Kigali, said, “the general
tenor in Washington was not favorable to large peacekeeping operations.” Clinton’s crisis
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managers were not only hostile to U.S. participation in peacekeeping, but also to any large-scale
operation in Rwanda. This viewpoint hardened after eighteen Army Rangers were killed in
Mogadishu, just six months earlier, despite insistence by Leader and David Rawson that a
strongly supported peacekeeping mission was vital to the success of the Arusha accord, the
diplomatic track the U.S. had committed to support.320 Moose, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs, recalled the discussion was about how large a force was needed, financial cost, and how
to sell a Rwandan mission to a skeptical Congress. The error of U.S. policy was not
understanding the motivations and objectives of the Hutu extremists. Initially, there was little
enthusiasm for getting between the Hutu and Tutsi rival forces. Subsequently, Moose concluded,
“I think frankly that our major mistakes were the mistakes we made before it started … I think
we were severely limited in what we could have done to actually prevent this from going the way
it went.”321 If we consider bureaucratic politics, the culture didn’t allow for dissonant
information to alter policy and an array of available options, such as a rapid deployment force in
Africa, simply did not exist.

4.How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or
nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an
administration and from one presidency to the next?
Rwanda suffered from bad karma due to Haiti and Somalia, since the Clinton
administration adjudged those cases as policy failures they were loath to repeat.322 In the case of
Somalia, beginning in August 1993, U.S. Army Rangers attempted to capture Mohammed Farah
Aideed for attacking UN peacekeepers; Aideed eluded capture for months, set a trap for the U.S.
peacekeepers, and ultimately killed eighteen troops in the well-known incident at Mogadishu
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(October 3-4, 1993).323 In addition to the obvious negative lesson learned by the loss of lives, the
“Black Hawk Down” scenario tempered the Clinton administration’s enthusiasm for
peacekeeping missions. Clinton ordered increased U.S. presence in Somalia, while informing
UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali of a six-month time limit. Bush I had sent U.S. troops,
which, according to National Security Adviser Lake, Clinton had expected to be replaced by UN
peacekeepers before the end of January 1993, but Boutros-Ghali did not want to commit to that
timetable. According to Richard Clarke, the change of mission from humanitarian aid to a
manhunt was not a presidential-driven decision, but was driven by President Clinton’s macho
dictum: “we will respond massively” to such an attack.324 George Stephanopoulos recalls the
President cursing and vowing, “When people kill us, they should be killed in greater
numbers.”325 Whereas Stephanopoulos was uncertain as to whether Clinton’s outburst was due to
frustration or conviction, the chief of staff indicated the commander-in-chief agreed with New
York Times columnist William Safire’s determination that the “new impotence” of the United
States “is the unwillingness of too many Americans to expend blood and treasure.”326 Projecting
this precept to Rwanda, Clinton might have concluded that what he could do and what he ought
to do were two different things. Ironically, Clinton seemed to have been afflicted by the Vietnam
Syndrome in reverse.

The dramatic events in Rwanda followed a parallel timeline as the political crises in
Somalia and Haiti.327 United States troops were prepared to enter Haiti in September 1993, but
the plan was suspended when the Haitian military regime reneged on a previously negotiated
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agreement to give up power. Only eight days after the October 3rd incident in Mogadishu,
organized protestors taunted the USS Harlan County in Port-au-Prince harbor, prompting the
U.S. Navy ship’s withdrawal.328 Hence, the Clinton administration demonstrated its hesitance
after Somalia and the emptiness of its resolve to intervene. Not without irony is the fact of the
U.S. intervention in Haiti by way of a diplomatic initiative and bloodless invasion in September
1994, following the seeming “mistake” of non-intervention in Rwanda.
In the wake of the Rwandan genocide, in William Jefferson Clinton’s own words, “I
ordered evacuation of Americans and sent troops to guarantee their safety.”329 Policy analyst
Alan Kuperman maintains that ground troops should not be deployed for humanitarian
interventions during civil wars, but cases of genocide should be an exception.330 Former
diplomat C. A. Crocker contends Clinton’s performance in Rwanda was “worthy of
criticisms.”331 Specifically, UN Ambassador Albright said the mistakes in Somalia offered the
wrong lessons for Rwanda: “Somalia counseled caution; Rwanda demanded action …”332
According to Prudence Bushnell, continuing civil strife in nearby Liberia was seen as being
much more in U.S. interest and received a good deal of attention.333 George Moose perceived
apprehension from the NSC, State Department, and Defense Department about adding Rwanda
to a growing list of ongoing peacekeeping operations, five of which were in Africa.334 Madeline
Albright conceded that only a broad-based coalition led by the United States could have
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intervened effectively in Rwanda, but the Pentagon was dead-set against any such idea.335 The
commander-in-chief said, “We were so preoccupied with Bosnia, with the memory of Somalia
just six months old and with opponents in Congress to military deployments in faraway places
not vital to our national interests that neither I nor any on my foreign policy team adequately
focused on sending troops to stop the slaughter.”336 Even as Clinton approved dispatching 4,200
U.S. troops to Rwanda and Zaire (where many Rwandan refugees fled) in July 1994, he insisted
“Mission creep is not a problem here.”337 The President clarified “the immediate and sole
purpose” of the mission was humanitarian aid and relief rather than peacekeeping.338 Therefore,
Somalia was not the model for U.S. policy toward Rwanda, but it was the lesson applied to
Rwanda.
I.International, systemic, or structural factors:
One body of opinion holds the world community’s “willful indifference” responsible for
Rwanda’s genocide.339 Michael Barnett, who worked for the U.S. Mission at the UN (19931994), contends the United States “muzzled the call to intervene” in a “cowardly act of
abandonment” at the United Nations Security Council.340 The UN Secretary General has since
claimed he “begged” the Security Council to act to intervene. Yet Barnett implies Boutros-Ghali
lied, insofar as he apparently disregarded General Dallaire’s reports of “ethnic cleansing” and
“genocide” as well as the mission commander’s plea for reinforcements.341 Madeline Albright
further contends Boutros-Ghali was “disengaged,” but never acknowledged his failure to act
effectively at the onset of the Rwandan holocaust. Additionally, secret documents reportedly
335
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implicate French President Francois Mitterand for publically supporting the Hutu government
prior to the genocide, despite his knowledge of attacks ordered against Tutsis.342 Thus, there was
plenty of blame to share.
Anthony Lake holds the sole superpower’s “perception of military omnipotence” did not
mean the United States had to use it wherever and whenever it could.343 At the same time, “the
pernicious corollary” had been the alliance partners’ unwillingness and inability to the share a
leadership role.344 According to the Arusha peace agreement, signed August 8, 1993,345 Phase 1
of the Arusha plan: the United Nations Aid Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) would monitor a
demilitarized zone and put unarmed military observation teams in place. UNAMIR Commander
Romeo Dallaire was confident of accomplishing his mission with 1,200 troops. Phase 2 called
for an added 2,500 troops over three months, and was “the most dangerous part of the mission.”
A combat battalion and an engineering company would get between the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) and Hutu-dominated Rwandan Government Forces (RGF). The warring units would
surrender their positions and the enhanced UNAMIR force would collect their weapons. Dallaire
believed the mission required “robust rules of engagement,” supported by reserve forces
overseeing the demilitarized zone. Phase 3, planned to take ten months, would be “actual
demobilization and reintegration process,” creating a National Guard from RPF, RGF, and
gendarmarie (Hutu militia) with most given pensions, retraining, and civilian jobs. Phase 4,
planned to take twelve months, would organize multiparty, democratic elections, during which
time there could be renewed violence. Dallaire’s “hope” was that his UN peacekeepers would be
relieved of their duties and replaced in phase 4. “In UN terms, the mission was to be small,
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cheap, short and sweet.”346 While future UN Secretary General Kofi Anan, who was the official
in charge of peacekeeping at the time, was sincere and honorable, he could only give limited
resources to the Rwandan mission and its order-of-battle was not to engage either side in
combat.347 However, both the United States and United Nations dismissed or ignored Dallaire’s
calls for help in the midst of the bloodbath commencing on April 6, 1994.348 According to
Power, U.S. policy weaknesses included: (1) bias toward states and negotiations; (2) “naïve
policy optimists” such as Ambassador David Rawson; (3) “blindness bred by familiarity” of
experts accustomed to violence (for example, 50,000 killed in Burundi, 1993); (4) Rawson
assessed the Rwandan civil war would be “quick”; and (5) Assistant Secretary of State George
Moose was “psychologically and imaginatively too limited.” Thus, Moose and others transmitted
the stereotyped assumption that “these people do this from time to time.”349

When the United Nations decided to send the small UNAMIR mission in late 1993,
consisting of about 1,500 troops, as in Bosnia, the exact mandate of UN peacekeepers was
unclear.350 The UN peacekeeping office, under the direction of Kofi Anan, was preoccupied with
the Balkans circa 1992-1993. In January 1994, when Dallaire faxed UN headquarters with
information from an informant that planning for mass murder was underway, the peacekeeping
office told Dallaire to bring the allegations to the Rwandan president for him to investigate.351
Madeline Albright explains those allegations competed for attention with horror stories and dire
predictions all over the planet.352
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President Clinton’s speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1993 was widely
interpreted to have said, “The UN should learn to say no,” foreshadowing Presidential Decision
Directive 25. The person closest to Clinton in worldview was Lake, who explained, “In that
speech, the president began by calling for stronger peacekeeping operations by the UN—not say
no, but learning how more effectively to say yes … If you think about it, if the UN were to
intervene in every country which has internal armed conflicts, either large scale or small scale,
and takes them over, the UN is going to become the greatest colonial power in history, which is
hardly its mandate. So you have to make choices. The choices have to be based on the degree of
need, on the one hand, and our ability, or the UN’s ability, to act practically on the other. That
became the purpose of PDD-25—not to provide answers to those questions, but to ask the
questions. That leads to, in my view, good policy. While some argue that PDD-25 said stay out
of Rwanda, the problem in Rwanda, I think largely was that we never had a coherent discussion
based on PDD-25 of whether we needed to go in or not.”353

The Clinton administration’s after-the-fact spin was contained in a telegram where the
White House recounts how the United States closed its embassy in Kigali, ordered American
personnel to go home, demanded the Rwandan government vacate office, consulted with the UN
Security Council to boot Rwanda’s ambassador, and froze Rwandan assets in the United
States.354 Romeo Dallaire said he was “dumbfounded” by Clinton’s claim that the United States
had sent $9 million in relief aid to the people of Rwanda, whereas Washington was $8 million in
arrears for UNAMIR operations.355 The lack of U.S. policy coherence is partly due to the
unfulfilled promise of the peace accord. In the view of U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda David
353
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Rawson (who was in that post 1993-1996), the Arusha accord was “fundamentally flawed”
because it was brokered by “self-appointed” factional leaders disconnected from a consensus of
popular support, and thus fell apart, just as a similar multi-party agreement failed in neighboring
Burundi.356 Hence, in hindsight, we can only wonder why Rawson, Leader, Moose, Bushnell,
and Christopher at the top put all their chips on the accord in the first place. Clearly, wishful
thinking leads to a best-case analysis when the potential costs and risks of the alternative are too
high. In the words of Albright, weeks passed before outsiders realized the scope of the genocide.
The same day the prime minister and ten Belgian peacekeepers were murdered, UN headquarters
rejected Dallaire’s request for permission to use force because UNAMIR might seem to be
choosing sides. Albright further states there was not only a lack of information, but also
confusion as to who was doing what to whom.357 To quote Albright directly, “I am struck by the
lack of information about the killing that had begun against unarmed Rwandan civilians, as
opposed to the fighting between Hutu and Tutsi militias.”358 By May 17, 1994, the Security
Council approved a resolution calling for an expanded peacekeeping operation, but the United
States was admittedly “unenthusiastic about the prospects for the mission as designed by the
UN.”359 With the United States doing little to bring coalition partners aboard, the mission was an
institutional failure for the United Nations, by its own official admission.360

One issue on which General Dallaire and Ambassador Albright concurred was the
obstructionist role played by France in the UN and NATO. French President Mitterand gave
strong support to the Hutu regime before the genocide came to light and might have been
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reluctant to reverse policy so abruptly and fully. The French approach was to impede decision
making in the UN Security Council by undermining the plan proposed by Dallaire in January,
prior to the carnage, and then again in April and May, forcing acceptance of weakly worded
resolutions, even as Albright was trying in vain to get U.S. policy off the dime. Moreover,
France was the only NATO ally with a significant, deployable military presence in Africa.

II.National, domestic, or internal political:

Factions embroiled in insurgencies are able to take advantage of opportunities created by
public debate within democracies.361 Leadership is challenged by the media and intelligentsia
opposed to brutal methods and significant casualties. Democratic actors cannot employ brutal
methods of suppression and annihilating oppositional elements.362 Therefore, interventions with
combat troops are limited by nature to exclude brutal suppression of warring factions.
Warren Christopher’s point of view on “whether to intervene for purposes that are quite
different from the traditional missions of our armed forces … While there is no magic formula to
guide such decisions, I do believe that the discrete and careful use of force in certain
circumstances … will be essential to our success in diplomacy and foreign policy.”363 Yet the
general proposition did not resonate in the specific case at hand. In terms of military
intervention, Lake offers: “it was almost literally inconceivable … I would think, especially in
the wake of Somalia, that there was no chance that the Congress would ever have authorized
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funds to send American troops into Rwanda. Indeed, we were struggling to get the funds for our
relief operations.”364

Notwithstanding Lake’s assessment, a bipartisan group from Congress went to President
Clinton in April 1994 and asked him to send troops into Rwanda to halt the slaughter. “We are
writing to express our strong support for an active United States role in helping to resolve the
crisis in Rwanda,” wrote member of Congress Robert Torricelli of New Jersey.365 Clinton
declined, saying it was the UN’s responsibility or that of the Rwandans themselves.366 The spin
the Clinton administration put on the unfolding genocide was that if they could not put a stop to
it, they would still use military transport planes for food drops.367 Clinton faced intervention
fatigue and peacekeeping skepticism, plus the fact that U.S. dues pledged to the UN were half a
billion dollars in arrears.368 The Pentagon saw no U.S. interests on the line in Rwanda. Thus,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Woods was told by the Pentagon brass: “Just make
it go away.”369 The Senate Republican leader, Bob Dole, weighed in that Rwanda held “no vital
interests.”370 Clinton’s decision-making team definitely voiced more reasons to stay out than to
go into Rwanda. There then ensued an Orwellian exercise in “bureaucratese” as Christine Shelly,
State Department spokesperson, obfuscated, “the use of the term genocide has a very precise
legal meaning, although it’s not strictly a legal determination.”371 Thus, Shelly and others were
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given specific guidance not to speak the word genocide. “I have a phraseology which has been
carefully examined and arrived at.”372

The Rwandan storyline on BBC, CNN, and NPR stressed “ancient tribal hatreds [and]
violence.”373 Would better intelligence have persuaded Clinton, Christopher, and Lake to act
more assertively to intervene? One scholar blames poor interagency communication and
bureaucratic inertia for information not reaching the top-level officials.374 Indeed, there has
emerged a decided “if-we-had-only-known” nuance in the recollections through hindsight.
Bushnell said, “I have no recollection” of Romeo Dallaire’s informant’s prediction of an
impending genocidal catastrophe in January 1994.375 Madeline Albright explains, “Even though
my instructions came from the State Department, I thought I might be able to get faster action
from the NSC … where Tony Lake’s knowledge of Africa was crucial … I first asked for more
flexible instructions, then yelled into the phone, demanded them. I was told to calm down. The
NSC would look again at what to do.”376 The result was inaction and Albright’s “deepest
regret.”377 Despite the “alarms” sounded by Dallaire and others, “Rwanda was not cited either
prominently or frequently.”378

The Clinton administration eventually sent U.S. troops, after the Tutsi RPF had stopped
the genocidal killing spree, even as another 2,000 Rwandan refugees died daily, mainly Hutus
fleeing the RPF advance. Clinton asked Congress to authorize $320 million for assistance and
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dispatched 4,000 troops to refugee camps in Zaire and 200 Marines to guard the airport in
Kigali.379 However, Congress appropriated $170 million, barely half the amount requested, and
set an October 1st cutoff date. Oblivious to 800,000 souls having perished, Ambassador David
Rawson, as quoted by Power, was still voicing commitment to the dysfunctional Arusha
accord.380

III.Individual, personal, and ideological factors:

“Is what he’s saying true? … How did this happen? … I want to get to the bottom of
this.” Despite these presidential lamentations, Samantha Power’s thesis was that Bill Clinton
showed no real inclination to stop the genocide.381 In fairness, however, as Prudence Bushnell
said, “it was so counter to the thinking of an American mind certainly, that one would [be]
behind the scenes, planning the slaughter of the people. Never mind that there was still violence,
it never crossed anybody’s mind that something on the scale of what happened would be actually
deliberately planned.”382 Some observers viewed the Rwandan cataclysm through a prism of
racism, wherein Westerners were indifferent to faceless African victims of violence.383 As we
have stated, the historical analogy for Rwanda was Somalia, not the Holocaust.384 Albright
concurs with Power on this position: “History is written backwards, not forwards.” The United
Nations Ambassador candidly states, “When the violence exploded, we tried to fit the situation in
Rwanda into the framework we had created … Tragically, the lessons we thought we had learned
in Somalia simply did not apply to Rwanda. Somalia was something close to anarchy. Rwanda
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was planned mass murder.”385 As we mentioned above, the Clinton administration was loathe to
speak the word genocide.386 Christine Shelly at State split hairs regarding “intentions,” even
while asserting an “absolute requirement … to intervene directly” did not exist.387 As actual
genocide witnessed its third week, the UN Security Council argued about the g-word, April 27,
1994. Secretary Christopher cabled U.S. diplomatic personnel to warn that if the Security
Council acknowledged the existence of genocide, the United States would be compelled to act by
virtue of the UN Charter. Given British and American pressure, the Security Council statement
published April 30th condemned “breaches of international humanitarian law,” sidestepping the
g-word.388 Christopher implicitly allowed Geraldine Ferraro, the U.S. Representative to the UN
Human Rights Commission, to use the term and Tony Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, quoted Shakespeare (“a rose by any other name”) in his report dated
May 18th. Yet the Secretary of State warned against characterization of any specific incident as
an act of genocide, or the Rwandan slaughter in total as genocide.389 Perhaps the most damning
indicator of Clinton’s lack of urgency or indifference is that there was never a high-level policy
meeting about Rwanda between April and July.390 After American diplomats and civilians were
rescued from Rwanda, there was no political cost in avoiding taking further action, since no
American lives were at stake there.391 Personally, early on in the crisis, Clinton was concerned
for the safety of a Rwandan activist whom he had met. Power quoted an anonymous official,
who observed, “Sometimes it felt as though she was the only Rwandan in danger.” When the
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woman was ushered safely into exile, the President’s personal interest was over.392 Clinton’s
inaction fit Janis and Mann’s concept of unconflicted inertia leading to defensive avoidance.393
In late July, after the genocide had effectively ceased, Clinton authorized a massive
Rwandan relief effort, including food, medicine, fresh water, and sundries. In his memoir, the
President says the effort cost $500 million and put 4,000 troops into the region (based in Uganda,
not Rwanda or Burundi). Clinton writes, “…even after all the slaughter, it would still save many
lives.”394 Regardless of U.S. intentions, the mission was humanitarian aid and rescue, not
peacekeeping or peace enforcement, and thus had no impact on the state of civil warfare that had
swept away hundreds of thousands of souls in a genocidal undertow. As the Secretary of State
recalled, “we now felt compelled to act,” but nonetheless stressed avoidance of “mission creep”
and “the shadow of Somalia loomed large over our internal planning.”395

Romeo Dallaire wrote, “Canada and other peacekeeping nations have become
accustomed to acting if, and only if, international public opinion will support them.”
Unquestionably, what the Canadian general called “moral relativism” pervaded the Clinton
administration’s thinking. “Some governments regard the use of force itself as the greatest evil.
Others define ‘good’ as the pursuit of human rights and will opt to employ force when human
rights are violated … The concept of human rights assumes that all human life is of equal value.
Risk-free warfare [emphasis added] presumes that our lives matter more than those we are
intervening to save.”396
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IV.Criteria for the use of force:
Do civil wars end without some form of foreign intervention? If not, this means the
United States will be involved sooner or later. Recent scholarship by Fotini Christia suggests the
United States ought to recognize it will eventually intervene if its strategic interests or principles
are at stake. Christia prescribes funding factions and shaping alliances, not simply sending in the
U.S. Marines.397 However, while foreign intervention might influence the outcome, civil wars
historically end with a decisive military outcome. In the case of Rwanda, the superior RPF force
prevailed.

Had the Clinton administration decided to intervene in Rwanda, how could it have done
so? An effective strategy would emphasize nation-building and economic development, not only
“fire-power intensive strategies.”398 A task force investigating the Rwandan debacle found that
the genocide could have been prevented, or, at least, significantly curtailed.399 The UNAMIR
mission came to Rwanda in January 1994 with 1,200 to 1,500 soldiers, most of them from
Bangladesh, commanded by two Canadian officers. For example, the mission had eight armored
personnel carriers at its disposal, but needed at least fifty for transit and transport. 400 The
incompetence and futility of UN and U.S. efforts is shown by the failure to deliver a handful of
American-made armored personnel carriers due to Department of Defense paperwork issues.401
In contrast to the United Nations’ offensive operation in Somalia, UNAMIR was a “traditional”
peacekeeping mission, based on the idea that Hutus (RGF) and Tutsis (RPF) would negotiate in
397
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good faith.402 General Romeo Dallaire charged the UN with undermining its own mission in
Rwanda. Dallaire understated that he faced life-and-death moral choices on a daily basis.403

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali submitted three options to the UN Security Council,
April 20, 1994. Note this was early enough in the progression of the genocide to have saved most
of the dead. Option 1 was immediately reinforcing UNAMIR, beefing up its manpower to 5,000
troops. Option 2 was downsizing UNAMIR’s force from 1,500 to 170 and trying to broker a
ceasefire. (Note most of the innocents were butchered with machetes that do not “fire” per se.)
Option 3 was total withdrawal. At the Security Council, Madeline Albright recalls, “The
instructions that angered me were to support option 3—complete withdrawal …”404 Albright
records in her memoir that the bloody events in Rwanda in late April 1994 corresponded to the
issuance of PDD-25 on May 3 and a report from the Stimson Center, which concluded: “the UN
should refrain from intervening in circumstances precisely like those in Rwanda.”405 Lake
counters that the report, developed under heavy pressure after the Mogadishu, Somalia debacle
of August to October 1993, contributed to U.S. reluctance to intervene actively in Rwanda, but
was not the decisive factor.406

According to the United Nations Charter, the Security Council had to choose between a
“Chapter VI mission” (peacekeeping) and a “Chapter VII mission” (peace enforcement). Two
alternatives were considered. The first was Romeo Dallaire’s plan, which called for an added
5,000 combat troops to secure Kigali, “fan out” to protect tens of thousands of Rwandans fleeing
their homes, and “create safe havens” for refugees and displaced persons. Only the United States
402
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had the capability to bring the air power and logistics called for by this plan. Author Samantha
Power contends Vice-President Albert A. Gore, Jr. met Boutros Boutros-Ghali and promised
U.S. support through airlift.407 At the White House, Richard Clarke and Anthony Lake opposed
Dallaire’s “inside-out” plan. The alternative “outside-in” plan was to create “protected routes”
for refugees on Rwanda’s borders without use of air cover. However, the problem with the U.S.backed plan was that most refugees were not fleeing to the borders; rather, most Tutsi refugees
were trapped or hidden inside Rwanda. Clarke insisted the U.S. plan was “feasible, doable … in
the short term” and Dallaire’s plan was unworkable. However, the mission commander
disagreed, stating: “My mission was to save Rwandans. Theirs was to put on a show at no
risk.”408 The new peacekeeping doctrine, PDD-25 (as mentioned above), circumscribed U.S.
participation, aid, and support to other states joining peacekeeping operations.409 After
“haggling” at the Security Council and with the UN peacekeeping directorate, the Clinton
administration approved “a version of” Romeo Dallaire’s plan—albeit after most Tutsi victims
were dead.410 Moreover, U.S. logistical support, including heavy artillery, guns, ammunition, and
vehicles, was delayed by “squabbles” between the Pentagon and UN peacekeeping office until
President Clinton personally interceded, but shipments were delayed till June and July.411 The
revised compromise plan was not a complete pullout, yet the operation was scaled down and too
slowly implemented. By the time the enhanced UNAMIR mission was up and running, Tutsi
rebels led by Kagame secured Kigali and most of Rwanda, except for a “safe zone” established
by 2,500 French troops sent by President Mitterand, June 23, 1994. Afterward, Clinton ordered
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the Rwandan embassy in Washington closed and froze Rwandan assets in U.S. banks.412 The
Clinton administration’s response was too little, too late, and out of sync.

The U.S. military’s attitude toward UN peacekeepers, as recounted by James Woods, was
not complimentary. When ten Belgian peacekeepers were among the first victims of the Hutu
gendarmerie, Woods heard the comment: “…our rangers died fighting in Somalia. These guys
[Belgians], with their blue berets, were slaughtered without getting a shot off.”413 This comment
was not only disrespectful, it missed the point: the Hutu militia believed the UN would pull out if
some of its peacekeepers were immediately killed (in a kind of low-tech “shock and awe”). As
UNAMIR Commander Dallaire requested an additional 2,500 troops, peacekeeping director Kofi
Anan warned him not to compromise “impartiality.” Then, a thousand NATO troops from three
alliance member states came to Rwanda to evacuate only!414 The disagreements in NATO
centered on French antagonism toward Dallaire’s plans. French opposition and American
reluctance combined to undermine any sentiment for decisive action from NATO beyond getting
foreign nationals out, and the later French mission to create a “safe zone” for Rwandan refugees
and displaced persons had limited effect on the death toll. United Nations headquarters
downplayed the carnage as an internal matter, just a flare-up within an ongoing conflict. The UN
officers on the ground were vexed by the fact that unarmed civilians were not being murdered by
an organized army, but rather by armed thugs. President William Jefferson Clinton’s only
statement at the height of the genocide in Rwanda “reassured” the public about the safety of 255
Americans.415 Journalists and scholars familiar with Rwandan events suggest a tactical force
along the lines of the expanded UNAMIR force proposed by Romeo Dallaire could have halted
412
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the genocide and rounded up the armed militia commandos. There was simply no international
effort attempting to stop the genocide.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili (Colin Powell’s successor) said
the Pentagon worked on a system of air drops to provide food, medicine, and supplies to refugees
rather than Dallaire’s “way-station plan.”416 The United States had promised to pay $30 million
for UNAMIR and another $30 million for a second operation.417 UNAMIR 2 was designed to
secure the country to facilitate the safe return of two million refugees, but when Dallaire
proposed this plan to the UN Security Council in September 1994, France and the United States
opposed the idea.418 Dallaire’s operational plan, called Homeward Bound, sought to return two
million refugees outside Rwanda’s borders and 1.7 million internally displaced or homeless
Rwandans in coordination with nongovernmental organizations, UN agencies, and the Tutsi RPF
and RPA. Dallaire insisted refugees and displaced persons should not be kept in camps, where
they would be vulnerable to attack from the Hutu militia, whom the Canadian General called
genocidaires.419 At the Security Council, France’s UN Ambassador labeled UNAMIR 2 as
“unworkable,” which “infected” others, led to “cold feet” for a “risky” mission, but it was U.S.
“apathy” that “stifled any urge to act,” in Dallaire’s opinion. Hence, thousands of defenseless
people were attacked by gendarmerie in camps on both sides of the Rwandan border until
Congo/Zaire invaded to force the Rwandans to go home. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands
more, mostly Hutus, were killed or died fleeing the RPF. Prudence Bushnell observed that there
was great reluctance among the U.S. military to support a multinational African peacekeeping
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force. To airlift supplies as a humanitarian aid and relief operation was more acceptable.420
Dallaire suggested U.S. conscience was soothed by the aid airlifted over the Goma refugee
camps.421 Ironically, the U.S. decision to put its resources into the Goma operation cost $170 to
$320 million, compared to the $30 million price tags for UNAMIR and UNAMIR 2!422

The first criterion for the use of force is that all other options, such as negotiations and
sanctions, have been tried or ruled out. In Rwanda, the Arusha accords indeed failed. The second
criterion was not satisfied, as the political, diplomatic, or military objectives were unclear. This
was a two-sided conflict, wherein the genocide erupted as a variation of “ethnic cleansing” or
“final solution” that jettisoned objectivity between parties as a viable position. There was no
confidence on the part of Clinton’s decision makers for Romeo Dallaire’s military battle plan. By
design, the Clinton administration’s plan lacked sufficient resources to go into Rwanda with
“overwhelming force.” There was no exit strategy apart from a timetable imposed by Congress
and the President’s determination to avoid the slightest possibility of American casualties.
Rwanda was a case of non-intervention to the utmost.

SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
Although lamentable, Clinton’s “no-go” decision in Rwanda resulted from a variety of
international, domestic, individual, and military factors. First, the civil warfare was considered
the unfortunate norm for sub-Saharan Africa. Second, African affairs lack a domestic
constituency and held the potential for a negative blowback in public opinion on the order of the
recent Somalia fiasco. Third, the decision-making hierarchy did not respond to the concerns of
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middle-level personnel, such as Prudence Bushnell, who saw the erupting violence as more
acute, while policy makers tended to blindly follow to a preferred policy until reality rendered it
moot. Finally, there was no consensus between U.S. policy makers and the UN peacekeeping
commander on a military strategy that could accomplish the goals of preventing or stopping the
genocide and ending the civil war.423
The Rwandan civil war ended in July 1994; Tutsi forces won the war and lost the
genocide. The killing fields of the Land of a Thousand Hills were not yet clean. Tutsi RPF
soldiers would massacre unarmed Hutu civilians at the Kibeho refugee camp in June 1995.
Arlene Render of the State Department protested the atrocity on behalf of the United States, a
government that had no operational capacity in place to prevent such a thing from happening.424
General Romeo Dallaire had asked rhetorically: “Who is grieving for Rwanda and really living it
and living with the consequences?” Bill Clinton flew to Kigali, Rwanda in 1999 “to offer a
partial apologia” and said “genocide” eleven times, but, as the late David Halberstam noted
sarcastically, the President stayed in the country only three and a half hours.425 Once again, the
Clinton administration’s response was too little, too late, and out of sync. However, Clinton
claims in his memoirs that the Secret Service was dead-set against a trip to Rwanda, which is
why he limited his visit to the airport in Kigali only.426

The Kigali Memorial Centre opened in April 2004, the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan
genocide, on a site where over 250,000 people had been buried. These graves and the Centre
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became permanent memorials to the victims of the genocide and a reminder of the cost of
inaction and apathy.427 It is important to note the failure to intervene in this case has fueled socalled humanitarian interventions ever since, subsequently playing on false analogies presented
by the Rwandan genocide.

CHAPTER 5
CLINTON: KOSOVO—GO

INTRODUCTION
As the Yugoslav federation began to break apart in March 1989, Slobodan Milosevic
declared a state of emergency, effectively ending the autonomy of the predominantly ethnic
Albanian region of Kosovo. Kosovar Albanians protested elimination of their autonomy, which
dated back to the days of Tito’s dictatorship, and they suffered repression, police raids, mass
arrests, jobs lost, and Albanian-language schools shuttered. Yugoslavia’s Serbian President
Milosevic was at the height of his power and Kosovo, as a region rather than a state or republic,
was not qualified for independence.428 The legal distinction distinguished Kosovo from Bosnia,
at least in the view of some outside observers, although the Serb-Kosovar antagonism had
festered just as long.
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Pressure from allies, particularly the British, as well as NATO and the UN would drive
U.S. intervention in Kosovo (see Category I). Successful interventions in Haiti and Bosnia made
the Kosovo adventure more feasible to Bill Clinton, a reluctant interventionist. Domestic
opposition was present, but largely impotent (see Category II). Of considerable importance is the
personal ideology and worldview of the Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, and her moral
suasion of the President (see Category III). The case of Kosovo also highlights military strategy
(see Category IV) where the effective use of air power and the credible threat of force proved
decisive.
1. Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition),
where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act?
In 1995, Kosovar Albanians hoped the United States and United Nations would press
Serbia to restore autonomy in conjunction with the peace settlement in Bosnia, but they were
disappointed. In March 1998, the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) killed a Serbian official,
leading to widespread reprisals.429 Whether the repressive response was intentional or not is
arguable, insofar as some observers commented the KLA had made a strategy of provocation
since its creation.430 By early 1999, Milosevic indicated his intention to purge Kosovo of its
ethnic Albanian and largely Muslim majority. After rejecting a demand that NATO forces be
allowed to enter Kosovo to prevent “ethnic cleansing,” Serbia-Yugoslavia was subjected to a
seventy-seven day bombing campaign, Operation Allied Force, leading to Milosevic’s troops
forcing hundreds of thousands of Kosovars to flee for the Albanian and Macedonian borders,
thus creating the kind of humanitarian crisis the air-strike campaign had been initiated to prevent
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and thereby threatening the unity of NATO itself.431 From the onset, President William Jefferson
Clinton ruled out the use of combat troops and limited direct U.S. involvement to minimize
casualties and to avoid a prolonged commitment in an intractable regional conflict.432
In October 1998, Clinton’s envoy, Richard Holbrooke negotiated with Milosevic to
accept the presence of 2,000 peacekeepers in Kosovo. Milosevic used the introduction of the
peacekeeping force as an excuse to retaliate against the Kosovar Albanians.433 Under the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an unarmed 700-member mission
was responsible for overseeing the Serb withdrawal from Kosovo. The ceasefire was broken by
both sides in short order. In January 1999, U.S. Ambassador William G. Walker, head of the
Kosovo Verification Mission, accused Serb-Yugoslav forces of massacring forty-five Kosovar
Albanians in the village of Racak.434 It was almost as if Milosevic allowed the peacekeepers in
so that he could challenge or humiliate NATO. For the Serb leader this proved to be a fatal
mistake in judgment as international attention honed in on Kosovo. In the words of U.S. General
Wesley Clark, “The UN was engaged early and continuously. NATO, rather than the U.S.,
bilaterally seized the problem.”435 Clark emphasized that post-operations planning and
commitments were first put in place and force was only “a last resort.”436 The NATO
commander and his political overlords hoped for a quick end. Yet when the air strikes led to the
killing and expulsion of Kosovar Albanians by Serbs, Clark moved to switch from a casualty431
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avoidance strategy to a more offensive strategy, using ground forces supported by Apache
helicopters, to put a stop to the Serbs’ ethnic cleansing.437 As might be expected, the NATO
leaders were reluctant to change the mission.438 Milosevic had 40,000 soldiers, militia, and
police on the ground in the province.439 The UN and NATO commitments to Kosovo had not
anticipated that Milosevic’s answer to the air strikes would be to heighten violence against the
Kosovar population.440
In the opinion of some observers, international sanctions failed and led only to inflation,
unemployment, social disorder, and economic disintegration. To the extent that economic
sanctions were effective, they made control over land and resources even more important and
worsened Serb repression of the Kosovar Albanians.441 Albanian nationalists established a
shadow government, headed by Ibrahim Rugova, but only Albania granted it formal recognition.
Rugova’s organization set up schools and health care facilities, but was helpless in the face of
Milosevic’s troops and police. Until 1998-1999, U.S. policy remained ambivalent, denouncing
Serbians’ repression of the Kosovars, but insisting that Kosovo must remain part of Serbia.
Robert Gelbard, U.S. envoy to the Balkans, condemned the KLA rebels fighting the Serbs as
“terrorists.”442

Kosovo became important as a regional conflict with international implications for all the
same reasons why Bosnia was important five years prior. The Serbian repression and Kosovar
insurgency threatened not only the Balkans, but potentially undermined liberalization of
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southeastern Europe. The conflict also challenged the NATO alliance, which had, to some
extent, proved its mettle in Bosnia by 1995, insofar as it now had to show its resolve to end
conflicts could be sustained and repeated. The international implications of taking action against
ethnic cleansing and genocide compelled the United States to become directly involved, as was
the case of Bosnia, and were significant beyond Europe. Potential disagreement over interpreting
events in Kosovo set up a potential conflict with Russia, the first such crisis since the collapse of
the former U.S.S.R.

The context of the Kosovo crisis as a post-Cold War test with Russia was the expansion
of NATO to include former Soviet satellites. NATO’s addition of the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland was opposed for obvious reasons, considering the alliance’s original purposes.443

2. Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage?
Kosovo could be viewed as Yugoslavia II or even Serbia II for the post-Cold War United
States. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, President Bill Clinton started on a diplomatic track and
ended up on one of direct military intervention.444 Saunders posited that an “internally focused”
chief executive would act in a transformational intervention in response to an internal threat to
the “target state.” Saunders explains that the perception of the cause of the conflict, internal or
external, will determine the decision maker’s actions, being more likely to intervene in response
to an externally provoked scenario.445 Clinton definitely saw the threat to the rump Yugoslav
state as internal, not due to external forces. According to Saunders’s paradigm, the goal of
443

Cross, Sharyl, Russia and NATO Toward the 21st Century: Conflicts and Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Kosovo. NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship, Final Report, August 2001; see also Asmus, Ronald D., Richard
L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Building a New NATO,” Foreign Affairs, September- October 1993, p. 37.
444
Martel, William C., Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Strategy, 2nd Ed. (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2011), p. 199.
445
Saunders, Elizabeth Nathan, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2011), pp. 2-3.

104

intervention thus would tend toward removal of the regime. However, the case of Kosovo
contradicts Saunders’s expectation with respect to Clinton’s non-transformative intervention,
whereby “decapitating” Slobodan Milosevic’s Serb regime was never a core objective.446
According to former Acting Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in the Bush I
administration, the successor Clinton administration aimed to support the Muslims in Bosnia and
Kosovo in order to repair the perception of anti-Muslim bias that they believed tarnished U.S.
image in the Islamic world. This concern seems not to have been a consideration for Bush I,
perhaps because of the concurrent and successful grand alliance with the Saudis and other Arab
partners to liberate Kuwait. Nonetheless, it is not clear to what extent preoccupation with the
Persian Gulf War may have dampened the Bush I administration’s interest in involving itself in
the former Yugoslavia.447 Perhaps, for the elder President Bush, it was as Abraham Lincoln once
said, “only one war at a time.”
The U.S., NATO, and UN response in Kosovo was “humanitarian,” but not exclusively
so. There were tangible U.S. interests, including credibility, stability, and a problem that
threatened the Bosnian peace settlement.448 In March 1999, Serb military, police, and militia
initiated “Operation Horseshoe,” using an artillery assault to frighten the Kosovar population,
coercing them to flee, laying siege to towns, and executing young men over age sixteen.449 Even
as the United States and its NATO allies intervened, Serbs drove more than a million Kosovar
Albanians from their homes, three-quarters of a million fleeing to Macedonia and Albania.
NATO air power seemed not to have inhibited Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing orders.450 As
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Samantha Power asserts: “The decision to bomb Serbia marked a radically assertive break from
past American responses to atrocity.” However, NATO repeated the mistake of fighting the “last
war,” anticipating Serbian capitulation in the wake of the bombing campaign and not expecting
the bloodthirsty march against the Kosovars.451
According to Madeline Albright, as early as December 1992, “U.S. diplomats informed
Milosevic that the United States would be prepared to respond militarily if the Serbs initiated an
armed conflict in Kosovo.” (One might be curious to learn what “dog” the Bush I team had in
that “fight” as opposed to Bosnia.) Clinton’s first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher,
“reaffirmed this position in February 1993.”452 However, Albright’s comment was casual and
informal. Albright’s “early warnings” are pretty cryptic and referred to after the fact. There is no
evidence that her ultimatum was taken seriously by Milosevic or communicated to him at all.
Hence, five years later, as Clinton’s second Secretary of State, Albright, said publically, “We are
not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get
away with in Bosnia.”453 Still unclear is whether this language was intended for quiet diplomacy
or public alarm and in either case if the Serb-Yugoslav regime believed any such U.S. threat was
credible. Therefore, by 1998-1999, United States policy was determined by linkage with Bosnia,
lessons learned from the Bosnian experience, and the driving force of America’s chief diplomat.
Other factors may have predisposed Clinton to favor intervention, but Albright drove the policy
in Kosovo, not the President.
From his memoirs, Bill Clinton shows no hint of doubt about the correctness of the
Kosovo policy for which Madame Secretary pushed. In hindsight, Clinton seemed to have
451
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absorbed Albright’s policy line, illustrating that a decision maker could be persuaded to a
particular course of action if it was compatible with his ideology and worldview; in this case,
their commonly held idealist viewpoint that the United States was, as Albright famously said, the
“indispensable nation.”
3.

How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or
management style) have a determinative effect?
Anthony Lake, outgoing National Security Adviser, set the tone for the idealism of

Clinton’s foreign policy. “It is dangerous hubris to believe we can build other nations. But … we
can help other nations build themselves …”454 Policy making with respect to Kosovo
demonstrated Clinton’s “ad-hocracy in action.”455 Key players such as Lake, his successor Sandy
Berger, Albright, and her predecessor, Warren Christopher, all saw Kosovo as fundamentally
different from Bosnia under Bush I and Clinton during the 1992-1993 period.456 When the SerbYugoslav regime launched its ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians, U.S. officials were
reportedly “revolted” and “outraged.” At this point, there were no longer any illusions regarding
Milosevic. In particular, Secretary of State Albright was “anxious to make amends” for Bosnia
and Rwanda, as Samantha Power ascertained.457 Slobodan Milosevic was a “repeat offender” in
the Clinton administration’s “institutional memory.”458 The President identified the Kosovar
Albanians as “defenseless people,” but recognized war in the former Yugoslavia “could drag
U.S. allies into a wider conflict.” Clinton’s rationale for involvement in Kosovo was a
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combination of (1) the historical analogy of the Holocaust, (2) U.S. self-interest in preserving the
gains of the Bosnian peace settlement, and (3) European stability.459
Secretary Albright clearly found the Serb assault on the Kosovar Albanians as
unacceptable and a crisis to which the United States and NATO had no choice but to respond and
worked to rally support.460 “We had to approve concrete measures that would expand our
leverage over Belgrade … that was the only language [Slobodan Milosevic] would respond to
now.”461 Thus spoken like a true child of the Cold War. Albeit such tough talk sounds like a
simplistic truism from a politician on a campaign stump rather than the policy pronouncement of
the distinguished “Madam Secretary.” In her own words, Albright was convinced that a
diplomatic settlement was impossible unless there was a credible threat to Milosevic. The U.S.
position statement to the effect that “nothing has been ruled out” was weak in her opinion. She
said, “It was a clear step back from our earlier position and a reprise of our early timidity on
Bosnia …”462 The Secretary of State and National Security Adviser clashed, Berger calling
Albright’s advocacy of air strikes “irresponsible” and “you sound like lunatics.”463 Albright
believed from the beginning that economic sanctions would not work unless backed by force.
Thus, she argued for removing Milosevic’s regime from power.464 Albright sympathized with the
KLA’s opposition to Milosevic’s dictatorship, the rebels’ dream of independence and selfdetermination, and conceded their need to use force. Yet, the Secretary lamented, “there did not
appear to be much Jeffersonian thinking within the KLA.”465 In sum, Madeline Albright
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articulated an ideology of Wilsonian idealism, American exceptionalism, and messianic
democracy.
President Clinton’s Secretary of State was determined to persuade the NATO allies to
renew the threat of air strikes.466 She emphasized that Milosevic was central to the problem and
had to be removed if any resolution was to succeed. As stated earlier, Madeline Albright became
the driving force in the administration on Kosovo. In April 1998, Clinton said, “I was determined
not to allow Kosovo to become another Bosnia.”467 He had earlier stated, in a radio address in
February, “Bosnia taught us a lesson: in this volatile region, violence we fail to oppose leads to
even greater violence we will have to oppose later at greater cost.”468 Nonetheless, the cautious
president sent Richard Holbrooke to “reason” with Milosevic, still avoiding the option of the use
of force. Holbrooke’s stature and rapport with the Serb-Yugoslav president signaled
Washington’s seriousness. Clinton again tapped Holbrooke to sit down with Milosevic after the
European meeting at Rambouillet (February 1999), “but even Dick couldn’t budge him.”469 The
events unfolding drew Clinton into line with Albright’s position in support of air strikes. NATO
launched its bombing campaign March 24, 1999 and continued for almost four months, as
killings and displacement of refugees persisted. It is important to note Clinton and Albright put
their faith in the persuasive power of air strikes rather than ground troops. In his memoirs,
Clinton addressed the argument that U.S. policy would have been more effective with boots on
the ground. The commander-in-chief countered that the Serbs would have inflicted large civilian
casualties before combat troops could be put in place and “that would cost more American lives
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without enhancing the prospects of victory.”470 The Clinton policy makers were dealing with a
more hard-line and insular Milosevic regime than they had dealt with in the case of Bosnia, circa
1995.471 When Clinton announced the U.S.-NATO intervention in Kosovo to the American
public, he made it clear he had no intention of using combat troops.472
The Clinton administration’s freewheeling management style pitted his hawkish
Secretary State against his dovish National Security Adviser. The need for consensus in the
situation room imposed limits on the president’s range of options, even as events propelled the
United States toward direct involvement. Thus, the use of air power without ground combat or its
credible threat emerged as the limited consensus and became Clinton’s officially stated policy.
Whether it changed depended on the way events unfolded, in particular the belligerence and
recalcitrance of the Milosevic regime.
4. How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or
nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an
administration and from one presidency to the next?
General John W. Shalikashvili’s appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
1993 was key to changing Clinton’s policy toward Bosnia, due to his compassion and work with
Kurds in Iraq in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War.473 Shalikashvili’s advocacy of
humanitarian intervention represented a change in culture at the upper echelon of the Pentagon.
Shali’s successor, General H. Hugh Shelton, appointed in 1997, added the Dover Test as a
criterion for deployment of combat forces, whereby popular support was judged anecdotally by
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the reaction of people to wartime casualties that returned to Dover (Delaware) Air Force Base.474
Shelton’s sensitivity was compatible with the president’s “zero tolerance” attitude toward
casualties. An early advocate of direct action, Madeline Albright wielded much more power as
Secretary of State than she had as UN Ambassador. “Five years ago, when I proposed using
force in Bosnia, Tony Lake never let me finish my argument. Well, now I’m Secretary of State
and I’m going to insist we at least have this discussion.”475 Albright predicted: “Bosnia’s past
would become Kosovo’s future.”476 Her resolve not to repeat the mistakes of Bosnia and Rwanda
influenced the chief executive.
The Pentagon’s lesson learned by historical analogy placed greater emphasis on “force
protection” in military planning.477 The policy choice of using force by air without boots on the
ground suited the military’s general reluctance to commit to putting troops in harm’s way,
although the U.S.-NATO theatre commander disagreed. The Pentagon argued against fulfilling
Wesley Clark’s request for Apache helicopters because the Joint Chiefs suspected it was a
potential backdoor entry with combat troops.478 Additionally, presidential aide Sidney
Blumenthal holds Clark was handicapped because he was “not one of the boys” immersed in the
military’s subculture and thus his views were disregarded by the brass.479 Power analyzes that
allied commanders suffered from “fighting the last war” (in this instance, Bosnia) and “wishful
thinking.”480 Bill Clinton and his decision-making team expected NATO bombing to bring a
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quick end to fighting in Kosovo as was the result in Bosnia. Contrary to this hope, no two wars
are the same. The air strikes continued much longer—eleven weeks instead of two.
Halberstam described the Kosovo campaign as an “incomplete and in many ways
unsatisfactory war” that led to “an incomplete and difficult peace.” The ethnic hatred in Kosovo
went far deeper than the antagonisms in Bosnia, thus making concessions and compromise more
problematic.481 The foregoing assumption is subjective and may be true or not. Nonetheless, this
logic led to a widespread conviction that Kosovo called for actual force, not just a believable
threat. Yet the Clinton White House’s decision making was underpinned by institutional or
personal memory of the failure of Rwanda, the success of Bosnia, which seemed to follow from
proxy warriors and bombing without ground troops, an idealistic worldview amenable to military
intervention for humanitarian reasons, and the unflinching determination of the Secretary of
State. General Wesley Clark, as NATO force commander, might have been a key player who
pushed or pulled Clinton to act in Kosovo, but the end result was victory in what was, in Clark’s
words, “not, strictly speaking, a war.”482 As a result, the President of the United States “owned”
the Kosovo policy’s outcome, although his earlier inclination had been much more cautious.
Even though pundits and critics were calling Kosovo “Madeline’s War,” Clinton said, “Well, it’s
my war and we’re going to see it through to the end.”483 The President was not very introspective
or self-critical in his coverage of Kosovo in his memoirs, but, as Blumenthal summarizes, “He
had learned the harsh lesson of Bosnia: diplomacy without the threat of force would not work in
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the Balkans.”484 This lesson was learned very late in the game, as Tony Blair had to push the
alliance to its limits to get Clinton to commit.
Furthermore, the so-called “Vietmalia Syndrome” might have been at work. The term
was coined by diplomatic envoy Richard Holbrooke to describe habits of thinking resulting from
the Vietnam War trauma that had been reinforced by the Somalia fiasco.485 Colin Powell, on
hiatus from government service at the time, noted the change in political thinking since the days
of the Vietnam conflict, when as few as eighteen casualties in a single day resulting from one
skirmish would not have merited media attention or public outrage, as was the conspicuous case
in Somalia.486 As a result, there was a reluctance to deploy force in situations where hostilities
were threatened or underway. Given that these are the very circumstances under which soldiers
normally operate, it is ironic that such concern for potential casualties became a priority for
military leaders as well as civilian politicians.487 In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the
values of both the military culture and the civic culture had evolved.
I.

International, systemic, or structural factors:
Richard Holbrooke, Clinton's chief negotiator, revealed that French President Jacques

Chirac delivered an ultimatum to the president on June 13-14, 1995, demanding greater U.S.
involvement in a Kosovo resolution; otherwise, France would withdraw.488 According to
Holbrooke, the Bosnia scenario (1992-1995) had brought U.S. relations with its European allies
to their lowest ebb since the Suez Crisis of 1956. The problem was not owing to a lack of
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direction from Clinton’s White House, but rather “too much leadership.”489 Another factor would
be the four-year Serbian siege of Sarajevo, which began in 1992. Holbrooke wrote, “NATO
finally did what it should have done years earlier: it launched massive air strikes against Bosnian
Serb positions.”490 Hence, due to these factors, U.S. policy changed from non-intervention under
Bush I to intervention under Clinton. Yet we should also conclude U.S. decision making was
reactive rather than pro-active in the case of Bosnia. Ultimately, NATO and UN pressure spurred
a change during the successor administration. The international system had changed profoundly
and ironically NATO was fighting its first war in 1999, the year of its fiftieth anniversary. As the
United States and the Atlantic alliance were struggling to come to grips with the post-Cold War
environment and exploring expansion into Eastern Europe. If NATO enlargement was perceived
as a threat by Yeltsin’s Russia, the official admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland on March 12, 1999 could not have been more poorly timed.491 NATO’s very existence
was called into question and a perceived failure of will in Kosovo could spell the organization’s
demise. Clinton understood those to be the stakes. Speaking of the British Prime Minister,
German Chancellor, and himself, he said to Blumenthal, “[Tony] Blair and [Gerhardt] Schroeder
and I could ride into the sunset, but we’ve got to do this with NATO intact, having done this as
an alliance.”492
In the case of Kosovo, there were two competing narratives concerning how the war
against Milosevic’s Yugoslavia was won: the supremacy of NATO air power, or the indirect
intervention of Russia on the side of the NATO allies (similar to the case of Syria in 2012). Did
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the de facto Russian alliance with NATO and threat of conventional follow-up (combat forces)
and negotiations force an end to the war, or (as military historian John Keegan argued) was it
“air power alone”?493 Secretary of State Madeline Albright undertook a “double magnet” policy:
pulling Russia toward the U.S. and NATO and pulling Serbia toward Russia.494 Wesley Clark
noted “international authority was invoked in a diplomatic effort to resolve the prospect of
additional ethnic cleansing … The application of force was measured at the outset.”495 Clark
correctly pointed out that no Americans were killed in action, but two military personnel died in
a non-combat accident and three soldiers were taken prisoner.496 To some degree, the Clinton
administration might have been “boxed in” by its no-combat-troops commitment, but the Kosovo
intervention was judged a success in ending “ethnic cleansing” and thus could be seen as a test
case for deterring such atrocities elsewhere. In that sense, the case of Kosovo served the systemic
objective of order and stability, especially in the testing ground of the post-Cold War order and
may have made it easier to think the United States could do more under the next administration.
The Russian government, headed by Boris Yeltsin, supported the Kosovo autonomy
agreement, but long opposed any international military intervention. Boris Majorski, the Russian
delegate to the Paris peace talks in March 1999, stated, “Problems which have accumulated over
decades cannot be resolved with bombing.”497 The Russians warned that separation of Kosovo
from Serbia-Yugoslavia would establish a dangerous precedent with ominous implications for
not only Chechnya and Crimea, but also places like Scotland and Quebec. Russia’s Foreign
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Minister Igor Ivanov was more blunt, telling Albright: “we have many Kosovos in Russia,”498
including Chechnya. In addition to the Russian Federation, the European Union was opposed to
Kosovo’s independence and the United States could not accomplish its goals in Kosovo without
European support.499 The U.S. plan in the period from July to September 1998 was to coerce
Milosevic to stop the violence and reduce the numbers of Serb-Yugoslav troops and militia in
Kosovo to the level prior to their offensive.500 On September 23, 1998, United Nations Security
Council declared conditions in Kosovo to be a threat to peace and security. On September 24,
1998, NATO formally threatened bombing if the offensive continued. In response, Milosevic’s
forces murdered hundreds of Kosovar Albanians.501 Hence, the United States formulated its
policy in response to pressure from allies.
Among the alliance partners, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign Secretary
Robin Cook were described as “far more aggressive” against Slobodan Milosevic than previous
U.K. leadership.502 On October 8, 1998, Albright and Cook lobbied for the UN Security
Council’s authorization to threaten the use of force. Russia promised to veto any such resolution.
Rather than thwarting the Clinton White House’s preferences, this set the stage for NATO to take
action, despite the European allies preferring that the UN take responsibility. NATO authorized
the use of force October 13, 1998 and Milosevic agreed to terms (later reneged) with Holbrooke
the same day.503 At this point, U.S. intelligence from Serbs indicated Milosevic was ready to
make a deal, but the Kosovar Albanians were not. As Albright recalled, the Kosovars were
divided among themselves, growing bolder and regaining strength, and unwilling to compromise.
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Additionally, the NATO allies were reluctant to condemn Serb actions while the KLA remained
on the offensive.504 When Albright admonished the NATO ministers that the threat of the use of
force had to be credible, she recorded their reaction as “There goes Madeline again.”505
France and several other European governments voiced considerable misgivings about
the efficacy of air strikes. They feared setting a too easy precedent for military intervention
because a state would not accept foreign troops on its soil or an externally imposed solution to its
internal conflict. Yet, even as European military brass warned against issuing an ultimatum,
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who opposed the use of force in the former
Yugoslavia a few years earlier, became one of NATO’s strongest voices calling for sending an
ultimatum to the Serbs.506 As Albright lined up support for the U.S. position, the NATO allies
were particularly keen on maintaining strict compliance with international humanitarian law and
minimizing collateral civilian casualties, especially since the operation was characterized as a
“humanitarian intervention.”507
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, reporting in 1999 on the Srebrenica
massacre, warned that “the tragedy will haunt our history forever. A deliberate and systematic
attempt to terrorize, expel, or murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary
means and with the political will to carry the policy through to its logical conclusion.” Annan
implied the major responsibility for providing “political will” rested with the United States.508
Madeline Albright remembers the European allies were less solidly committed at first. France
and Italy were reluctant to push sanctions against Milosevic’s regime and were concerned about
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provocations by KLA rebels and arming them. For their part, the Russians did not want to meet
at all.509 Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov defended Milosevic and told Albright and
Cook that he considered the Kosovar Albanians to be the troublemakers.510 Subsequently, in the
spring of 1999, as the NATO intervention transpired, U.S. diplomat Strobe Talbot called it “the
most severe, dangerous, and consequential crisis” in Russian-American relations since the end of
the Cold War.511 In other words, in a post-Cold War world, Russia remained a crucial, and hence
structural or systemic, source of pressure.
Throughout the year 1998, according to Talbot, Clinton had been eager to engage Yeltsin
on the Kosovo issue, but met with no success. After Yevgeny Primakov became Prime Minister,
there seemed to be more interest in Kosovo, but it came in the form of stern disapproval of
NATO’s threatened air strikes. For the Russians, the innuendo was that the United States could
intervene whenever and wherever it chose, even in regions where Russia had interests, such as
the Balkans. More ominously, nationalists in the Russian Duma called for intervening on the side
of Serbia and President Yeltsin warned President Clinton: “Don’t push Russia into this!”512 Yet,
as Talbot saw the situation, increasing Russian frustration with Milosevic’s regime moved
Yeltsin, Primakov, and Ivanov from opposition to NATO’s incursion to acquiescence.513
Therefore, despite illusions about a unipolar system after the evaporation of the USSR,
the United States faced two major sources of structural constraints: (1) the pressure from alliance
partners, and (2) the need to accommodate a still influential and engaged Russia.
II.

National, domestic, or internal political:
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The NATO victory in Kosovo benefited the Clinton presidency, but the potential risks of

intervention outweighed the payoff. Success in these “teacup wars” would give the President
some domestic capital, but the potential downside was catastrophic.514 Clinton’s aide Blumenthal
wrote: “[Clinton’s] entire foreign policy rested on his ability to carry out a campaign that faced
intense opposition from both right and left …”515 In the spring of 1999, Clinton was looking at
impeachment and the “vast right-wing conspiracy” that First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton saw
coming after the liberal Democratic President. According to an article in the New York Times, the
dangerous situation in Kosovo was made worse because of the impeachment drama by
distracting the White House and narrowing the administration’s options. The Times piece by
Scolino and Bronner speculated that an earlier decision could have prevented the Serb assault on
Kosovo and might have given Clinton a freer hand to risk some political capital on the use of
combat troops.516 However, except for advocates such as Albright and Clark, there is no hard
evidence the United States would have been any less reluctant to put soldiers in the field absent
the impeachment distraction. Moreover, no ally apart from Britain seemed to have any interest in
a real hot war in the Balkans.517 Senator Larry Craig of Idaho, head of the Senate Republican
Policy Committee, charged Clinton was: “… a president embroiled in a sex scandal that
threatens to bring down his administration. He sees the only way out in distracting the nation and
the world with a foreign military adventure. So, he orders his spin-doctors and media wizards to
get to work. They survey the options, push a few buttons, and decide upon a suitable locale:
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Albania.”518
As for the tolerance for casualties, U.S. forces lost eighteen in a single day in Mogadishu
compared to zero in Kosovo. This worked to Clinton’s advantage, although there was an
undercurrent of opinion that charged the Balkan intervention was a self-serving distraction for an
administration beleaguered by scandal.519 The omnipresent Lewinsky scandal held the public’s
attention throughout 1998 and 1999. More than a few pundits and critics made allusions to the
1997 film Wag the Dog, in which a president orchestrates a fake war to deflect attention from a
domestic scandal. While some Republicans questioned the timing of the air strikes, an Economist
editorial even suggested provocation, implying that the bombing “created 10,000 new fanatics
where there would have been none.”520 Simultaneously, both liberals and conservatives urged an
“all in” strategy. An influential opposition party spokesperson, John McCain, and National
Security Council chief Sandy Berger were using the term “win” to characterize the U.S. goal in
Kosovo.521 Ironically, the drive toward intervention was led by Madeline Albright and the State
Department, whereas the Defense Department and others in the administration were reluctant to
become embroiled in a second operation in the Balkans while there were still troops in Bosnia.
Although the Clinton administration’s standing was enhanced by the success of its policy in
Kosovo, there is little to indicate U.S. actions were motivated by political considerations, or
anything other than a desire to resolve a very messy scene in Kosovo.
Public opinion seemed to rally in support of Clinton’s Kosovo policy rather than driving
it or pushing back. In April 1999, a Pew poll found 47% of Americans in favor of U.S. and
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NATO military action in Kosovo and 48% opposed. However, when military action was
specifically designated “to end [the] conflict,” 51% approved and 42% disapproved.
Nevertheless, while 62% supported the Clinton administration’s policy, 72% said it was “very
important” for the Clinton administration to get Congressional approval. In June 1999, 62%
approved NATO air strikes, 32% disapproved, and 6% did not know. When asked if air strikes
were right or wrong, 68% said they were right, 22% said they were wrong, and 10% did not
know. Interestingly, polling on June 9, 1999 found that 46% favored and 49% opposed the
possibility of 7,000 U.S. troops deployed in Kosovo (5% did not know). When an agreement was
reached that in fact called for those 7,000 troops, 56% favored and 37% opposed in polling June
10-13, 1999 (7% did not know). Clearly, public support lined up behind the President once the
commitment was a “done deal.” In July 1999, 54% of Americans polled were in favor of U.S.
troops being deployed as peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo and 43% were opposed (3% did
not know). The strongest opinions were at the fringes, where 15% were “strongly in favor” and
18% were “strongly opposed.” Thus, President Clinton could rely on moderates in the center,
who favored his policy of active engagement in the former Yugoslavia, 39% to 25%.522
The Republican-controlled House of Representatives resisted the Clinton administration’s
move toward intervening in Kosovo, but failed to assert its constitutional authority, voting 427-2
against declaring war (which Clinton never requested) and tied 213-213 on a resolution to
continue the air war. The House voted 249-180 to require the President to obtain Congressional
approval before sending ground troops, apparently doubting his sincerity to keep his word or his
capacity to control events.523 Tellingly, none of these votes had a binding effect on the Clinton
administration’s actions. A few Republicans in Congress criticized the Kosovo mission,
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including Representative John Kasich of Ohio, who called Clinton’s policy “a terrible decision.”
McCain criticized the Kosovo intervention as a replay of the Bosnian scenario, a “supposedly
one-year mission” that continued for five years. An early hawk from the sidelines, McCain now
said the Clintonians lacked clear-cut goals and a coherent policy in the Balkans. Another
Republican Senator, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, suggested U.S. peacekeepers might be
targeted by the KLA rebels as well as Milosevic’s forces.524 Former Republican presidential
nominee Bob Dole asserted an effective Kosovo policy was a casualty of the “all consuming”
Clinton-Lewinski scandal.525 From the opposite viewpoint, Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi
suggested the use of force in Kosovo would look like “blatant manipulation” of public opinion to
distract attention from scandal and impeachment.526 According to Representative Peter King of
New York, Minority Leader Tom DeLay decidedly prematurely saw Kosovo as “act 2 of
impeachment.”527 While the storyline highlights Congressional opposition, political distraction,
and not much potential gain in resolving a faraway foreign crisis, President Bill Clinton put a
positive spin on his Kosovo policy. “We haven’t allowed the White House to become paralyzed.
Under the most adverse circumstances, we have got a lot done.”528
III.

Individual, personal, and ideological factors:

Early in the Kosovo scenario, U.S.-NATO commander General Wesley Clark
underestimated Milosevic’s potential for resistance. General Clark also had a contentious and
antagonistic relationship with Clinton’s third Defense Secretary, William Cohen.529 Clark
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conceded that Clinton’s proscription against ground troops limited the NATO operation’s
effectiveness. The theatre commander felt he had no support from the Secretary of Defense and
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Clark was left out of high-level meetings where the policy he would be
expected to carry out was decided. 530 Recently departed National Security Adviser Anthony
Lake wrote, “It is not enough to say we have no choice but to act, that the alternatives to
intervention are horrible.”531 In Lake’s view, what happened in Kosovo was “a response – not a
strategy” and lacked a clearly defined political goal. (Lake compared the undefined political
solution in Kosovo to Vietnam.)532 The political solution allowed Kosovo to remain a part of
Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, but there was serious doubt the Kosovar Albanians would live
happily ever after under Serbian sovereignty.533

President William Jefferson Clinton was not initially inclined to intervene directly. The
wording is instructive in that any variations of the modifier direct implied ground or combat
forces. The President’s NSC gurus, Lake and Berger, were equally dovish. Culture, formative
experiences, and ideology can be crucial determinants: Madeline Albright and John Shalikashvili
saw things differently due to their similar formative influences owing to their family, personal,
and ethno-cultural histories. In league with Wesley Clark, they pushed Clinton in a more active
direction, toward direct intervention. Their motivations were humanitarian and out of concern for
political stability. A counter argument was that U.S. military intervention in the Balkans was
triggered by ethnic nationalities refusing to live in peace with one another. Ironically, the result
of U.S. activism was a patchwork of ethnically pure mini-states in the Balkans, quite dissimilar
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from America’s multicultural society.534 Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot championed the
principle of self-determination to promote integration, but the unintended result of U.S.
diplomatic efforts was disintegration.535 In contrast to the Bosnian peace settlement, Talbot
sought to resolve the region’s politics “without this time having to redraw the map …”536
Talbot’s fluency in Russian no doubt aided the agreement negotiated with Russia. Moreover,
Talbot had as much credibility with Yeltsin as Holbrooke did with Milosevic, and Talbot had
entrée with Clinton due to their long friendship, the capstone being the simple fact Talbot entered
government service at Clinton’s behest.537

Clinton’s ideology, worldview, and interpretation of history heavily influenced his
decision making, which resulted in what might be called a “half-in” approach (perhaps similar to
Barak Obama’s approach to Libya and Syria). The use of force was constrained to air power
only, the President repeatedly stating before and during the seventy-seven day war against
Serbia-Yugoslavia that combat troops were not an option. In this manner, Clinton was able to
outmaneuver a bi-directional opposition of anti-intervention doves and hard-line hawks with a
moderate, inherently limited approach. Additionally, the president skirted the big “never again”
of Vietnam or the little “never again” of Somalia as mistakes of the past to avoid repeating.
Within the Clinton administration the war hawks were led by Secretary of State Albright and
field commander Clark, countered by a dovish NSC Director Berger and a passive-aggressive
Defense Secretary Cohen in cahoots with a reluctant Pentagon. This cast of players, wittingly or
not, bubbled up a policy that was perfectly suited to the commander-in-chief’s political
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philosophy—a limited, moderate intervention compelled by humanitarian and human rights
concerns rather than strategic or economic interests. The resulting end to ethnic cleansing and
deposition of Milosevic fit Bill Clinton’s idealistic worldview.

IV.

Criteria for the use of force:

Let us begin by restating the Powell Doctrine and then assess the case of Kosovo in light
of those principles. First, all other options should have been explored, such as diplomacy,
sanctions, or negotiation. Second, the political, diplomatic, or military objectives are clearly
understood. Third, the battle plan to be employed is realistic and the military objectives can be
effectively maintained; in other words, are the strategy and tactics “doable” and “winnable”?
Fourth, there are sufficient resources to accomplish the mission, often translated to mean going
in with “overwhelming force.” Fifth, and lastly, there must be an exit strategy and timetable in
place for the withdrawal of personnel once the mission’s goals have been achieved.
According to Martel, NATO’s credible threat of combat troops on the ground after the
protracted bombing campaign led to victory in Kosovo. 538 The goal of the United States was a
diplomatic solution agreed upon by the Serbians and Kosovar Albanians that would provide the
latter with a degree of autonomy.539 Secretary Albright recalled Milosevic’s strategy was to
blame the KLA insurgents for the crisis, labeling them as “terrorists.”540 Then Ambassador
William Walker’s international inspection team verified the horrific Racak massacre (January
1999). A high-level meeting at the White House led to President Clinton’s decision to call
Richard Holbrooke out of civilian life and send him to negotiate with Milosevic (September 30,
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1998). The ceasefire deal brokered by Holbrooke in October 1998 was breached by the Serbian
leader in March 1999 and a second Holbrook mission came for naught. Thus, all other options,
sanctions and diplomacy, were tried to no avail.
Operation Allied Force began March 24, 1999 and ended June 10, 1999. Some 300,000
Kosovars had been displaced by that moment in time. The Serbs apparently believed they could
defeat the KLA in “Operation Horseshoe,” an offensive launched on the basis of an erroneous
assumption that the U.S. and NATO would not follow through on their threats. When Slobodan
Milosevic broke the ceasefire he negotiated with Holbrooke, the Serbian president did not think
NATO would go “all in.”541 The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1199,
endorsing the air strikes (March 19, 1999). Serbia’s air defenses were “highly redundant” and
“suffered little degradation.” Other targets were leadership and infrastructure.542 NATO and U.S.
objectives were as follows: (1) destroy installations with minimal casualties (presumably allied);
(2) effectively destroy Serb-Yugoslav targets (defenses, leadership, and infrastructure); and (3)
target selection was controlled by President Clinton, Secretary Cohen, Chairman Shelton, and in
consultation with General Clark.543 We might question whether such micromanagement, with the
President of the United States being involved in target selection, is a workable model for this
kind of intervention, especially when things go wrong, such as accidentally hitting the Chinese
embassy.
General Wesley Clark points out that NATO deployed 60,000 troops in Bosnia for a
population of four million and 40,000 troops in Kosovo with a population of two million, a
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proportionally heavier commitment by 33%, reflecting the depth of the blood feud.544
Negotiations commenced with Milosovic and Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russian Federation
President Boris Yeltsin’s envoy, and Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Vice-President Albert
A. Gore, Jr. and Finnish President Martii Ahtisaari. Sandy Berger of NSC detailed: (1) “We will
win”; (2) “Serbs out, NATO in, Albanians back”; (3) “The air campaign is having serious
impact”; and (4) Clinton was ready to use ground troops if necessary. “So go back to one. We
will win.”545

The issue of sufficient resources illuminates the coming of age for the belief in the
invincibility of high-tech air power as an attractive coercive method that entails little loss of life
compared to front-line war fighters. Not only could air strikes be directed from long distances or
by remote control, but also advanced technology could put a safe distance between logistical
support and would-be targets. CIA Director George Tenet further holds that command, control,
communication, and intelligence (called C3I) was not “over-centralized” by Washington during
the Bosnia and Kosovo warfare insofar as soldiers in the field had access to intelligence data “in
foxhole and cockpit.”546
As Undersecretary of State Talbot recollected, the presence of twenty-four Apache
helicopters was supposed to indicate U.S. intention to follow up the air strikes with a ground
war, although the President had virtually ruled this out.547 (As mentioned above, Cohen denied
Clark’s request for the Apaches.) When a final ultimatum was ignored, NATO undertook the air
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strikes.548 Power analyzed that allied commanders suffered from “fighting the last war” and
“wishful thinking.” As discussed above under lessons learned, the “Vietmalia Syndrome” acted
as a bit of a brake. NATO had an overwhelming advantage in numbers of troops; American
leadership thought the air strikes unambiguously signified U.S. seriousness; and NATO
commanders predicted the bombing campaign would last for a week since Bosnia had taken two
weeks.549 Power suggested NATO’s risk-avoidance for its air force pilots by using missiles
(“drones”) might have heightened civilian casualties. NATO drones hit Kosovar refugees,
passenger trains, Serb civilians, bridges, TV and radio stations, satellite head-ends, and power
generators.550 On August 7, 1999, a United States Air Force plane bombed the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade, causing a number of deaths and no small amount of embarrassment.551 (Talbot was
informed that Chinese officials believed the bombing was deliberate and a mob in Beijing
stormed the U.S. embassy.552) By the end of May, British Prime Minister Blair and American
President Clinton met to come up with a strategy to win the war, or, at least, forestall the
possibility of losing. The NATO commander, Wesley Clark, offered the “Wes plan,” which
called for 175,000 NATO troops to invade the province of Kosovo. The Pentagon’s Shelton and
the Defense Department’s Cohen stood opposed to the idea, but NSC’s Berger endorsed it,
saying, “All options are on the table.”553
Thus commenced NATO’s “virtual war,” so named by Canadian journalist Michael
Ignatieff. 554 American commentator David Halberstam concurred, invoking the imagery of H.G.
Wells and George Orwell. Jet planes took off from bases in the western hemisphere, carried out
548
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missions over Europe, and returned home the same day.555 Unmanned drones and missiles were
directed to targets by operators in front of viewing screens far from the battle zone. Laser-guided
and photo-guided weapons honed in on targets selected by computers. Air Force B-2 stealth
bombers from U.S. bases penetrated enemy defenses undetected, testing technology developed
since the Persian Gulf War.556 While these advanced military technologies performed well,
“winning” the war proved elusive, since the agreed-upon targets were so limited and Serb
leadership stubbornly resisted surrendering.557 Only months later did the New York Times report
that NATO was much closer to undertaking a ground war in Kosovo than most observers
recognized.558 After six years of Balkan crisis management, President Bill Clinton, a reluctant
commander-in-chief, sent in air power against Serbia and was ready, despite his reluctance, to
follow up with a ground invasion of Kosovo.559 Serb-Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic
believed the threat of U.S. combat troops was real, though Clinton’s memoirs speak to his
steadfast opposition to sending in ground forces. The truth may be somewhere in the middle.
Blumenthal recalled Sandy Berger’s “Plan B-minus,” presented in a memorandum to the
President dated June 2, which called for 100,000 American, 50,000 British, and 25,000 other
troops to invade Serbia in early September.560 (Note that an expected ninety-day buildup, during
which time the tyrant could murder at will, was always put forward as an impediment to a direct
intervention.) The viability of Plan B-minus became moot. Milosevic capitulated June 3, 1999,
and agreed to evacuate his forces from Kosovo June 9, 1999.561

555

Cohen , Roger, New York Times, August 30, 1995.
Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 457.
557
Ibid.
558
Erlanger, Steven J., New York Times, November 7, 1999.
559
Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 480.
560
Blumentahal, The Clinton Wars, pp. 648-649.
561
Power, “A Problem From Hell,” p. 460.
556

129

Observers credited Wesley Clark with “winning” NATO’s first war. However, Clark
wrote about the frustration of air force pilots’ desire to apply strategic theory in practice. Clark
indicated that they were eager to initiate what would later be dubbed “shock and awe” to
decimate the enemy’s capacity to fight and bury his will to resist. The air warriors were
frustrated and angry at the NATO high command for not letting them “turn out the lights in
Belgrade.” 562 Martel’s analysis confirmed his opinion that mobilization of air power without
deployment of troops in country led to a favorable outcome and limited the duration of the
operation.563 This conclusion, shared by Wesley Clark himself, contrasted with Ignatieff’s view
as well as Keegan’s and Halberstam’s proposition that de facto alliance with Russia, Russian
withdrawal of support for Milosevic’s regime, and Russian collaboration with NATO
peacekeepers comprised the “game changer.” Indeed, it was a kind of “perfect storm” wherein
air power, the credible threat of ground combat, and Russian turnabout coalesced, but no factor
alone was decisive or determinative.
The Clinton administration’s direct intervention adhered fairly well to the Powell
Doctrine. (Anecdotally, the then-retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said as much.) The
objective of restoring Kosovar autonomy and ending ethnic cleansing was limited yet clear. The
war-fighting logistics, including troop strength, proved adequate. Sanctions and diplomacy were
tried again and again. Plus, the Secretary of State undertook a multi-faceted approach to securing
support within the administration and among the allies, while separating the Russians from the
Serbs. The two-part strategy of air strikes for seventy-seven days followed by an invasion with
combat troops on the ground ready to go was successful in forcing Milosevic’s regime to sue for
peace. Public opinion was divided, but not bitterly so and there was nonpartisan support for the
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administration’s decision to intervene, greatly aided by the total absence of battlefield deaths. As
far as an exit strategy is concerned, U.S. and allied forces did not get bogged down in a
prolonged military operation, never-ending occupation, or insurgency. Nonetheless, the Kosovo
picture was far from perfect. Clinton and his decision-making team expected NATO bombing to
bring a quick end to fighting in Kosovo as was the result in Bosnia. The air strikes continued
much longer—eleven weeks rather than two. When Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin withdrew
his support from Milosevic, he capitulated and allowed UN peacekeepers to enter Kosovo, where
they encountered some hostility from Kosovar Albanians and Serbs.564
CONCLUSION
Slobodan Milosevic was out of power by 1999 and died in prison in 2006.565 Martel and
other scholars concluded the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo were “political-military
victories that led to comprehensive changes in the status quo, involved limited mobilization for
war, and protracted post-conflict obligations for the United States and its allies…”566 With the
benefit of hindsight, said obligations turned out not to be onerous, bloody, divisive, and
expensive.
At the international level, the United States faced two major sources of structural
constraints: (1) the pressure from alliance partners, and (2) the need to accommodate a still
influential and engaged Russia. Of equal importance was the passionate advocacy of intervention
by the chief U.S. diplomat and her influence on the chief executive. Additionally, strategic
factors helped make Kosovo a “win” for Clinton: (1) successful use of surgical air strikes, (2) a
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“cost-free” intervention with zero casualties, and (3) proving that the credible threat of force
could be as effective as the actual use of force.

CHAPTER 6
BUSH II: IRAQ—GO
INTRODUCTION
132

The most compelling rationale for the invasion and occupation of Iraq launched in March
2003 in the context of post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy was to move the frontline of the eponymous
War on Terrorism to the Arab Middle East, to fight the enemy in their own backyard instead of
Manhattan. To quote Condoleezza Rice, testifying before the 9/11 Commission: “We were at
war and we didn’t know it.”567 Iraq did not represent a direct threat to the United States. The
United States did not target Iraq because of its strength, but rather it was the weakest potential
target in the region due to twelve years of sanctions, international isolation and ostracism, and
softening up from at least eleven bombing campaigns and more than a hundred “surgical” air
strikes in retaliation or warning for myriad transgressions throughout the 1990s. While the
American public might not have fully appreciated the underlying rationale for what Richard
Haass labeled a “war of choice,”568 the President of the United States implicitly acknowledged
that Iraq redux was Phase II of a “long war,” following Phase I in Afghanistan. In George W.
Bush’s words aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, under the banner of “Mission Accomplished”:
“the battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terrorism that began on September 11, 2001.”569

The defining moment for the Bush II administration was the 9/11 attack; hence, all
decisions and their justification derived from that event and all policy planning referred back to
it. During the 2004 electoral campaign, the President said, “We know that throughout the 1990s
the terrorists were training and plotting against us. They saw our complacency as weakness and
so their plans became more ambitious and their attacks more deadly until finally the twin towers
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became ground zero and the Pentagon was in flames ... My outlook was changed on September
the 11th.”570
General Tommy Franks, the commandant of U.S. and allied forces in what was dubbed
Operation Iraqi Freedom (an ironic code name for invading a sovereign state and overthrowing
its government), sent a message to the men and women in his charge: “Our mission is clear. We
will disarm Iraq and remove the regime that has refused to disarm peacefully. We will liberate
the Iraqi people and we will help the Iraqi people to start anew to build a future of their own with
a government of their choice.”571 His words, dripping with idealism, failed to acknowledge any
objective U.S. interests in play or anticipate an eight-year-long protracted occupation.
Our hypothesis is that the stated causes of war with Iraq, Iraq’s possession of weapons of
mass destruction and Iraqi harboring of terrorists, were trumped up for popular consumption and
the underlying national interests were prosecuting the War on Terrorism and promoting U.S.
superpower hegemony. Thus, Bush II’s policy was based on a set of interrelated international
factors—combating Islamist terrorism, jihadism, and militancy; pre-emption; and
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (category I). The arguments were assembled for
public consumption to justify the second war with Iraq, although it was, in fact, driven by the
Bush II administration’s ideology, worldview, and belief in American power as a force for good
in the world (category III). This vision went awry due to unanticipated consequences deriving
from an unrealistically optimistic war plan.
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1.

Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition),
where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act?
In his memoirs, George W. Bush made the case for going to war with Iraq by casting

Saddam Hussein as a villain who waged “low-grade war against the United States,” paid money
to terrorists, fired on U.S. aircraft, violated or defied UN sanctions, “ruled brutally,” and “didn’t
just pursue weapons of mass destruction. He used them.”572
In the words of Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Saddam Hussein’s willingness to use
weapons of mass destruction was “well-known to the world.” Saddam was ready to add nuclear
weapons to his arsenal after Iraq’s defeat in the Persian Gulf War and United Nations Security
Council resolutions had had “little impact.”573 The Bush II team was concerned about how close
Saddam had been to getting a nuclear weapon in 1990-1991, but subsequent U.S. intelligence in
the ensuing years was outdated and inaccurate.574 Thus, Saddam Hussein and Iraq posed a
“mortal threat,” quoting Cheney. The President and Vice President discussed Iraq in the days
following September 11, 2001.575 This is factual, not speculation; therefore, what logic would
dictate waiting and making Iraq the number two priority after the less powerful rogue Taliban
state, Afghanistan? Cheney was one of the first key players in the Bush II administration to
employ the syllogism: If 9/11 had used weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the attack would
have been all the more deadly. Hence, if Saddam Hussein had WMDs, the United States would
be justified in pre-emption. Although there was no compelling evidence of WMDs or delivery
capability, the rhetoric suggested otherwise and they became the major selling point for the Iraq
War. However, alternatives to the use of force existed and there was no urgency or decision572
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making timetable. The only timetable was whenever the Bush II team determined they were
ready to go.
In August 2002, George W. Bush’s introduction to The National Security Strategy of the
United States of America asserted that at the “crossroads of radicalism and technology … we
cannot let our enemies strike first …”576 This statement established the Bush II administration’s
intention, but did it express any distinguishable national interest other than an aggressive
defensive posture or self-help? In the case of Iraq, the United States under Bush II proceeded
significantly differently from the “go” decision for Afghanistan. The United States had an
opportunity to bring the United Nations, and indeed NATO, into the Iraqi operation, but did not
do so. Hence, the Bush II administration clearly chose to go essentially unilaterally in Iraq redux,
except for the United Kingdom, its most predictably reliable partner. The objective was not to
please friendly states, but to intimidate America’s foes. This approach would appear to be in
response to the Bush II ideological environment, whereby, unlike the prerequisite of the Cold
War era, solidifying alliances and honoring commitments to win and hold friends in the “free
world” camp, the United States could work its will and would project its power during the
“unipolar moment.” This was an article of faith for the Bush II circle of neoconservative
ideologues.
The atmosphere in which the decision to go into Iraq was made had been crucial. Vice
President Dick Cheney recounted the “fog of war” immediately after the 9/11 attacks.577 “We
needed a new way forward, one based on the recognition that we were at war.”578 In so doing,
“We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those that
576
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harbor them.”579 Cheney recalls, “We were confident that we would have help in the effort
ahead.”580 However, what was the logic of linkage between Afghanistan and Iraq in the scope of
the new policy framework? Iraq was under discussion from the outset. Whereas Cheney said he
indicated Afghanistan should be first, Iraq was always a target.581
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld shared Cheney’s interest in “getting Iraq,” just a
day after 9/11. Rumsfeld lamented there were no easy targets in Afghanistan, whereas Iraq had
better targets!582 At Camp David, September 15, 2001, Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz argued in favor of hitting Iraq.583 President Bush himself had suspected
immediately after the 9/11attack that Saddam Hussein’s regime was involved.584 Terrorism
expert Richard Clarke reported to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that evidence
linking al-Qaeda with Iraq and 9/11 was “anecdotal” and there was “no compelling case” for
Saddam Hussein’s involvement in the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.585 Clarke, a
holdover from the Clinton administration, later said bombing Iraq “was like our invading Mexico
after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.”586 We caution that Clarke was outside the Bush II
inner circle. Thus, his influence did not equate with his status as counter-terrorism czar and his
dissent would appear to have been regarded as unwelcomed dissonance.
At a subsequent Camp David crisis-management meeting, Rumsfeld told Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers that the United States should consider attacking Iraq and
Afghanistan at the same time. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, as both Rice and Secretary of State
579
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Colin Powell recalled, was obsessively concerned with Iraq and saw an opportunity to get rid of
the problem.587 Therefore, the Bush II administration made a case against Iraq based on fear of
Saddam’s regime taking advantage of 9/11.588 (Ironically, this led to the neoconservative
ideologues in the Bush II team to take advantage of 9/11 to hit Iraq.) George W. Bush had ruled
out action against Iraq by September 15th or 16th, but Wolfowitz continued to press the case for
moving against Iraq at a September 17th National Security Council meeting.589 General Tommy
Franks testified before the 9/11 Commission that the President told him Iraq was “off the table,”
and rejected Franks’s request to draft a war plan. Regardless, among the small circle of
Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Franks, there was a clear presumption that Afghanistan was “round 1”
of a longer war, one not limited to the hills of Afghanistan.590
Cause of War 1: WMDs— Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (chemical and

biological weapons or a nuclear bomb) made Saddam Hussein’s regime a threat to regional
stability. However, as an anonymous Central Intelligence Agency staffer told the 9/11
Commission, the Bush II administration’s “preliminary judgment” of Iraqi WMDs was based on
an intelligence standard of proof rather than a legal standard of proof.591 Rumsfeld rationalized
somewhat disingenuously, “Though the intelligence failures surrounding Iraq are now well
known, recent history is abundant with examples of flawed intelligence that affected key national
security decisions and contingency planning.”592 The Defense Secretary added, “the intelligence
community reported near total confidence in their conclusions.”593 CIA Deputy Director John
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McLaughlin concluded in August 2002: (1) Iraq had reconstituted its weapon facilities; (2) Iraq
had a mobile biological warfare capability; (3) teams of weaponry experts were reassembled; and
(4) the Iraqis were “clearly working” on a platform or delivery system.594
A Report of the Project for a New American Century succinctly saw the issue as “The
Right War for the Right Reasons” in Iraq: Setting the Record Straight.595 The Iraqi Survey
Group (ISG), headed by David Kay and Charles Duelfer, was unable to verify the story that Iraqi
officials had scuttled their stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons in 1999 with
documentation or any physical evidence. Although the ISG and UN inspectors accepted the story
about the destruction of weapon stockpiles as factual, being “not able physically to verify that
story” constituted “a weakness in our analysis.”596 It is important to note that the Bush II
administration relied on essentially identical intelligence as had the Clinton administration and
the most reliable information was gathered prior to the Persian Gulf War.597 Therefore, the 2002
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on which the Bush II White House based its decision
making was outdated and flawed. Subsequently, the Presidential Commission on the Intelligence
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction reported that the NIE
“simply didn’t communicate how weak the underlying intelligence was.”598 The commission’s
cover letter to the President states: “We conclude that the Intelligence Community was dead

wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction …
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After a thorough review, the Commission found no indication that the Intelligence
Community distorted the evidence regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. What the
intelligence professionals told you about Saddam Hussein's programs was what they
believed. They were simply wrong.”599 Whether due to wishful thinking or single-focus
myopia, the Bush II principals “cherry-picked” the intelligence to support their WMD claims.
Cause of War 2: Iraqi harboring of terrorists—Defense chief Rumsfeld wrote after the
fact: “Documents discovered after the coalition’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 shed more light on the
depth of the regime’s links with terrorism … My view rested on the fact that previous attempts”
to prove linkage “had failed.”600 Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Hugh Shelton “strongly
opposed” an attack on Iraq in 2001 because he believed it would undermine allied support for the
Afghanistan war.601 Nevertheless, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz persisted, keeping Iraq in their
crosshairs. The Defense Secretary quoted CIA’s George Tenet: (1) there was “senior level
contact” between Iraqis and al-Qaeda; (2) Iraq was a “safe haven” for Islamist militants; (3) there
was “solid evidence” of al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq; and (4) al-Qaeda had sought aid to acquire a
WMD capability from the Iraqis.602 The infiltration of al-Qaeda and other Islamists, jihadists, or
militants into Iraq accelerated after the 2003 invasion and occupation. Iraqi participation in the
guerrilla insurgency was subsequently fueled by popular resentment against the United States,
United Kingdom, and their allies. Subsequently discovered evidence of Saddam’s defunct regime
harboring, financing, or cooperating with outside militants was simply an example of the ancient
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maxim: the enemy of your enemy is your friend. The underlying motivation for the Bush II
policy makers was to make Iraq the primary base of operation for the War on Terrorism and a
magnet to attract the radical forces to carry on an insurgency that would destroy them. The
clearest evidence that the Bush II policy makers understood Iraq would become a magnet was
the inseparability of the mission in Iraq and the global War on Terrorism in the public utterances
of administration officials, none blunter than the President himself, who boasted, “Bring ‘em
on!”
2. Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage?
The case of Iraq redux suggests pre-existing involvement may well be a factor in “go”
versus “no-go” decisions. Intuitively, the positioning of troops in or near the country of interest
would facilitate any intervention under consideration and actions taken against the targeted
country could have a cumulative effect, whereby each successive decision sets a precedent for
further actions, or a kind of “escalation ladder.”
There was undoubtedly a history of conflict between the United States and Iraq. Going
back to the Carter administration (1977-1981), Paul Wolfowitz, Jeffrey Kemp, and Dennis Ross
(later a Clinton advisor) drew up the Limited Contingency Study to reform U.S. military policy
in the Persian Gulf region, based on three essential questions: Could the United States get troops
into the region to repel a possible Soviet invasion? Could the United States defend Saudi oil
fields? Or should the United States seize Saudi oil fields under the threat of a future oil embargo?
The Limited Contingency Study further hypothesized a threat to Persian Gulf oil resources from
within the region. Thus, a decade and a half before the first Persian Gulf War, Wolfowitz’s team
projected Iraq as the “pre-eminent” military power in the region and anticipated its potential
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threat to the Saudis and Kuwait.603 In July 1990, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens warned
Bush I administration officials about Iraqi nuclear weaponry only one month before Saddam
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.604 Arens and Deputy Chief of Staff Ehud Barak met with Dick
Cheney and unfurled reams of data on European assistance in Iraqi uranium enrichment. Arens
said a nuclear-armed Iraq posed an existential threat to Israel. For Washington, the imperative
was to keep Israel out of the war so as to keep the Saudis and other Arab partners in the
coalition. The solution, as related by Cheney, was for the U.S. to guarantee anti-Scud missile
defense for Israel, as the Iraqis provoked Israel with Scud attacks.605 Blackwill and Carnasale
speculated that a single, crude, half-megaton nuclear bomb on the back of a flatbed truck could
have inflicted 50,000 casualties on the U.S. and coalition forces during Desert Storm.606 CIA
intelligence also raised warnings regarding Iraq. The consensus in 1990 was that Saddam
Hussein would make some move against Kuwait, but not an invasion and occupation of the
whole little country. Thus, Cheney, Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, and cohorts were all
“consistently wrong” in their immediate expectations of what Iraq would do next.607 The
precedent of having been wrong in 1990-1991 meant that those same decision makers would err
on the side of the worst-case analysis in 2002-2003.
There also may well be a pattern of policy continuity from one administration to the next,
though not quite a “seamless web.” Following the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), the June 1993
Tomahawk missile attack was one of four retaliatory raids against Iraq; there was an earlier
strike in January 1993, another in response to Iraqi bombing of a Kurdish city in 1996, and
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Operation Desert Fox in 1998. January 19, 1993, Iraq refused to allow UN inspectors to fly into
the country, and the Iraqi military began operations in the demilitarized zone between Iraq and
Kuwait, and the northern no-fly zone. The United States fired Tomahawk cruise missiles at
factories identified with Iraq’s nuclear weapons development. Henceforth, Iraq capitulated and
allowed the UN weapons inspectors to resume their flights. The biggest U.S. action in the 1990s
was Operation Desert Fox. George W. Bush quoted William Jefferson Clinton: “The best way to
end that threat is with a new Iraqi government.”608 While the foregoing four actions taken in the
form of surgical air strikes between 1993 and 1998 against Iraq by the predecessor
administrations do not fit our criteria for intervention, targeted action by the Bush I regime to
rescue the Kurds in northern Iraq in March 1991 is interesting because there was no push to
follow up by “finishing the job” (i.e., regime change) begun in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.609
Retaliation for the attempted assassination of Bush I on an April 1993 trip to Kuwait
provided the circumstances for Clinton’s second hit on Iraq. On June 23, 1993, after Kuwaiti
police thwarted an Iraqi intelligence plot to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher asked counter-terrorism chief Clarke “to plan retaliation,
but insisted that it had to be limited to Iraqi intelligence headquarters and it had to be carried out
on Saturday evening to minimize casualties”610 President Bill Clinton waited for verification that
the missiles had successfully met their targets before making an announcement of the air
strike.611 CNN reported “relative certainty,” following Clinton’s warning to Saddam Hussein,
there had been no further Iraqi support or involvement in terrorist acts against the U.S.”612
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According to Clinton’s Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, “The U.S. has repeatedly said
that any state that sponsors or supports terrorism against us will pay a price for its conduct.”
Christopher wrote, “the president [Clinton] made it clear that he wanted to send an unmistakable,
dramatic message to Iraq.”613 Christopher insisted the strike caused “relatively few casualties in
the civilian population.”614 (Perhaps “relatively few” adds up to wishful thinking.)

Operation Desert Fox (1998) followed, in association with the British, against Iraq’s
“repeatedly unwilling cooperation” with the UN Special Commission on Weapons Inspection.
Overall, under the Clinton administration, U.S. forces executed 130 air strikes for violations of
no-fly zones between northern and southern Iraq.615 Note that Clinton failed to consult Congress
in the 1993, 1996, and 1998 incidents.616 Significantly, the Clinton administration seems not to
have considered a ground invasion, despite the Iraqi regime’s repeated infractions. Clinton’s
successor, George W. Bush, pointed out that “Congress overwhelmingly passed and President
Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act” in 1998.617 According to Bush, “as Colin Powell put it,
[the U.S. was] keeping Saddam in his box. Then 9/11 hit…,” thus leading the Bush II
administration to take “a fresh look at every threat in the world.”618 Yet the cause-and-effect
relationship is not clear and the sequence of events suggests the momentum for acting against
Iraq was already underway. As early as December 2001, George W. Bush was considering two
possible avenues toward Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime: (1) “coercive diplomacy” involving
economic sanctions, no-fly zone enforcement, arms embargo, and weapons inspections; (2) a
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military build-up aimed at overthrowing the regime by force. Condoleezza Rice explained that
over time the two avenues “merged into one”: diplomacy and force.619

Vice President Cheney, in hindsight, asserted, “Saddam Hussein did not find Desert Fox
persuasive. In 1999 he began firing on U.S. and British planes that were enforcing the no-fly
zone in northern and southern Iraq.”620 Cheney further revealed he and the president-elect were
given intelligence reports that Iraq was steadily pursuing WMD capabilities in December
2000.621 However, a pattern—indeed, a progression—of retaliation under Clinton provided a
precedent for Bush II as well as momentum.
Richard Haass, NSC staffer for the Bush I administration and director of policy planning
at the State Department during Bush II, contrasted the two very different U.S. wars in Iraq. The
1990-1991 Persian Gulf War was a “traditional war” to oppose aggression and restore
equilibrium to the regional order. (See Chapter 2.) The 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom was a
“radical” pre-emptive war designed to overthrow Iraq’s government and remake the Arab Middle
East on new premises, presumably democratic and secular ones. (Albeit Saddam’s regime was
secular, not Islamist, but decidedly undemocratic.) The Persian Gulf War cost an estimated $100
billion with considerable contributions from allies, and Operation Iraqi Freedom cost $70 billion
the first year, with cumulative costs approaching $1 trillion after eight years. (Exact cost of the
Iraqi war is not definitively known, since all expenditures were essentially off-budget by way of
supplemental appropriations, with much of the specifics classified.) The Persian Gulf War cost

619

Rice, No Higher Honor, pp. 169-171.
Cheney, In My Time, p. 366.
621
Ibid.
620

145

about 150 U.S. personnel killed in action (KIA),622 whereas Operation Iraqi Freedom cost 5,000
KIA plus as many as 40,000 wounded in both Afghanistan and Iraq.623
The Persian Gulf War to liberate Kuwait gave the U.S. military “semi-permanent”
presence in Iraq. In contrast, Iraq’s army, defense budget, and arms imports decreased to a
fraction of their previous levels. Iraq had also suffered measurable social and economic decline
after its previous eight years of war against Iran. With Iraq weakened and vulnerable, Paul
Wolfowitz, then a private citizen, wrote Bill Clinton a letter in 1998, urging a U.S. invasion and
occupation of southern Iraq. The letter, co-signed by a number of notables including Donald
Rumsfeld, received no reply from Clinton.624 The transition between the Clinton and Bush II
administrations is symbolized by a “no-fly zone” versus a “mushroom cloud” or surgical air
strikes versus tanks rolling across the Iraqi border, insofar as Cheney, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld,
Richard Perle, and Douglas Feith (but perhaps not so much Powell and Rice) had more ambitious
political-military objectives in U.S. policy toward Iraq and the Arab-Muslim Middle East than
the Clintonians.625
An unambiguous conclusion is that (1) pre-existing involvement or previous intervention
and (2) continuity of policy weighed significantly in the “go” decision in Iraq redux, facilitating
and contributing a momentum to the 2003 intervention. Rather than the “sea change” in thinking
following 9/11, to which President Bush II attributes his decision-making, the Wolfowitz letter,
for example, was part of the paper trail linking the second Iraq War to a larger, evolving strategic
vision of U.S. post-Cold War hegemony.
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3. How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or management
style) have a determinative effect?
The first place to look for answers defining the Bush II administration’s decision-making
style is the National Security Council and the National Security Advisor. “George W. Bush had
no trouble making decisions when the search for consensus failed,” according to Condoleezza
Rice.626 One observer wrote: “Of all the top-level officials, she was by far the closest to Bush …
She operated at the interface between the president and his advisors.” Rice was a “toughminded” realist whose worldview transitioned from cautious conservatism to assertive idealism
in Bush II’s apocalyptic first year in power. During the 2000 presidential campaign, she said the
United States “should avoid becoming bogged down in nation-building enterprises.” After 9/11,
Rice guided Bush II toward “realism in the service of ideals.”627 According to political scientist
Jean Edward Smith, in contrast to Dwight David Eisenhower, who convened some 300 NSC
meetings, George W. Bush met once with the full NSC (January 30, 2001) and thereafter
delegated titular authority over the body to Rice.628 Yet, the personalities with the real power,
Rumsfeld and Cheney, were openly disdainful of Rice. According to Rice’s biographer,
Elisabeth Bumiller, she and the Defense Secretary openly argued in meetings, requiring Andy
Card’s mediation.629 Worse, Rumsfeld withheld vital war plans for Iraq from Rice and her staff.
Her relationship with Rumsfeld improved somewhat with her promotion to Secretary of State.
Conversely, Rice’s working relationship with the Vice President deteriorated from 2005 onward,
she and Cheney sparring over the troop surge in Iraq plus other issues, including policy toward
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Iran, Syria, and North Korea.630
Advisers exercised a decisive hand in Bush II’s foreign policy for the simple reason the
President was largely inexperienced and unknowledgeable in world politics.631 According to
Condoleezza Rice, Bush II’s decision-making style “requires a very good administrator who can
‘keep the trains running on time’ internally and work seamlessly with the other agencies …
[where] there is a kind of bureaucratic continuity.”632 As Rice explained her role: “The national
security advisor is staff—rarified staff, to be sure, but staff nonetheless.”633 Regardless of the
expressed administrative theory at work, Bush II policy decisions appear to have emerged from
trench warfare among the key players and the bureaucracies they controlled.
The respective staffs of the National Security Advisor, Vice President, and Secretaries of
State and Defense were the loyal facilitators of their bosses’ power-driven egos. Vice President
Cheney’s “fresh wrinkle” was to create his own shadow national security council, headed by
Lewis “Scooter” Libby, his chief of staff. Cheney’s “footprints” started from a January 2, 2002
meeting with CIA Director Tenet to “review possibilities” to overthrow Saddam Hussein.
“Within a month” Tenet presented a plan to Rumsfeld. Concurrently, Wolfowitz asked the CIA
to investigate the chief UN weapons inspector, Hans Blix—there proved to be no evidence of
complicity, dishonesty, laxity, or that intelligence findings on WMD data were “fudged” or
“cooked.”634 The point was not to implicate Blix, but rather to add a building block in the case
for war. Cheney’s “freedom of action” contrasted with and contributed to Rice’s “weakness.”
She had been one step down in status from Powell, Cheney, and Rumsfeld during the Bush I and
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Nixon-Ford administrations (in the case of Rumsfeld), hence “outclassed” by the alpha males at
the table.635 As John Prados notes: “Rice had also determined to stay close to the president,
usually a good recipe for a security advisor, except that in this White House the line of action ran
through Cheney’s office.”636
“To be sure, tensions between Defense and State are almost endemic,” Rice conveyed in
her memoirs, and “there are many times when the secretary of state is more willing to use force
than the Pentagon … Nonetheless, secretaries of state find the Pentagon all too willing to exert
influence on foreign policy.”637 Rice witnessed the antagonism between Colin Powell and
Donald Rumsfeld as “beyond such almost inescapable tensions.” Much of the infighting was
carried on by way of Rumsfeld’s “slices” or “snowflakes,” cryptic little notes that floated
through the corridors of the Pentagon, hence evading direct or face-to-face confrontation.638
Additionally, Rice had to contend with the meddlesome Vice President. “The problem was
[Cheney’s] staff, which seemed very much of one ultra-hawkish mind, was determined to act as
a power center of its own.”639 The internecine bureaucratic warfare further inhibited a more
efficient policy-making process, as Rice envisioned, whereby lower ranking staff could iron out
details and leave higher strategy to the departmental secretaries. “The truth is that we would have
had fewer Principals’ meetings had the distrust between Don [Rumsfeld] and Colin [Powell] not
made the levels below the secretaries incapable of taking decisions.”640 With all due respect to
the future Secretary of State, this might have been the result of the overbearing personalities of
the players involved. Moreover, the National Security Advisor lacked the clout to contain these
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conflicts in the service of a commander-in-chief with scant expertise and little inclination to
force his will on policy outcomes.
The staff’s paralysis in information gathering and policy recommendation led to
decisions being made on the basis of limited, rather than diverse, input. The contest in
bureaucratic politics became a mismatch: State had 57,000 employees and a $45 billion budget;
whereas Defense had 700,000 employees and a $700 billion budget (ca. 2012)641 Thus, Powell
faced challenges from Rumsfeld at Defense, Cheney, and key appointees such as the ultra-hawk
Undersecretary of State John Bolton, who owed loyalty to Bush and Cheney, not Powell.642
Therefore, Powell’s assistant, Richard Armitage, and chief of staff, Colonel Lawrence
Wilkerson, lacked entrée and influence in the Bush II White House.643 Powell wanted foreign
policy decision making to be “inclusive” and “transparent.” Unlike Bush I’s “collegiality” and
Clinton’s “messiness,” Bush II’s NSC meetings were “rehearsed” with “formality” and “run
behind the scenes … with Condoleezza Rice orchestrating.”644 However, Rice was the
conductor, but not the composer; she didn’t write the score. According to O’Sullivan, “A back
channel existed by which Cheney and Rumsfeld, with Rice’s complicity, made most of the
important decisions.”645 Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill was surprised to see the “deepest
division” and “open combat” between Powell and Cheney so early in the new administration’s
tenure.646 Colin Powell was “confounded by Cheney,” who “played by his own rules.”647 The
Vice President became a confident crusader. Dick Clarke described Cheney as “quiet and soft-
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spoken,” which hid “almost extreme views … out of place if aired more broadly.”648
Who was in charge? Without a doubt, Cheney wielded enormous authority under Bush II.
He picked O’Neill to head Treasury and Rumsfeld to run Defense. Rice’s assistant Stephen
Hadley and Rumsfeld’s assistant Paul Wolfowitz had served on Cheney’s Defense/Pentagon
staff during Bush I’s term, 1989-1993. Thus, strong personal ties, combined with institutional
memory of Bush I’s Persian Gulf War, predisposed key players as war hawks. As historian
O’Sullivan ascertained, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith ran the government.649
Journalist Woodward “speculated” about Powell’s “deep-seated anger” at Cheney. “The
relationship between the two was so bad that they could not even discuss their differences.”650 A
direct line of access to the chief executive might have mitigated this toxic environment, but Bush
and Powell had “little personal chemistry” and never achieved any general rapport.651 As British
Ambassador to the United States, Christopher Meyer, opined, Bush and Powell’s was “not a
relationship made in heaven.”652 Anecdotally, since Powell was the most highly regarded Bush II
official, domestically as well as internationally, the fledgling president might have been jealous
or intimidated by the former general. The Bush II administrative structure further undermined
Powell’s ability to influence outcomes. Powell was described as a “shrewd briefer” who
presented all “available options” while “shading briefings” to illustrate the efficacy of his
preferred course. Unfortunately, George W. Bush “did not like debate or discussions about
policy.”653 Clarke claimed the President “looked for simple solutions, the bumper sticker
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description of the problem.”654 Powell’s nemesis Rumsfeld was known to be “as bold and as
relentless as any modern ministerial figure,” allowing him to dominate policy making for the
time being.655 As policy toward Iraq coalesced, Bush and Rice made compelling “mushroom
cloud” analogies regarding WMDs, even as Cheney and Rumsfeld alleged al-Qaeda operated
from Iraq.656 By February 2003, Colin Powell found himself investigating the triangular
connection between al-Qaeda, Iraq, and WMDs, although he doubted its validity.657
The Secretary of Defense came to be identified with his press conference allusion to
“known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns.” Rumsfeld wrote: “The idea of
known and unknown unknowns recognizes that the information those in positions of
responsibility in government, as well as in other human endeavors, have at least disposal is
almost always incomplete.” Nevertheless, incomplete information should not be an excuse for
incompetence. Rumsfeld further elaborated: “It emphasizes the importance of intellectual
humility, a valuable attribute in decision making and in formulating strategy.”658 Humility was a
character trait he showed inconspicuously659 and the resultant strategy was undercut by
“unknown unknowns” that were overlooked by a policy process that was a backformation,
whereas the decision was predetermined in search of an acceptable rationale. Interestingly,
Rumsfeld applauds Bush II’s “leadership” and “sound stewardship” and notes that “even the
New York Times called for “a fundamental reassessment of intelligence and defense activities”
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following 9/11.660 As one of the key insiders driving the Iraq war policy, Rumsfeld curiously
revealed: “While the President and I had many discussions about the war preparations, I do not
recall his ever asking me if I thought going to war was the right decision.”661 Although the
Pentagon boss implied Bush’s decisiveness, this revelation also exposed the limited range of
voices involved in policy formulation. Tellingly, Rumsfeld reiterated, “Not one person” on the
Bush II team was “opposed to, even hesitant, about the President’s decision.”662 This statement
would indicate the absence of contrary and divergent viewpoints at the table, a process bordering
on groupthink.
4. How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or nonintervention
scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an administration and from
one presidency to the next?
Vice President Dick Cheney recollected September 11, 2001: “On this day, all our
assumptions about our own security had changed. It was a fundamental shift … The first war of
the 21st century wouldn’t simply be a conflict of nation against nation, army against army. It
would be first and foremost a war against terrorists who operated in the shadows, feared no
deterrent, and would use any weapon they could get their hands on to destroy us.”663 The
evidence, factual and subjective, does not bear this vision out. International political terrorism
and its transnational character was nothing new. Neither were the Twin Towers and the Pentagon
the first symbolic or high-value American targets attacked by Islamist militants. Previous
terrorist assaults (e.g., Kobar Towers and U.S.S. Cole) were simply outside U.S. borders, except
for the Twin Towers bombing in 1995.
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Unburdened by self-doubt or countervailing logic, President George W. Bush saw “[t]he
lesson of 9/11 … We would confront the threat from Iraq, one way or another.”664 CIA Director
George Tenet proposed a counterterrorist strategy combined with regime change in Afghanistan,
relying primarily on covert operations, special forces, and domestic allies inside Afghanistan.665
Even though Tenet saw Iraq as “a different matter,” Dick Cheney wanted to know what the CIA
could do “inside Iraq.” The Vice President emphatically recalled Bush I’s “mistake” in standing
by while Saddam Hussein’s regime “slaughtered” Kurdish rebels in the wake of Desert
Shield/Desert Storm.666 Ironically, Cheney, then Defense chief, was one of the voices that
worried what worse evil might replace Saddam if the U.S.-led coalition had deposed the
dictator.667 “During the first Gulf War,” Rumsfeld recounted, “[t]he question was whether the
U.S. should end the conflict or move to Baghdad … I remember very clearly Colin Powell
saying that this was turning into a massacre.”668 Rumsfeld added: “A campaign to take Baghdad
and oust Saddam was a daunting notion [in 1991] … Colin Powell, who had played such a
prominent role in the decision not to attempt regime change, responded to the criticism: ‘[I]n due
course, Saddam Hussein will not be there.’”669 In terms of a diplomatic alternative for Iraq redux,
Rumsfeld put forward a particularly bizarre proposal: “I thought a diplomatic overture on Iraq
from the Bush [II] administration—a ‘Nixon goes to China’ approach” might be possible. Iran
and Iraq were still hostile, reasoned Rumsfeld, but both were hostile to the United States, so
maybe Saddam could be wooed to befriend the enemy of his enemy.670 Rumsfeld had been
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Ronald Reagan’s emissary to Iraq in the 1980s to try to do just that, but there was no indication
Rumsfeld actually made this suggestion to Bush II in 2002-2003.
The immediate antecedent of the second Iraq War was Operation Enduring Freedom. In
Afghanistan, Day 1: losses were forty wounded and eight killed in action; al-Qaeda and Taliban
were more heavily concentrated than expected, but essentially the war was over in fifteen days,
although, as General Wesley Clark pointed out, the U.S. Air Force was brought into planning
“only at the last minute.”671 According to Dick Clarke, “when we attacked, we treated the war [in
Afghanistan] as a regime change rather than a search and destroy against terrorists.”672 The
Afghan War commenced on October 7, 2001, “by implementing the bombing plans … that had
been prepared but unused during the Clinton administration.”673 The pre-existing plans illustrated
continuity and momentum rather than the highly touted sea change after 9/11. As Clarke
affirmed, “Not until November 25 [2001] … did the U.S. insert a ground force unit
[Marines].”674 Thus, the Afghan intervention was the prototype for Operation Iraqi Freedom, but
Operation Enduring Freedom was the wrong lesson for Iraq.675 Colonel Gian Gentile has
determined that counterinsurgency failed in Vietnam and it failed in Afghanistan as well.
Likewise, nation-building failed. Why? Gentile’s thesis laid the blame on an ideology that held,
“War can be made to work (if only the right general can be brought in to fix it).” Failure of U.S.
strategy in Afghanistan was tied to an unproved capability to reconstruct the country,
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economically and politically. Another factor was that the American public was not “morally
connected” to the war.676
A number of elements contributed to the debate over strategy within the Pentagon prior to
the second Iraq War. In September 2001, the Pentagon’s boss was thoroughly disheartened by
the war plan briefing presented by CENTCOM. Two problems were that it was essentially a
reprise of the first Iraq War and it assumed chemical and biological weapons would be used
against U.S. troops with no provision for counteracting them. Rumsfeld related three additional
assumptions woven into the fabric of prewar planning: Saddam’s loyalists would concentrate
around Baghdad, leading to a protective siege; anti-Saddam opposition groups would support
U.S. intervention; and Iraqi forces would launch diversionary attacks on Israel, as they had done
in 1990-1991.677 A year later, in November 2002, Rumsfeld was dismayed that the war plan
revised by Tommy Franks called for 450,000 troops, described as “the mother of all deployment
orders.”678 Rumsfeld ultimately approved Franks’s war plan because it initially put 150,000
troops on the ground with an additional 300,000 in reserve.679 The unanticipated contingency
omitted from war planning that had the deadliest consequences was the insurgents’ use of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the concomitant vulnerability of U.S. lightweight
trucks and Humvees.680 Rumsfeld later denied forcing a minimalist approach on the war in Iraq,
but even George W. Bush characterized the Franks battle plan as a “light footprint.”681
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Secretary of State Colin Powell was in charge of the effort to line up international support
for the U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the first NSC meeting after the 9/11
attacks, Powell tried to steer the Bush II focus toward the threat from Osama bin Laden, alQaeda, and Islamist militancy, as he worried that Iraq would be a dangerous distraction.682
Powell applied lessons learned from his first-hand experience. For example, Manuel Noriega
evaded U.S. forces for several days in December 1989 and Afghanistan was eightfold larger than
Panama. As Donald Rumsfeld suggested that bin Laden would be “bottled up” in Afghanistan,
Powell rebutted, “Bottled up! They can get out in a Land Rover.”683 In addition, Powell feared a
replay of the Vietnam War’s “conspiracy of illusion,” where wishful thinking undergirded a
policy of continuing more of the same based on a flawed initial premise.684 Powell realized that
international consensus was vital to the legitimacy of the Iraq War, but his predecessor James
Baker had traveled to dozens of capitals to enlist support for the Persian Gulf War, whereas
Powell traveled no further than London and New York. The Secretary of State acquiesced to a
policy for which he had serious doubts and as a result Iraq redux came to be perceived as a
unilateral American operation. Iraq could be seen as Powell’s failure, but not his alone.685 Ten
years afterward, Vice President Cheney said, “sure and swift victories are likely to be rare.” At
the time, U.S. forces took “a remarkably short time” to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan,
casting the “fast-forward” mold for Operation Iraqi Freedom.686 Moreover, Cheney interpreted
further rhetorical flourishes: “two dangerous lessons learned” by terrorists in the 1980s and
1990s was that the militants could attack U.S. targets “with impunity” and in response the United
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States would likely cut its losses and withdraw.687 The only problem with Cheney’s two lessons
was that they had no empirical basis in fact. The Bush II White House did not lack good
intelligence about the “lessons” drawn by al-Qaeda. The President’s Daily Briefs (PDB) from the
CIA mentioned specific threats from Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda forty times between
January 20th and September 10th, 2001.688
The so-called “neocons” or self-styled Vulcans brought a “grand strategy” to foreign
policy decision making, beginning in 2001. The Project for a New American Century (PNAC)
proposed a “blueprint” for maintaining the pre-eminence and power of the United States,
precluding any rival superpower from emerging, shaping the international security order in
support of U.S. interests, and molding the global civic culture to conform to American values.689
Although PNAC predated 2001, this worldview actuated U.S. foreign policy in the post-9/11
universe. At the same time, historical lessons were applied to serve policy justification.
Historical analogies are usually distorted and so are lessons of history. After his perceived
success in the first Iraq war, President Bush I said, “We’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once
and for all.” Nevertheless, the Vietnam syndrome haunted Colin Powell, the former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs and later Secretary of State. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was not plagued by
such nightmares: “It’s a different era … It’s a different place.”690 That bald claim might be true,
but neither was Iraq the same place as Afghanistan, nor was 2003 a re-enactment of 1991.
The Iraq War plan of attack was the outcome of a confluence of applied historical lessons
and perceived opportunities: adjudged successful counterinsurgency and regime change in
Afghanistan; resolve to confront the threat from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq; a robust commitment to
687
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the War on Terrorism; and applying the “lessons” of the Persian Gulf War without repeating its
“mistakes.” Underlying the foregoing was a deeply rooted belief in the objectives of United
States military assertiveness and dominance in the PNAC principles to which key Bush II players
ascribed.
I.

International, systemic, or structural factors:
In the week after 9/11, Paul Wolfowitz proposed Iraq as the third target in the first round

of the “War on Terrorism”: al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Iraq. Colin Powell objected that the Allies
would balk (using the terminology of a “bait and switch”), whereupon George W. Bush returned
the focus to al-Qaeda and Afghanistan.691 Secretary of State Powell was unquestionably the most
highly regarded and credible spokesperson in the Bush II administration, but his stature in
Europe was eventually undermined by his connection of Iraq to al-Qaeda at the United Nations
in February 2003. At a more fundamental level, the Bush II administration clearly did not
consider the West European allies as the essential foundation of U.S. foreign relations.692 The
Bush II White House built strong ties with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s right-wing
Likud bloc and was sympathetic with Israel’s strategic objectives. Thus, Secretary Powell’s
influence on policy toward the Arab Middle East was limited. This liability allowed the Bush II
neocons to push their radical idealist agenda of regional transformation through regime change in
Iraq.693 Richard Haass, State’s head of policy planning, noted “Powell saw 9/11 as an
opportunity … The tragedy could be used to rebuild damaged relationships” with Europe.
Immediately after that catastrophic event, NATO declared an attack on the USA would be
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considered an attack on all member states (NATO Charter, Article V).694 Defense’s Rumsfeld
revealed that the NATO allies even sent AWACs to help patrol U.S. airspace in the days
following 9/11, thus illustrating the initial goodwill subsequently squandered.695 Powell was
optimistic: “We are engaging the world … We want to make this a long-standing coalition.”696 If
allies were necessary, the premier ally, UK’s Tony Blair, insisted that the use of force required
United Nations authorization.697 That was the rationale for Powell’s “show and tell” performance
at the UN.698 Such was the context in which Powell was working that he became the “go-to”
communicator for a military policy he disagreed with. The soldier turned diplomat had
envisioned an altogether different direction from the foreign policy conceived by the Bush II
inner circle. Meanwhile, the president himself boasted America could indeed go it alone.699
Prior to Bush’s “Axis of Evil” reference in his State of the Union address, January 29,
2002, the president asked for Iraq war plans. He was briefed on revised war plans for Iraq in
February, April, May, June, and August (when the final plan of attack was approved).700 Yet,
from February to April, George W. Bush said there was no war plan or (cryptically) he was
holding it close to his vest if there was one. By the “Axis of Evil” moment, the Bush II
administration had “progressively shifted the focus” of the War on Terrorism: from retaliation
for 9/11 to stopping terrorists from acquiring WMDs to preventing states from supplying WMDs
to terrorists. In an odd twist, presidential speechwriter David Frum recalled that the target of the
“Axis of Evil” speech was Iraq; Iran and North Korea were afterthoughts.701 Curiously, if the
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threats from Iraq were multifaceted and quite clear, why confuse the issue by bringing other
actors into the discussion?702 Frum’s contentions would appear dubious insofar as intelligence
not only confirmed the North Koreans’ possession of nuclear weaponry, but also that they were
sharing nuclear technology and materials with Iran, Syria, and Libya. (See Chapter 7.)
Although simmering on the back burner for a year and a half, the run-up to war with Iraq
was nonetheless “hasty.” The anticipated participation of Germany, France, and Russia never
materialized.703 In August 2002, Powell obtained Bush II’s approval of a “diplomatic track” to
take the U.S. case to the United Nations. British Prime Minister Tony Blair had said the UN’s
stamp of approval was the only way that the UK could support the United States. Jack Straw
replaced Robin Cook as British Foreign Minister largely because of Cook’s doubts about the
wisdom of invading Iraq. Then, on August 26, 2002, Cheney gave a speech accusing Iraq of
having nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons – immediately, the Vice President’s words
were interpreted as a “virtual declaration of war.”704 Cheney’s speech, deliberately or not,
undermined Powell’s diplomatic track and appeared to call for “pre-emption.” Also alarmed
were Bush I veterans, including Baker, Brent Scowcroft, and Lawrence Eagleburger.705 (What a
pity there was no reconstituted “wise men” group!) The President of the United States addressed
the United Nations, September 12, 2002. In less than two months, the UN Security Council voted
15-0 for Resolution 1441 (November 8, 2002). “This was seen as a Powell victory,” and for Iraq
it was “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” and to renew weapon
inspections. Still, as had been the case in the Persian Gulf War, Powell found the diplomacy,
702
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sanctions, and inspections would not allow enough time to work and could not slow the advance
preparations for war that were well underway.706
The United States failed to bring allies, France and Germany, on board. On January 22,
2003, France and Germany went public with their opposition to an attack on Iraq.707 Donald
Rumsfeld hence disparagingly referred to Germany and France, “That’s the old Europe.” The
Defense Secretary contended his use of the phrase “old Europe” was exaggerated, but he meant
what he said.708 The Secretary of State was caught off-guard when French President Jacques
Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder opposed the United States over Iraq.709
Indeed, Powell’s worldview was more in line with Chirac’s and Schroeder’s than with that of the
Bush II neocons. Also, support for Bush II in Iraq seriously undermined Blair’s popularity with
the British electorate. Hence, Bush’s public criticism of Germany disregarded and devalued
Germany’s active engagement in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.710
Powell ordered the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs to recruit exiles and organize some
seventeen committees to work on postwar planning and nation-building; this effort resulted in
the thirteen-volume “Future of Iraq Project” under Thomas Warrick. President Bush signed
National Security Presidential Directive Number 24, incorporating the “Future of Iraq Project,”
on January 20, 2003.711 Subsequently, Rumsfeld and Feith excluded Warrick from postwar
planning and worked with Ahmad Chalabi, an Iraqi expatriate, who had no support or credibility
in Iraq.712 In terms of Iraqi WMDs, Powell pored over CIA data and UN weapons inspectors’
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reports before his presentation to the Security Council.713 However, Powell found the CIA’s
intelligence weak, not Tenet’s “slam dunk.”714 Rumsfeld acknowledged “Powell left no room for
doubt” at the UN based on “more than a decade of proof” regarding Iraqi pursuit of chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons and connections with terrorism, in particular, the “Zarqawi
network.”715 In effect, Powell’s public position contradicted his private misgivings, as he
expressed later. Note Robin Cook resigned his post in the UK because of the use of discredited
British intelligence in Powell’s evidence.716
At the outset of the invasion of Iraq, Deputy Secretary Douglas Feith presented the Bush
II advisers with a plan to transfer power to an Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA), composed of exiles
and Kurdish leaders. The Defense and State Departments disagreed on the wisdom of using
“externals” (i.e., Iraqi expatriates and exiles) and State was overall much more pessimistic about
the prospects for a peaceful postwar Iraq.717 The State Department reportedly paid $33 million to
Ahmed Chalabi and the expatriate Iraqi National Congress, from 2000 to 2003, according to the
General Accounting Office (GAO).718 At one time called the “George Washington of Iraq,”
Chalabi and his group fell out of favor by 2004 amid allegations of fraud. Any plan to install
Chalabi in power in the immediate aftermath of the invasion was described by Dick Cheney as
possibly substituting a new demagogue for the old one and would be “immoral.”719 Instead of
Feith’s transitional body, Bush II put Jerry Bremer in charge of the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) with full executive power, apparently with Rumsfeld’s blessing. According to
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Condoleezza Rice, the CPA was “overblown and grandiose” and made mistakes. In September
2003, a twenty-five-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was created, but it had only an
advisory capacity. In January 2004, Chalabi (who had been forced to resign as head of the IGC
after a month) told Rice: “We need you to respect our need for sovereignty.” She hence told the
president: “We’re running out of time and the Iraqis are running out of patience.”720

George W. Bush admitted, “There was one important contingency for which we had not
adequately prepared. In the weeks after liberation, Baghdad descended into a state of lawlessness
…” as police “collapsed” and military “melted away.” Note Bush’s use of passive voice, begging
the question – Why did anarchy or chaos break out? De-Ba’athification, disarming and
dismantling of Iraqi military and police were executed at U.S. direction!721 As for the de facto
alliance or protective umbrella for the Kurds, Tenet of the CIA told Iraqi Kurds that this time the
United States was “really on the march,” implying a decade-long abandonment of them. Great
Britain’s Blair and allies in the Arab Middle East (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait) were on
board with Iraq redux, but not France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey (a potential base of
operations).722 While the Bush II war planners did not expect Iraqi forces to capitulate in five
days as they had in the Persian Gulf War, the expectation once the ground war began was that
resistance would peak as U.S. and allied forces converged on Baghdad, which was projected to
fall in three weeks. What did not happen was winning the “hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people.
Four years into the war, General David Petraeus would argue that U.S. military personnel had to
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get out of their compounds and ensure the security of Iraqi civilians, as the prerequisite to the
“troop surge” in 2007-2008.723

II.

National, domestic, or internal political:

John Prados argued that a factor common to the Iraq and Vietnam Wars was
“congressional sanction short of declarations of war and deceptive measures to obtain those
approvals.”724 The Bush II administration went into Iraq in 2003 with wider bipartisan support
than Bush I had enjoyed for Desert Shield/Desert Storm, partly because of the backlash some
liberal Democrats suffered for voting against what turned out to be the late 20th century’s most
popular war. John Kerry was one of these reinvigorated Democrats. In the subsequent
presidential electoral campaign, when Kerry became the Democratic nominee, the incumbent did
not home in on Kerry’s roundtrip flights from dove to hawk and back to dove, but rather the
“shallow illusion of peace” that had existed under Clinton and to which the United States would
allegedly return under Kerry.725 For his part, Senator Kerry charged Bush II was “acting alone”
in Iraq redux, though Rumsfeld and Cheney noted correctly Kerry had voted in favor of the
original decision in the U.S. Senate alongside fellow liberals, Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden.726
Upon his re-election to the Senate in 2002, Kerry had stated, “No military in history has
conquered as much territory and given it back to the people who live there.”727 This circumstance
illustrates an ideological idealism of “messianic democracy” and “American exceptionalism”
that transcends Democratic-Republican and liberal-conservative dividing lines.
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October 4, 2002, the House of Representatives voted 296-133 and the Senate voted 77-23
to use force against Iraq. By contrast, the U.S. Senate narrowly voted 52-47 “to authorize the use
of force” in the Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991. The congressional authorization of the use of
military force against Iraq cited (1) violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions; (2)
the 1993 attempted assassination of Bush I; (3) al-Qaeda’s presence in Iraq; and (4) Iraq’s
continuing to aid and harbor terrorist organizations.728 The Bush II strategy of holding the vote
just before the 2002 congressional election effectively circumscribed Democratic opposition to
the Iraq War for fear of a backlash at the polls.
The Bush II administration’s promotion of the “War on Terrorism” created a “siege
mentality,” in the words of former National Security Adviser Zbigniev Brzezinski. Historian
Terry Anderson identified “a cult of fear in America,” which persisted for several years.729 On
March 18, 2003, George W. Bush broadcast to the nation about the need to end Iraq’s “history of
reckless aggression … For the sake of peace in the world and security for our country and the
rest of the world.”730 Initially, the rally effect contributed to a solid foundation of support for
Bush II, based on the erroneous assumption that this second Iraq War would be cost-free like the
first one twelve years earlier. Bush II also benefited from the public’s consensus against Saddam
and the belief that decapitating his regime was justified for multiple reasons: WMDs, War on
Terrorism, and the heinous nature of the Ba’athist regime. The war’s popularity would fade
against the impact of the American public’s casualty sensitivity. As was the case for Bill Clinton
in places like Somalia and Kosovo, the American public supported military combat so long as
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the casualties were minimal.731 Public enthusiasm for the Iraq War faded as the death toll
approached 5,000 and the number of wounded ballooned to 40,000 over the course of the next
eight years.
Congressional deference has given wide latitude to the commander-in-chief ever since
the Cold War era, beginning with the Korean War, 1950-1953. The uptick in congressional
opposition—or, at minimum, criticism—of Bush II’s war in Iraq was uncharacteristic of an
otherwise acquiescent legislative branch that essentially abdicated its constitutional war
powers.732 The friendly bipartisan consensus dissolved as Iraq redux deteriorated into a guerrilla
insurgency, dysfunctional nation-building, billions of dollars in unbudgeted costs, more than
minimal casualties, and not a trace of WMDs found by Paul Bremer or Jay Garner, the
bureaucrats in charge.
Therefore, the rubber stamp of Congress was preceded by the Bush II team’s flawed
assumptions and preconceived determinants of their decision making. The nonexistence of
weapons of mass destruction, more than any other factor, poisoned the atmosphere within ninety
days of Bush’s erroneous assertion of “mission accomplished.” The scandal involving
Ambassador Joseph Wilson, Valerie Plame, and Scooter Libby began with a Washington Post
article (June 12, 2003), followed by Wilson’s Op-Ed piece (“smoking gun”) in the New York
Times (July 6, 2003), and syndicated columnist Robert Novak “outting” Plame as a CIA officer
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(July 14, 2003).733 The imbroglio revealed that Bush II had relied on corrupted data to support its
belief in Iraqi WMDs. “When Saddam didn’t use WMD on our troops, I was relieved … [and]
surprised,” Bush said. “The press corps constantly raised the question: ‘Where are the WMDs?’ I
was asking the same thing.”734 CIA Director Tenet enlisted David Kay to lead a weapons
inspection team, as he had done for the UN in 1991.735 Simply, “We were all wrong.” President
Bush II hastens to add, so too were Hillary, Kerry, Edwards, and the “vast majority of
Congress.”736 David Kay’s inspection team would find Iraq’s nuclear weapon progress was at
“the very most rudimentary.”737

The salience of the WMD issue is its implication that the underlying premise for the Iraq
War was not only false, but fabricated. A poll conducted between June and September 2003
asked people whether they thought evidence of WMDs had been discovered in Iraq since U.S.
forces invaded the country. They were also asked which media sources they relied upon. Those
who obtained their news primarily from Fox News (33%) were three times as likely to believe
that evidence of WMDs had been discovered in Iraq than those who relied on PBS and NPR
(11%) for their news, and one-third more likely than those who primarily watched CBS (23%),
and twice as likely than readers of print media (17%).738 Recall Wolfowitz’s admission that the
WMD argument was the one that most justified war.
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A month after invading Iraq, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich demanded Powell’s
resignation for misleading the American public and the world.739 Rumsfeld, for one, said Powell
and everyone else in the Bush II administration did not lie. “The far less dramatic truth is that we
were wrong.”740 Might we ask at what price error?
III.

Individual, personal, and ideological factors:
Mann argued that the decision to invade Iraq derived from the ideology and worldview of

the key Bush II foreign policy mavens, especially those neocons known as the Vulcans.741 First,
the centrality and the efficacy of American military power was essential to a stable world order.
Second, the United States was a force for good around the globe. Third, they held “an
extraordinarily optimistic” opinion of U.S. capabilities. Fourth, despite the historical importance
of alliances, the neocons were ready and willing to see the United States act unilaterally. Fifth,
the U.S. military should be so powerful that it would be impossible for any other nation-state to
compete with it.742
The Bush II foreign policy makers envisioned something of a new world order well
before 9/11 as a function of the new post-Cold War reality. Paul Wolfowitz said, “The world of
2001 is fundamentally different from that of 1972.”743 Even Condoleezza Rice stepped away
from her previous pragmatic realism. “Then September 11 greatly accelerated the
administration’s willingness to rethink cold war ideas about national security,” as she explained
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Bush II’s “sense of impatience” in foreign policy formulation, unlike the Bush I and Reagan
administrations.744
Is this the crux of the Bush II wars, whereby hubris and ideology (neoconservative
idealism) trumped pragmatism and principle, even international law? Kinzer contends: “The
[9/11] attacks brought out the president’s unilateral and chauvinistic instincts … arguing
publically that America was engaged in a biblical struggle of ‘good’ versus ‘evil,’ that others
hated America for its freedoms.”745 Unquestionably, the Bush II White House envisioned a
“new” Arab-Muslim Middle East.746 This vision resulted from “America’s historic missionary
zeal to ‘enlighten’ other societies,” in short, “exceptionalism.”747 A document titled Joint Vision
2010, prepared by the Joint Chiefs in 1996, defined five pillars of post-modern warfare: “fullspectrum domination, precision air strikes, dominant maneuvering, full-dimensional protection,
and focused logistics.” As explained by General Wesley Clark, “The vision heavily emphasized
information dominance and precision strikes.”748 This strategic philosophy was put into practice
in Iraq in 2003 and predates Bush II, 9/11, and the Bush Doctrine.
One cannot disregard the ideological lens or prism through which events are understood
and decisions are made by politicians in response. George W. Bush recalled, “The bombs that
fell on Iraq that night [March 19, 2003] marked the opening phase in the liberation of Iraq.”749 It
does not take a heavy dose of cynicism to see an Orwellian touch in labeling the invasion and
occupation of a sovereign state as “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Neither is it an indictment of
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human nature for an individual leader to promote his policy as serving a greater good rather than
selfish interests. Yet such a crusade-like pursuit might incur compromised principles or even
laws. “In responding to terrorism, Paul Wilkinson warned, a democracy must not use “methods
which are incompatible with liberal values of humanity, liberty, justice.”750 Unfortunately, Bush
II’s crusade mentality invited acquiescence, if not instigation, of actions at variance with liberal
democratic values. The conservative Cato Institute published a study that characterized the Bush
II administration’s activities as “a ceaseless push for power”751 based on the belief in “a
president who can launch wars at will.”752 (Note this is a generic POTUS to which the authors
refer, not a cult of personality centered on Bush II.) Similarly, Bacevich argues that 9/11 gave
the Bush II administration an unprecedented opportunity to advance their ambitions for
American hegemony.753 “They seized that opportunity with alacrity.”754
Bush’s “moral clarity” coincided with a “protective bubble,” where the president’s
information was provided “by a small coterie of advisors,” including Rice and chief of staff
Andrew Card. According to O’Sullivan, “His White House was airtight, not unlike Reagan’s,
with his schedule rigidly controlled by his gatekeepers.”755 Francis Fukuyama has observed,
“[The] neocons became extremely distrustful of anyone who did not share their views … [and]
that extended to Secretary of State Powell and much of the intelligence community.”756 Quoting
O’Sullivan: “They believed America had entered a postmodern, postdiplomatic age, where raw
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military power created radically new realities.”757 General Tommy Franks saw that “these
advisors’ deep and inflexible commitment to their own ideas was disruptive, as they sought to
influence their bosses—and ultimately George W. Bush—with respect to Iraq policy.”758 Powell
reportedly told British Foreign Minister Jack Straw he thought the neocons were “[expletive]
crazies”759 Powell was of a much different mindset and worldview from the neoconservatives’
“fundamentalist faith in the indispensability of American military power” and their “illusion of
America’s unchallenged military dominance.”760 Basic ideological and philosophical differences
made conflict “inevitable” for Powell with Cheney, Rumsfeld, and the neocon coterie.761 In the
final analysis, Colin Powell was a soldier, loyal to his commander-in-chief to the bitter end. His
style was to lay out the options, weighted in his preferred direction. “But once the decision is
made, the debate ends.”762
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, pompously or piously, opened a cabinet meeting
shortly after 9/11 by invoking the blessing of “ever faithful God.”763 Tellingly, Rumsfeld’s
opening statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, in August 2006, bordered on
paranoia and flirted with conspiracy theory on an apocalyptic scale: “If we left Iraq prematurely
…” the forces of militant jihad would be emboldened to move against “Afghanistan … the
Middle East … [and former Muslim territories] from Spain to [the] Philippines.”764 Secretary
Rumsfeld additionally invoked American folklore, equating the U.S. mission in the world to the
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triumphal narrative of courageous ancestors to “cross oceans” and “settle a wilderness.”765
Rumsfeld is also on record as saying the large number of troops in Kosovo led to a “culture of
dependence,” hardly an evidence-based finding, but rather an ideologically biased assumption.766
Likewise, proposals from Ambassador Paul Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to
build a market economy in a “free and democratic” Iraq indicated an ahistorical ignorance of the
fact that Mesopotamia was where marketplaces were invented 5,000 years ago, thus illustrating
the skewed and truncated worldview of staffers recruited by ideological criteria rather than
professional or academic expertise. Rumsfeld dismissed the idea of Bush II finishing Bush I’s
“unfinished business.”767 This disdain was in keeping with Rumsfeld’s belief in the “limits of
future knowledge” and “inability to predict the future,” negating hindsight as well as foresight.
According to Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “[Rumsfeld’s] big strategic
theme is uncertainty.”768 As a result, dissonant information, including contradictory intelligence,
could be dismissed. However, Mann rejected the viewpoint that considered the Iraq War to have
been “a mismanaged effort with tragic consequences,” akin to conservative revisionism on the
Vietnam War. The Iraq War was a stepping stone in a strategic vision, based on Mann’s assertion
of an historic mission annunciated by Condoleezza Rice and the Vulcans in the wake of 9/11.769
This vision was encapsulated in the document, National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, co-authored by Rice, Phillip Zalikow, her academic collaborator, and Stephen Hadley,
her assistant.770 The document contained three key elements of neoconservative strategy: (1) preemption; (2) the United States as unchallenged sole superpower; and (3) to promote democratic
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values.771 Alongside the stratagem of idealism in pursuit of hegemony, or hegemony as the
vehicle for ideality, the propaganda impact of the belief that interventionism was necessary for
“our freedoms,” as parroted by Bush II, would be long-lasting.
IV.

Criteria for the use of force:

Simply, the policies of the Bush II administration completely contradicted the Powell
Doctrine, notwithstanding the presence of that canon’s author in a key position.772 This section
presents the five criteria for the use of force and examines the Bush II White House’s adherence
to the principles. First, have all other options been explored, such as diplomacy, sanctions, or
negotiation? Second, are the political, diplomatic, or military objectives clearly understood?
Third, is the battle plan realistic and can the military objectives be effectively maintained? (In
other words, are the strategy and tactics “doable” and “winnable”?) Fourth, are there sufficient
resources to accomplish the mission, in effect, going in with “overwhelming force”? Fifth, is
there an exit strategy and timetable in place for the withdrawal of personnel once the mission’s
goals have been achieved? Let us examine the evidence.
#1 – Have all other options been explored, such as diplomacy, sanctions, or negotiation?
Sanctions were not given enough time to work, and weapon inspections yielded no fruit. For
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, “one of the more complex strategic challenges we faced was how
to fight an enemy that was present in numerous countries.” He thus contended, “The mission
must determine the coalition … The coalition ought not determine the mission.”773 However,
disregarding the reservations and objections of those unwilling to join the coalition—Canada,
France, and Germany in particular—imperiled not only the North Atlantic alliance, but
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potentially other global interactions as well. As discussed above, the “go” decision caused a rift
with Germany and France; discredited intelligence prominently featured in Powell’s Security
Council presentation compromised the position of Blair’s UK government; and disregarding the
findings of UN weapon inspectors strained the credibility of the United States at the United
Nations, a body whose support the United States had very publically courted.
#2 – Are the political, diplomatic, or military objectives clearly understood? From
the outset, General Tommy Franks saw the interrelationship of functions: “In addition to
boots on the ground, we would need ‘wingtips’ on the ground” to rebuild Iraq’s government,
economy, and society.774 Franks, as the would-be “MacArthur of Iraq,” saw the doubleedged sword of military occupation: “improved security” counterbalanced by the United
States “perceived [as] occupying bully.”775 The three legs of Iraq’s occupation and
reconstruction: (1) CENCOM commanded by Franks; (2) retired general Jay Garner’s
occupation headquarters; and (3) the Iraqi provisional authority during the transition to a
new national government.776 Franks’s tour of duty as CENCOM commander was
quintessentially post-modern or 21st century warfare insofar as he spent the run-up to the
invasion of Iraq “shuttling to Washington regularly.” Franks said Garner was a good choice
to lead the occupation and transformation, but the war against Iraq required a plan derived
from a concept based on the two equal imperatives, “security” and “civil action.”777 The
problem was that the people on the scene in Iraq ignored State’s research on security during
occupation in the “Future of Iraq Project” directed by Thomas Warrick.
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Former ambassador Jay Garner was tied up looking for WMDs when the Iraqi
government, military, and police were being dismembered by Paul Bremer’s Iraqi
Governing Council in carrying out nation-building, without the benefit of Mideast, Arabic,
or diplomatic expertise. De-Ba’athification and privatization were therefore inept. Hence,
insurgency began within 90 days!778 Bremer’s authority dismembered the Ba’ath party and
dismissed the army. The president said in retrospect, “I should have insisted on more
debate.” The decapitation of Iraqi governance “cut too deep.”779
The most profound miscalculation of the Bush II administration was not their failure
to predict the insurgency—because the architects of the War on Terrorism conspicuously
invited it. They should have expected infiltration, based on intelligence about Iraqi links to
Islamist militants, even if they exaggerated the threat to “hype” or “sell” the war. Rather,
the Bush II team failed to anticipate that the media and public would see the confluence of
Fedayeen (Ba’ath guerrillas), foreign militants affiliated with al-Qaeda, and Iranian-backed
Shi’ia and other Islamists as evidence of a “hopeless and unwinnable” quagmire like
Vietnam. George W. Bush countered this perception with respect to three audiences: first,
the American public; second, U.S. troops; and third, the enemy. 780 Thus, we have the
context of his comment: “Bring ‘em on.” What is puzzling is that Bush maintained his
words were misconstrued, whereas the evidence suggests this was the desired result, to
make Iraq Act II of the “long war” a.k.a. War on Terrorism—whereby U.S. troops
constituted a magnet to draw militant forces into battle. It follows that a guerrilla insurgency
should have been expected. Yet Rumsfeld denied guerrilla warfare was underway for weeks
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until the commander of troops in the field, General John Abizaid, acknowledged it, using
the term insurgency, in July 2003.781
#3 – Is the battle plan realistic and can the military objectives be effectively
maintained? Franks characterized Operation Iraqi Freedom in idealistic political terms:
“The goal of this campaign was not conquest, not oil, but freedom for twenty-six million
Iraqis.”782 Under the direction of Franks, the invasion kicked off with the largest special
forces operation in history, deploying American, British, and Australian veterans of the
Afghanistan war. The first mission was to destroy the Iraqis’ visual observation posts,
followed by air strikes to “blind” the enemy forces. 783 Early on, Franks worried about the
Rumilyah oil fields, fearing that Saddam would order them burned. 784 Thus, Franks’s
modified “shock and awe” strove to preserve vital economic assets in the midst of the
conflagration.
As the Vice President remembered the first NSC briefing by videoconference,
Tommy Franks presented an operational plan that was the same blueprint as the Persian
Gulf War, calling for 450,000 troops and a six-month build-up.785 That did not happen. With
the expressed support of Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, the CENTCOM commander told the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Leave me the hell alone to run the war.”786 General Franks disagreed
with the prevailing logic of the top brass, saying, “in their view numbers and weight of fire
counted.” This viewpoint has been around since Ulysses S. Grant in the American Civil
War. Although promoting modernization, the military, by nature, took a cautious approach
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to reworking standard procedures. 787 Thus, Rumsfeld exploited the disconnect between
Franks and the JCS. In December 2002, the Pentagon’s boss recommended that Franks and
his planners review a study titled Shock and Awe.788 The doctrine argued for “rapid
dominance” of the enemy’s communication, command, and control by deploying
technology-intensive weaponry. 789 According to Gordon and Trainor, “Franks appropriated
the term ‘shock and awe’ but not the details.”790 The rapid dominance concept comprised
four core components: (1) “total” knowledge; (2) “rapidity”; (3) “brilliant execution”; and
(4) “control of the environment.” The shock and awe doctrine also included “decay and
default,” defined as: “The imposition of societal breakdown over a lengthy period, but
without the application of massive destruction.”791 However, Rumsfeld further
recommended U.S. Air Force General Charles Hoover’s article: “How and When to Use
Shock and Awe,” which stated: “In the end, if we are going to lead[,] then we must be
considered the madmen of the world … It is only our ends that must be admired … If we are
to achieve noble purposes[,] we must be prepared to act in the most ignoble manner.”792
This extraordinary statement that emerged from the recommended reading of Pentagon
personnel set the stage for the introduction of extraordinary interrogation techniques and
still cruder actions, whether openly authorized or not, that tainted Bush II’s legacy in Iraq as
well as Afghanistan.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld disputed the idea that Army Chief of Staff Eric
Shinseki and Marine Corps Commandant James L. Jones opposed the Iraq War plan due to
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minimal troop levels (130,000 versus 400,000-500,000 in the Persian Gulf War), or their
disagreements with Franks.793 On February 25, 2003, Senator Carl Levin (DemocratMichigan) questioned General Shinseki, who responded that “a significant ground-force
presence … of several hundred thousand soldiers” would be required, seemingly implying
the force level assembled was inadequate.794 Shinseki claimed his comments were
“misinterpreted” and Rumsfeld disingenuously denied forcing the General into early
retirement in June 2003. 795 When the President asked Rumsfeld and the Pentagon chiefs if
they had enough manpower, “I accepted Don and the military’s judgment.”796 The Iraq
War’s operational planning essentially failed to match the Powell Doctrine’s necessary
condition of committing sufficient resources to accomplish the job. The invading force was
just too small. Whereas Cheney charged Powell with undermining the Bush II
administration by openly criticizing the minimalist battle plan behind the scenes to the
Western European alliance partners, George W. Bush wrote that Powell honestly expressed
his reservations to Tommy Franks, but promised to support the war, notwithstanding those
concerns.797 Rumsfeld, as the “transformational” leader and “war minister,” doggedly
pushed through a course of action that suited his ideological proclivities and bullied anyone
who stood opposed.798 Franks was “eager to please Rumsfeld [and] went along with the
Defense Secretary’s desire to prove the days of half-million troop mobilizations were a
thing of the past.”799 The basic problem was that the only previous large-scale military
action taken by the United States in Iraq had passed the performance test. Powell told
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Franks: “I’ve got problems with force size and support of that force.” Franks responded that
Powell “no longer wore Army green.”800 One might counter that Rumsfeld, Cheney, and the
other neocons never wore green, while the officer turned diplomat was applying his
experiential education (acquired from Vietnam and the first Iraq War) to the problem at
hand. In the words of Marine General Anthony Zinni: “all others who have never fired a
shot and are hot to go to war see it another way.”801 Zinni, who preceded Franks as
CENCOM commander, charged that Bush II “had to create a false rationale for going in to
get public support … the books were cooked, in my mind. The intelligence was not there.”
Zinni criticized the “lack of planning” for post-war Iraq because the administration should
have expected that chaos would result from “regime change” by force. 802 Zinni’s plan for
Iraqi nation-building, “Desert Crossing,” predicted post-war stabilization and reconstruction
would be “a massive challenge.”803 Moreover, no one addressed the tacit illogic: If the
United States was engaged in a new kind of struggle against a new kind of enemy,
comprised of nonstate and substate actors, then why did the U.S. deploy conventional
combat forces in a “traditional” military invasion and occupation?
A recurring theme in the history of warfare is the personalization or villainization of
the enemy. As Bush II’s forty-eight-hour deadline approached, CIA Director Tenet reported
the possible location of Saddam Hussein and his two sons. “We discussed the possible
outcome if a strike were ordered.” All favored it, as Rumsfeld recounted. Special forces hit
Dora Farms, where Saddam and sons were reportedly holed up—but they were not there!804
Franks succumbed to this impulsive side issue by recommending the raid “to decapitate the
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regime and end the war early” during Bush II’s final ultimatum before boots hit the ground.
The Dora Farms raid failed to corral the Iraqi leader and was a complete waste of time.
Moreover, the failed attempt was enough of a warning for the deposed Iraqi leader to avoid
capture (literally “holed up”) for months.
#4—Are there sufficient resources to accomplish the mission, in effect, going in with
“overwhelming” force? Gordon and Trainor observed, “For years, conservatives had seen
the Powell doctrine of overwhelming force as an impediment to action and an inhibition
against the exercise of American power.”805 Bacevich argued that Rumsfeld’s strategy was
flawed, convoluted, and contradictory. Rumsfeld’s grand plan for “transformation” of the
21st century military into a downsized, technology-intensive, global fighting force
contradicted the neocon’s new vision for democratizing the Arab Middle East. “Imperial
projects don’t prosper with small armies that leave quickly; they require large armies that
stay.”806 Or, in the words of journalist Tom Friedman, Rumsfeld sent in “just enough troops
to lose” Iraq redux.807 Rumsfeld has countered that no one in the Pentagon thought the
“Desert Storm on Steroids” plan, calling for a six-month build-up of half a million troops,
was workable. The former Defense chief added that millions if not billions of dollars’ worth
of equipment had been unused and thus wasted after Desert Shield/Desert Storm.808 “Shock
and awe,” the post-modern reincarnation of blitzkrieg, aims at demolishing the enemy’s
morale as much as its infrastructure. The variant directed by Tommy Franks missed both
targets. “I had decided to leave Iraq’s electric power grid untouched,”809 said Franks, a
decision that would have caused the precursors of modern “total” war, Grant and William T.
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Sherman, to cringe. Those winning generals ripped and crumpled the enemy’s infrastructure
so that they could never again use it. The president told Tommy Franks, “we’re not going to
destroy Iraq. We’re going to liberate the country from Saddam Hussein’s regime.”810 The
commanding general concurred, “excluding power plants [etc.] … preserving the national
infrastructure outweighs any momentary tactical advantage.”811 Hence, in the following
weeks and months, unemployed Iraqi soldiers, police, and militia would take their weapons
home to well lighted houses, where they could communicate over hard-wired and wireless
telephones and watch CNN coverage of the unfolding insurgency they would sooner or later
join. As informed observers predicted and witnessed, the armed insurgents did not join any
sort of war for the true faith or against the infidel, but simply to compel the foreign invading
and occupying army out of their country.

In June 2003, Franks retired to accolades as the guiding hand that “won” two small wars,
whereas in reality Franks presided over two early phases of a “long war,” which might be
considered superficially successful if taken independently of unintended consequences. On
March 19, 2003: “The invasion went ahead … with almost effortless success.” Some 135,000
troops reached Baghdad in three weeks.812 Instead of erroneous and irrelevant discussion of 9/11,
al-Qaeda, and WMDs, there needed to be a policy-making debate in Congress and the media
about why the war was necessary, postwar goals for Iraq, and actual costs. An initial figure of
$70 billion in total rose to $70 billion per year as a modest estimate. Who paid for the war?
Instead of Iraqi oil revenue, as the President ventured at a June 2003 press conference, it would
be the U.S. national debt. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Richard Myers said al-Qaeda comprised
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only a small fraction of the Iraqi insurgency, even as President Bush called Iraq the “central front
of War on Terrorism.”813 Australian author and consultant David John Kilcullen proposed a new
strategic approach to the global War on Terrorism, arguing that the strategy is best understood as
a “global Islamic insurgency,” initiated by a diffuse group of Islamists with conflicting goals.
Kilcullen questioned the relevance of classical counterinsurgency theory to modern conflict.
There may be numerous competing insurgencies in one theatre, meaning that the
counterinsurgent must control the overall environment rather than defeat a specific enemy.
Therefore, Kilcullen called for “conflict ethnography: a deep, situation-specific understanding of
the human, social and cultural dimensions of a conflict, understood not by analogy with some
other conflict, but in its own terms.”814 The absence of such a culturally specific political track
illustrated one of the major shortcomings of Bush II’s handling of Iraq redux: the wrong strategy.
One is reminded of General Omar Bradley’s famous quote about extending the Korean War into
China: “The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”815
#5—Is there an exit strategy and timetable in place for the withdrawal of personnel
once the mission’s goals have been achieved? As Franks himself described, the morale of
Iraqi loyalists was not snuffed. “A pattern soon emerged: The Fedayeen [Saddam Hussein’s
martyrs] would attack our convoys, and then the surrounding enemy would gather in the
cities inside walled compounds.”816 The U.S. and allied troops tried to weed out such
pockets of resistance to little avail insofar as “the Fedayeen continued to fight savagely …
The enemy’s tactics became even more unorthodox and brutal,” for example, dropping
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white flags and using women and children as human shields. 817 Three months after the
invasion, the Sadrist movement, led by Shi’a imam, Muqtada al-Sadr, which had opposed
Saddam and applauded U.S. intervention, announced it was time for United States and
coalition troops to go home. In short order, the Sadrist militia joined the insurgency. 818
The Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command in Afghanistan and Iraq,
Stanley McChrystal, recalled: “Over the summer [of 2003], the post invasion elation of April and
confidence of May had quickly muddied, turning to growing unease in June. By August,
nervousness tempered the halls and offices of the Pentagon.”819 As for WMDs, Paul Bremer
inspected 900 sites (from a list compiled by CIA) and found zero evidence of chemical,
biological, and nuclear weaponry.820 There would be no exit strategy or timetable for withdrawal
until 2007-2008, when a “troop surge” finally, in the opinion of many, put sufficient personnel
and firepower in place to weaken the insurgency and reduce it to a dying ember.
CONCLUSION

How could we judge the second Iraq War as a success? Even if we return to our initial
proposition that Iraq redux was designed to go on the offensive in the War on Terrorism, a good
deal of research would rebut the effectiveness of fighting a tactic (terrorism as the tactic of the
weak) rather than a specific enemy. Jay Garner, a retired military man, told Rumsfeld that the
United States under Bush II made “three tragic mistakes” in Iraq: (1) de-Ba’athification went too
far; (2) the foregoing purge unemployed 30,000 to 50,000 soldiers and police and drove them
“underground”; and (3) Jerry Bremer could not be “the face of the government to the Iraqi
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people” during the extended transition period to self-government. When Garner returned to
Washington in June 2003, he told Rumsfeld, “There’s still time to turn it around.” The Pentagon
boss answered, “We’re not going to go back.”821 Garner never told George W. Bush about his
“three tragic mistakes.”822 The president joked to Garner, “Hey, Jay, you want to do Iran?”
Garner replied in jest, “we want to hold out for Cuba.”823 (Was this just Bush II’s meaningless
little joke? See Chapter 7.)
The 9/11 Commission stated, “the global conflict against Islamist terrorism became a
different kind of struggle.”824 The apparently successful model of Afghanistan, where the CIA
employed intelligence, covert capabilities, and cash while the U.S. military supplied firepower
and logistics against an insurgency, was applied to Iraq with deleterious effects. The 9/11
Commission’s final report went on to say, “Our enemy is twofold: al-Qaeda, a stateless network
of terrorists … and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world.” Thus, the United States
was engaged in “more than a war on terrorism … Terrorism is a tactic … Calling this struggle a
war accurately … Our effort should be accompanied by a preventive strategy that is as much, or
more political as it is military.”825 This is where Bush II’s policy misfired and fell short, leaving
aside whether it was a war of necessity or choice. The 9/11 Report concluded, “If the United
States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do
the job for us.”826 Donald Rumsfeld summed it up: Saddam’s regime collapsed twenty-one days
after the war began … Less than two years after 9/11, the U.S. military had changed the regimes
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in Afghanistan and Iraq, two of the world’s leading sponsors of terrorism.”827 However, the
United States under Bush II failed to “close the deal” in Iraq as well as Afghanistan, both wars
requiring escalation (“troop surge”) before an exit strategy or protracted timetable for withdrawal
could be installed. (See Chapter 8.) As for exercising superpower hegemony by projecting power
in Iraq, the United States was handicapped from intervening in any other wars of choice or
necessity that might have popped up while being weighed down in Iraq and Afghanistan for the
next eight years. For example, if a hypothetical threat from Iran or North Korea materialized, the
United States would have been hard-pressed to deploy troops rapidly and effectively.
The unintended consequences of Iraq redux highlight that the decision-making process
was flawed from the outset. The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was driven by international
factors, but failed to enlist the support of important allies (Category I). The Iraqi decision was
driven by an ideology of messianic democracy, American exceptionalism, and a belief in the
efficacy of American power (category III). The occupation of Iraq floundered due to myriad
misconceptions and wishful thinking regarding strategy and tactics on the ground during an
unplanned, under-resourced, and overextended counterinsurgency (category IV).
One is reminded of Napoleon Bonaparte’s caveat: “Never ascribe to malice that which
can be adequately explained by incompetence.”828
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CHAPTER 7
BUSH II: IRAN—NO-GO
INTRODUCTION
All of the factors that contributed to the Bush II administration’s “go” decision in the Iraq
War, 2003, were present in the circumstances surrounding a possible strike against Iran. The two
primary causes of war with Iraq, weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism, applied
to Iran, especially during the period of 2006 to 2008. One could argue that the case for action
was even more compelling given Iran’s real potential nuclear threat and its close ties to
Hezbollah. The momentum toward intervention and continuity from one administration (Clinton)
to the next (Bush II) were equally applicable to Iraq and Iran. Systemic factors, including
alliance issues, were present in the case of Iran as well. Intuitively, we suspect military factors
might have been decisive in keeping direct intervention against Iran off the table: there was an
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established operational base in the region, but it was not clear whether a surgical strike against
Iranian nuclear facilities would have been effective by itself; the scope and scale of an Iranian
intervention, beyond a simple air strike, would be far greater than the Iraqi and Afghan
operations because of Iran’s larger geographic area and population; while counteraction by other
states was unlikely, there was weak cooperation from diplomatic partners, particularly Russia;
and the ongoing campaigns, including troop surges, in Iraq and Afghanistan, precluded opening
up a third theatre. At the same time, we ought not rule out the influence of public opinion
(casualty sensitivity and intervention fatigue) and potential partisan opposition. The evidence
strongly suggests a larger recognition of the limits of projected power by the Bush II “Vulcans,”
however belatedly in their tenure. Additionally, provocation by Iran was much less in
comparison to the excessive WMD and terrorist-support claims made by Bush II in the case of
Iraq. The “cry wolf” phenomenon had seriously undermined the administration’s credibility.
Similarly to the case of Iraq, an array of international (category I) and ideological
(category III) factors would have driven Bush II to intervene militarily had it not been for the
reality that U.S. military power (category IV) was overextended.
1. Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition),
where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act?
Gaddis posits that the response to “surprise attacks” altered the strategy of U.S. foreign
policy three times in diplomatic history: (1) initiating continentalism and unilateralism after the
1814 burning of Washington, D.C. by the British; (2) instituting the intercontinental grand
alliance strategy after the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese; and (3) declaration of the
so-called Bush Doctrine, “unilateralism,” and “pre-emption” after 9/11.829 Rather than a sea
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change, we propose a gradual evolution in the direction of intervention, occupation, and nationbuilding. Gaddis’s view seemed logical in the near term, but became less so as 9/11 receded into
history.
At the time of Desert Storm and Desert Shield, Colin Powell had stated: “For the previous
ten years, Iran, not Iraq, had been our Persian Gulf nemesis. We wanted Iraq to continue as a
counterweight to Iran.”830 Even as the first war with Iraq wound down, in March 1991, “our
practical intention was to leave Baghdad enough power to survive as a threat to an Iran that
remained bitterly hostile to the United States.”831 There were also concerns about the economic
impact of disruption in the flow of Persian Gulf oil. Parra has written: “The collapse of the
[worldwide oil] market and the reluctance to accept the need for some collective action to restore
supply was considerably delayed by reductions in production that were forced on Iraq and Iran
by the appalling war that Iraq so rashly started in September 1980.”832 Thus, Iran was of
longstanding strategic and economic importance to U.S. foreign-policy interests.
Cause of War 1: WMDs— In May 2001, Bush I’s Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
“reminded the president of the intelligence community’s reports [that] Iran was pursuing
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.”833 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was
launched by the Bush II administration in 2003 as a voluntary intergovernmental program to
inhibit the global trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and related
materials.834 As Condoleezza Rice explained in 2005, PSI did not have a “formal support
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structure, secretariat, headquarters or chairperson,” but instead was based on commitments from
participating states to cooperate with interdiction efforts through national legal channels.835 PSI
operated according to a “broken tail-light scenario,” whereby member states interdicted the
transportation of WMDs or related cargo in their own ports when the shippers violated the host
country’s national laws.836 PSI members (U.S., U.K., Australia, France, Italy, and Bahrain)
conducted multilateral exercises and war games (for example, a live exercise to find a nuclear
detonator aboard an oil tanker) to enhance cooperation in interdiction. In February 2005, based
on U.S. intelligence, a European government denied an export license in accordance with
national export law for an Iran-bound shipment of coolers that might have been used in the
Iranians’ heavy water reactor program.837 In October 2006, the PSI held its first training exercise
in the Arabian Gulf with an intelligence-sharing war game.838 In accordance with United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1696, a “third country” denied the transfer of missile components to
Iran in November 2006, and a shipment of material used for ballistic missile propellant intended
for delivery to an Iranian entity was denied access to an Asian port and rerouted to its port of
origin.839
The advancement of Iranian nuclear weaponry development was indicated by an
unclassified Defense Department report to Congress in 2010: “In late 2008 and early 2009, Iran
launched the Safir, a multi-stage space launch vehicle, which indicates progress in some
technologies relevant to ICBMs.” The report also predicted: “With sufficient foreign assistance,
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Iran could probably develop and test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of
reaching the United States by 2015. Iran could also have an intermediate-range ballistic missile
(IRBM) capable of threatening Europe.”840 Thus, if not the actual WMD, the Iranian nuclear
delivery capability seemed neither fabricated nor exaggerated, unlike the case with Iraq. While
the evidence in the 2010 CDA is post-Bush II, the logical conclusion is that U.S. military
capacity was already stretched to the limit by two concurrent wars. Moreover, the level of threat
from Iran seemed more of a long-term concern than a short-term one. This perception of threat
continued into the Obama administration.841
Cause of War 2: Iranian sponsorship of terrorists–Defense chief Rumsfeld summarized the
malignant character of U.S.-Iranian relations: “Since the radical Islamist regime came to power
there, no other nation in the world has been responsible for as many deaths to U.S. troops as
Iran.”842 Although that claim is not credible, Rumsfeld’s exaggeration highlights the degree of
enmity toward Tehran in Washington, where the hardliners in the Bush II administration had
been weighing their options for dealing with Iran as early as the summer of 2003.843 The Quds
Force, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was founded by Ayatollah Rouhollah
Khomeini in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution as a paramilitary militia to defend the
Islamic Republic against internal and external threats. The Quds Force’s power has expanded far
beyond its original mandate to include managing Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and insurgent
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operations through its elite guerrilla force and proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.844
According to Reidel, the Revolutionary Guard was created as a “counterweight to the regular
military, and to protect the revolution against a possible coup.”845 In establishing the Quds Force,
Khomeini was seeking to avoid a reprise of the successful 1953 coup that overthrew Mohammed
Mossadegh’s reform government and reinstated Shah Reza Pahlavi. The Quds Force’s activities
since 1979 had been aimed at fishing in troubled waters far beyond Tehran, including
involvement in the insurgency in Iraq. In 2007, Bush II accused Iran of providing roadside
bombs to networks inside Iraq, coalition forces captured several militants in Iraq with alleged
links to the Quds Force and Hezbollah, and the Treasury Department designated the Quds Force
as a supporter of terrorism for aiding the Taliban and other terrorist groups. Whereas some
analysts held that Iran’s role in Iraq and Afghanistan was exaggerated, analyst Mehdi Khalaji
stated, “the Revolutionary Guards are the spine of the current political structure [in Iran] and a
major player in the Iranian economy.”846
The Quds Force’s political influence grew in opposition to reformist president Mohammad
Khatami, 2001-2005, and a number of Quds Force members entered politics when Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad won the presidency in 2005. Despite a lack of evidence of excessive deaths at the
hands of Quds in Iraq, institutional players such as Treasury and State were building a case
against the Revolutionary Guards, even if their influence was exaggerated in the Iraq insurgency.
The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism pointed to a “marked resurgence of Iran’s
state sponsorship of terrorism, through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, its
Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and Tehran’s ally Hezbollah … [and] have reached a
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tempo unseen since the 1990s.”847 The Quds Force exploited the antagonism between Ayatollah
Ali Khomenei and Ahmadinejad because the second Supreme Leader became dependent on the
group’s power, in the opinion of Iran expert Milani.848 The Quds Force policed the streets of
Tehran, carried out domestic surveillance, conducted foreign intelligence operations, and also
controlled Iran’s ballistic missiles.849 According to a RAND study, released in January 2009,
“much of the institution’s rise to prominence over competing militias and paramilitaries in the
revolutionary period was due to its effectiveness in suppressing internal dissent.”850 Quds Force
guardsmen and Basij militia were accused of violently crushing demonstrations in cities and on
campuses,851 and the Ashura Brigades were created in 1993 to suppress civil unrest.852 The Quds
Force was without question cut from the same cloth as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Hezbollah.
However, the Quds Force was not seen as directly attacking U.S. interests beyond the immediate
Middle East environs. At this point, however, Rumsfeld’s alarmism came to no avail.
After 9/11, Rumsfeld maintained: “we had little specific intelligence to support targeting
terrorist operatives themselves.”853 Nonetheless, Iranian organization and sponsorship of
Hezbollah in Lebanon was widely known.854 Hezbollah’s anti-Western militancy began in 1983
with attacks on Western targets in Lebanon, expanded to attacks on Israel and other activities in
retaliation for threats to the organization or Iran’s interests, and aimed to intimidate foreign
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governments into releasing imprisoned operatives.855 Hezbollah and the Quds Force executed
joint missions, including the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996.856 The symbiotic
relationship between Iran and Hezbollah was not only based on ideological and religious affinity.
Hezbollah was heavily dependent on its Iranian mentors for financial support, estimated by the
Pentagon to have been between $100 and $200 million annually.857 Therefore, Hezbollah
became Iran’s primary militant proxy. Although Hezbollah continued its guerrilla warfare
against Israel, it ceased terrorist activities against American or Western targets after the Khobar
Towers incident.858 Thus, once the Quds Force ceased attacking U.S. targets, the pressure to preempt or prevent would be less. Regardless, the Iranian-Hezbollah connection clearly indicated
that Tehran fit the Bush Doctrine’s definition of a state sponsor of terrorism.
More directly, the Quds Force was accused of aiding the Taliban resistance in
Afghanistan and assisting the Bosnian Muslims against the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia.859
Given that Iraq redux was the overriding preoccupation of U.S. military and foreign policy from
2003 onward, the Iranian Quds Force was “deployed to challenge the United States presence” as
a deterrent in Iraq.860 The collaboration between the Quds Force and Shi’ite militia groups
predated the Bush II invasion, originating in the clandestine opposition to Saddam Hussein’s
Sunni-dominated regime.861 General John Abizaid charged the Quds Force with sponsoring
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“Shi’a death squads” in November 2006.862 As sectarian violence continued, U.S. Army
commanders in Iraq accused the Quds Force of having a hand in planning a raid on the city of
Karbala in January 2007.863 Later that year, General Ray Odierno concluded that Iranian support
for Shi’a insurgents escalated as U.S. forces carried out the “troop surge” policy in 2007.864
At this time, considering Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory
remarks about Israel and the assertion of his country’s right to pursue a nuclear program, one
could argue that Ahmadinejad could prove to be a legitimate impending threat, like Saddam and
Iraq circa 2002-2003, thereby justifying a pre-emptive response by Bush II, as per the vaunted
Bush Doctrine. Yet the evidence would suggest the meddling of Iran in the Iraq insurgency was
exaggerated. For example, CNN cited studies that reported half of the foreign insurgents
infiltrating into Iraq were Saudis.865 Additionally, counterterrorism expert Richard Clarke
observed that the Ayatollah, not the Iranian president, controlled the Quds Force.866 Moreover, a
prominent Iranian defector, Mohsen Sazegara (Deputy Prime Minister, 1981-1989), stated: “Not
only the foreign ministry of Iran; even the president does not know what the Revolutionary
Guards does [sic] outside of Iran.”867 Thus, the evidence of state sponsorship of terrorist activity
was ambiguous at best, if not a rogue elephant.
According to Donald Rumsfeld, Iran was supplying insurgents in Iraq with deadly
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as early as 2004. The Defense Secretary queried the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a November 2006 memorandum: “If we know so much
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about what Iran is doing in Iraq, why don’t we do something about it?” Rumsfeld answered his
own question some years later: “a country strained by two wars and an administration battling
criticism and declining public approval was not ready to be firm with Iran.”868 Dick Cheney
might have been inclined to rally the Vulcans to beat the tom-toms for war with Iran, but the vice
president had become increasingly marginalized in Bush II’s second term.869
2. Why did a president decide to intervene (or not) where his predecessor or successor may
have weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage?
As noted earlier, the momentum toward intervention and continuity from one
administration (Clinton) to the next (Bush II) was equally applicable to Iraq and Iran. As with the
case of Iraq, there was a prior history of conflict involving military action with Iran as well. The
most significant and infamous dispute between the United States and Iran came during the
Iranian hostage crisis, November 1979 to January 1981. The Carter administration’s military
intervention, Operation Eagle’s Claw, failed in April 1980.
On April 21, 1980, a Delta Force team of 132 elite soldiers, commanded by Colonel
Charles Beckwith, nicknamed “Charlie’s Angels,” was dispatched to a staging area in Egypt,
where they deployed by transport plane in a two-step trip to Iran’s Dasht-e-Kavir, an inland
region known as the Great Salt Desert, some 200 miles away from Tehran. Three days later,
eight Sea Stallion helicopters took off from the USS Nimitz in the Gulf of Oman, between the
Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. The helicopters were to refuel and rendezvous with Beckwith’s
commandos at a location identified as “Desert One.” From there, Charlie’s Angels and the Sea
Stallions would proceed to a mountain location sixty-five miles outside Tehran. The commandos
would move on to the capital by truck, infiltrate the embassy, rescue the hostages, and then the
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helicopters would fly in and pick up everyone. Meanwhile, U.S. Army Rangers would seize an
abandoned airfield thirty-five miles out of the city and wait for Charlie’s Angels to arrive with
the freed hostages, who would later be flown to safety by transport planes standing by. The
intervention commenced April 24, whereupon a fiasco of errors ensued. The operation
unexpectedly encountered a busload of civilians and a fuel truck at Desert One, and the Sea
Stallions never arrived. The combat helicopters suffered a broken rotor, malfunctioning
gyroscope, and failed hydraulic pump. The mechanical failures put three of the eight choppers
out of commission, and Beckwith aborted the mission. In a macabre finale, one of the helicopters
collided with one of the transport planes during the evacuation, killing eight Delta Force
members.870 Author Mark Bowden wrote that Carter’s “go” decision in Operation Eagle Claw
“defined the word ‘debacle.’”871 The official investigation by the Holloway Commission
attributed the mission’s failure to “the ad hoc nature of the task force and an excessive degree of
security.”872
The next controversy in U.S.-Iranian relations was the Iran-Contra Affair during the
Reagan administration. A small circle of advisers within Reagan’s White House, led by the
National Security Adviser, Admiral John Poindexter, illegally sold arms to the Iranians in the
Iran-Iraq War and secretly funneled the money paid to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. In
addition to aiding the right-wing insurgents to overthrow Nicaragua’s Sandinista government, the
Reagan administration’s objectives were to appease Iran and to facilitate Iranian influence with
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militant groups to release a number of American hostages in Lebanon.873 The ill-conceived
scheme failed in both regards: only three hostages were freed over the next eighteen months874
and the U.S.-Iran relationship remained hostile and would soon lead to a second intervention in
less than a decade.
To keep Persian Gulf oil flowing to the outside world, the U.S. Navy skirmished with
Iranian naval forces in 1986; two years later, U.S. air and sea power intervened against Iran to
compel a ceasefire to end the war with Iraq.875 On April 14, 1988, the frigate USS Samuel B.
Roberts sailed into a floating minefield and within twenty minutes was nearly blown apart by an
Iranian mine. In the space of seventy-two hours, the U.S. Joint Task Force—Middle East carried
out Operation Praying Mantis in retaliation.876 During a two-day period, units from all four
armed services destroyed two Iranian oil platforms that had been utilized in attacks on merchant
shipping. The U.S. forces subsequently destroyed three Iranian warships and disabled half a
dozen Iranian speedboats.877 After U.S.A.F. aircraft destroyed one Iranian frigate and crippled
another, Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci and Joint Chiefs Chairman William J. Crowe ordered
American forces to stand down in order to give the Iranians an opportunity to end the combat.
Operation Praying Mantis concluded the next day and cost the lives of two service members.878
In contrast to the Desert One fiasco, Operation Praying Mantis provided a positive precedent for
future intervention, albeit one in which U.S. forces went in and out quickly.

873

United States Congress, Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Secret
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert
Arms Transactions with Iran (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987-1988).
874
Draper, Theodore, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1994).
875
Manning, The Eighties Club, Chapter 11.
876
Peniston, Bradley, No Higher Honor: Saving the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2006).
877
Operation Praying Mantis, www.GlobalSecurity.org, accessed August 18, 2013.
878
Perkins, J. B., III (Captain, U.S.N.), “The Surface View: Operation Praying Mantis,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval
Institute 66, United States Naval Institute. http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/8-8434/page3.aspx.

198

Momentum toward intervention continued from Reagan to Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II.
In 1992, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (Gore-McCain Act) was passed to give the
president authority to impose sanctions against individuals or foreign governments that
“knowingly and materially” enhanced Iran’s or Iraq’s WMD capability or certain types of
conventional weapons.879 The legislation was motivated by concerns about Russian conventional
arms exports to Iran.880 In 1996, Congress amended the Gore-McCain Act to sanction arms
suppliers to state sponsors of terrorism, including Iran. In 1997, the Clinton administration opted
not to sanction China under Gore-McCain for transferring cruise missiles to Iran because the
weaponry was not considered “destabilizing,” but the ensuing debate in Congress indicated the
increased worries about Iran.881 The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (Glenn Amendment),
enacted in 1994, called for penalties against individuals that might assist in the acquisition of
nuclear weapons. The Glenn Amendment also empowered the president to impose sanctions on
non-nuclear countries for acquiring or exploding nuclear devices.882 Lastly, the Iran Sanctions
Act bolstered attempts to deny the Iranians access to resources that contributed to their nuclear
program as well as support for terrorist organizations.883 The act, passed by Congress in 1996,
enabled the President to impose financial sanctions on foreign individuals, businesses, or
organizations that invested in the Iranian energy sector, WMD technology, or advanced
conventional weapons.884 Indeed, there began preparations for possible war with Iran under Bill
Clinton. Specifically, intervention was under consideration in response to the Khobar Towers
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attack (June 25, 1996), but, as explained by Richard Clarke, the Iranians subsequently ceased or
suspended terrorist activities against the United States from 1997 onward.885
Momentum and continuity were evident in U.S. policy toward Iran as the Bush II
administration followed the Clinton administration, employing sanctions with the threat of force
ever present in the subtext. “The possibilities of military pressure and diplomatic engagement
were not mutually exclusive,” Defense Secretary Rumsfeld contended. “DOD policy officials
wrote a number of memos suggesting ways to reach out to the Iranian opposition movement …
Ultimately, the President decided that negotiations were the best way to deal with Iran.”886 In the
following section, we will examine Bush II’s perceptions of Iran in the context of coercive
diplomacy and the potential use of force.
3. How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or
management style) have a determinative effect?
By 2006, George W. Bush faced a crucial moment of decision with regard to Iran. The
president analogized the situation as “two ticking clocks.” One counted down to Iranian nuclear
weapons; the other marked time to political reform in Iran. “My objective was to slow the first
clock and speed the second.”887 Bush II wrote: “I had three options to consider. Some in
Washington suggested that America should negotiate directly with Iran. I believed talking to
Ahmadinejad would legitimize him and his views and dispirit Iran’s freedom movement, slowing
the change clock … The second option was multilateral diplomacy conducted with both carrots
and sticks … [i.e.,] a package of incentives … [plus] tough sanctions … [thus] slowing the bomb
clock … The final option was a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. This goal [sic] would

885

Clarke, Richard, Against All Enemies (Waterville, ME: Thorndyke, 2004), pp. 111-121.
Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 639.
887
Bush, George W., Decision Points (New York: Crown, 2010), p. 416.
886

200

stop the bomb clock … Some thought destroying the regime’s prized project would embolden
the opposition; others worried that a foreign military intervention would stir up Iranian
nationalism and unite the people against us.”888 The Texan “decider-in-chief” entertained a broad
mix of opinion in considering which way to go with Iran. “I discussed the options with the
national security team extensively in the spring of 2006. I consulted closely with Vladimir Putin,
Angela Merkel, and Tony Blair … In May, [Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice] announced
that we would join the Europeans in negotiating with Iran, but only if the regime verifiably
suspended its enrichment.” The United Nations Security Council backed the United States and
set a deadline of August 31, 2006 for Iran’s response. “The summer passed and the answer never
came.”889
More than a year later, the Bush II White House was thrown off course by the National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of November 2007. The President lamented with some
consternation: “Despite the fact that Iran was testing missiles that could be used as a delivery
system and had announced its resumption of uranium-enrichment, the NIE opened with an eyepopping declaration: ‘We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear
weapons program.’ [emphasis added] … I decided to declassify the key findings so that we
could shape the news stories with the facts. The backlash was immediate. Ahmadinejad hailed
the NIE as ‘a great victory.’ Momentum for new sanctions faded almost immediately among the
Europeans, Russians, and Chinese.”890 The president seemed to fault his own government’s
intelligence for undermining his policy, but his decision to make the finding public seemed to
contradict his apparent goals. “The NIE didn’t just undermine diplomacy. It also tied my hands
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on the military side.” Bush II listed the major concerns for military intervention in Iran as: “its
uncertain effectiveness and the serious problems it would create for Iraq’s fragile young
democracy. But after the NIE, how could I possibly explain using the military to destroy the
nuclear facilities of a country the intelligence community said had no active nuclear weapons
program?” With inadvertent irony, Bush II reasoned: “I wondered if the intelligence community
was trying so hard to avoid repeating its mistake on Iraq that it had underestimated the threat
from Iran.”891
If there was a forward-looking vision in the Bush II worldview that could be applied to
Iran, it was elaborated in the transformational diplomacy initiative promoted by National
Security Adviser and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in order to reinvigorate the Foreign
Service. As an ideological hybrid of the liberal “indispensable nation” and neoconservative quest
for hegemony, Rice and Bush II championed the expansion of democratic governments.
Therefore, any war goals for Iran would implicitly include regime change and nation-building
rather than simply eliminating uranium-enrichment and ending sponsorship of terrorism. Rice
stated that the 9/11 attacks had been rooted in “oppression and despair” and the United States
must support democratic reform and human rights throughout the Middle East.892
Rice also tried to reform and restructure the Foreign Service and State Department as a
whole. She described transformational diplomacy as a grand design to “work with our many
partners around the world … [and] build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will
respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international
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system.”893 As Secretary of State, Rice worked at the intersection of Bush II’s military and
diplomatic tracks. She proposed: “We will not meet the challenges of the twenty-first century
through military or any other means alone. Our national security requires the integration of our
universal principles with all elements of our national power: our defense, our diplomacy, our
development assistance, our democracy promotion efforts, free trade, and the good work of our
private sector and society. And it is the State Department, more than any other agency of
government, that is called to lead this work.”894 Unfortunately, the Department of State’s
influence on the nation-building and political operations in Afghanistan and Iraq was minimal—
with the Pentagon’s civilian and military policy makers dominating the post-invasion occupation
and reconstruction. There was little reason to expect that a post-intervention Iran would have
been handled differently by the Bush II White House.

According to National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, Bush II attempted engagement,
but became frustrated over time at Iran’s failure to respond.895 Mid-year 2003, Iranian officials
reportedly offered to turn over three suspected al-Qaeda terrorists to the United States and
promised more of the same in exchange for ending operations of an Iraq-based Iranian rebel
group, the People’s Mujahedin (MEK). The Iranian offer was discussed by Cheney, Rumsfeld,
Powell, and Rice at Bush II’s ranch in July 2003. Powell and Rice wanted to engage Iran and the
State Department held one meeting with the Iranians soon afterward. However, “hard-liners” in
the Pentagon and the vice president’s office opposed a deal with Tehran, which they saw as a
sponsor of terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferator, and on the verge of being overthrown in a
893
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popular revolution—through either covert U.S. action or outright military intervention.896 The
Islamic Republic fit into the worldview of Bush II as an implacable enemy, engaged in
actionable offences—nuclear weapons development and sponsorship of terrorism—that might
have invited U.S. military intervention were it not for overstretched resources during the critical
period of 2006-2008.

4. How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or
nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an
administration and from one presidency to the next?
As stated above, the case of Iran might have been part of a belated recognition of the
limits of projected power by the Bush II “Vulcans.” George W. Bush hinted at a lesson learned
from the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq when he offhandedly recounted: “others worried
that a foreign military intervention would stir up Iranian nationalism and unite the people against
us.”897
The Bush II administration engaged Iran in diplomatic initiatives on several occasions. In
May 2003, U.S. and Iranian officials met in Geneva “under U.N. auspices” to discuss
Afghanistan, Iraq, and related regional issues.898 The United States and Iran cooperated on
Afghanistan issues, including enforcement of an arms embargo on the Taliban, counter-narcotics
operations, humanitarian relief, and planning and intelligence assistance for Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF).899 The Bush II administration reportedly assigned Foreign Service Officers as
“Iran-watchers” in embassies and consulates in countries neighboring Iran and in cities with a
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significant Iranian exile presence.900 Late in Bush II’s tenure, Secretary Rice explored the idea of
opening a diplomatic interest section in Tehran, a step toward normalization, but such a
controversial move never came to a formal decision.901 In the period from 2006 to 2008, Bush II
attempted to support civilian nuclear programs in the Middle East through nuclear cooperation
agreements so that nations developing nuclear energy would not need to engage in uraniumenrichment that could be diverted to nuclear weapons. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Mary Alice Hayward bluntly asserted, the intent of the initiative was to counter Iran’s expressed
need to develop nuclear power for civilian uses. She stated, in December 2008: “We believe that,
within the region, [civilian nuclear agreements] can serve as powerful counter-examples to Iran’s
irresponsible enrichment program.”902 In January 2009, upon signing a civilian nuclear
cooperation agreement between the United States and the United Arab Emirates, Condoleezza
Rice called the agreement a “powerful and timely model,” but the Bush II administration had
failed to end Iran’s uranium-enrichment by either diplomacy or coercion.903

The failure to divert Iran’s movement toward nuclear weapons development through
other means left the Bush II White House with the military option, even as the Pentagon was
elaborating its “long war” doctrine. David Kilcullen, an adviser to General David Petraeus, stated
the long war concept was born in “a series of windowless offices deep inside the Pentagon” and
the term was coined in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).904 Hence, George W.
Bush adopted the term in his State of the Union address: “our own generation is in a long war
900
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against a determined enemy.”905 Andrew Bacevich questioned the origin of the long war
doctrine, by a “small, self-perpetuating, self-anointed group of specialists.”906 Tom Hayden
critiqued the contradiction between the QDR’s recommendation to finish “our current wars
before thinking about the next,” on one hand, and how “we fight wars that bleed into each other
without clear end points,” on the other.907 The term was absent from the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review issued in February 2010 by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.908 However,
the phrase might have disappeared, but the rationale of the long war continued to underlay the
U.S. military posture in the Middle East.

The Bush II team failed to cement a diplomatic solution to the perceived Iranian threats
of terrorism and WMDs, thus leading to consideration of military options, which hence became
increasingly unrealistic under the shadow of the extended stalemates in Iraq and Afghanistan,
eroding public support, and declining international prestige.

I.

International, systemic, or structural factors:

Systemic factors, including alliance issues, were present in the case of Iran as well.
George W. Bush recalled Condoleezza Rice’s first European trip abroad as Secretary of State:
“‘They’re not talking about Iraq,’ she said. ‘They’re all worried about Iran.’”909 Bush II
characterized the threat to peace posed by “the world’s leading sponsors of terrorism.”
Additionally, an Iranian opposition group brought information to the attention of U.S.
intelligence to show the Islamic Republic was pursuing uranium-enrichment and heavy-water
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production in August 2002. “All of a sudden there weren’t so many complaints about including
Iran in the axis of evil,” the President noted.910 Iran suspended its uranium-enrichment in
exchange for financial aid and trade from the U.K., Germany, and France in October 2003, but,
by June 2005, according to Bush II, “everything changed” when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came
to power.911 Russia and the European Union offered Iran help in developing civilian nuclear
power, but these offers were rejected.912 Therefore, the Bush II administration followed a twotrack policy on Iran: sanctions plus diplomacy. The President consulted with the British,
German, and Russian heads of government. The Secretary of State told the European allies that
the United States would join them in negotiations with Iran on the condition that the Ayatollah’s
regime verifiably suspended its uranium-enrichment activities.913 At this time, Rice said, “we’d
taken a number of small steps to unify the international community on the Iran issue … but there
seemed to be little motivation to levy Security Council sanctions against Tehran … with the
Russians signaling publicly that they didn’t favor punitive actions … The big carrot for the
Iranians was U.S. participation in the negotiations.”914 The international level was only half the
problem for Rice. “Getting consensus around a U.S. policy shift of this magnitude would not be
easy. I wasn’t even sure that I could get the President to that point,” said Rice. “The President
was not immediately convinced that we ought to offer to join the negotiations.”915 To complicate
the matter further, in May 2006, “the stepped-up aggression against our forces led by Iranian
allies in Iraq … made the President and other members of the NSC wonder whether ‘rewarding’
the Iranians with an offer to talk made any sense while they were killing our soldiers.”916 Bush II
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discussed the idea with Tony Blair of the U.K. and wondered whether the Europeans would
follow up with tough sanctions if negotiations failed. Blair supported the idea of sanctions and
carried it to Angela Merkel of Germany and Jacques Chirac of France, who promised they would
not “go soft.” Vladimir Putin was glad the United States was “taking Russia’s advice.”917 The
Secretary of State’s statement was described by her successor as National Security Adviser,
Stephen Hadley, as “pretty tough.” Hence, Secretary Rice explained: “I didn’t want Tehran to
think that it had gained the upper hand.” Rice made the offer public May 31, 2006: the U.S. was
ready to negotiate in exchange for “verifiable suspension” of uranium-enrichment and
reprocessing facilities. She said “all issues” were open to negotiate; in effect, a “political thaw”
between the Islamic Republic and the United States was key. “Left unsaid was the central point:
we were not, in the short run, seeking regime change,” she later admitted.918
Iran replied to what they interpreted as the “disrespectful tone” of Rice’s message. First,
talking tough had backfired, contradicting the conciliatory intention. Second, the U.S. required
Iran to capitulate on the main area of contention, uranium-enrichment, as a condition for
negotiating.919 Third and finally, to Rice’s disappointment, the Russians were less cooperative
than she had hoped.920 In July 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1696 demanded that Iran
suspend uranium-enrichment and reprocessing activities. Then Tehran’s chief negotiator refused
to meet with the EU representatives while Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attended the UN General
Assembly in New York. Rice considered this a ruse to cover Ayatollah Ali Khomeini’s pulling
the plug on the negotiations.921
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“The next challenge was to develop effective sanctions,” as the President saw it. “I
directed the Treasury Department to work with its European counterparts to make it harder for
Iranian banks and businesses to move money. We also designated the Iranian Quds Force of
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, which allowed [the U.S.
government] to freeze their assets.” In December 2006, Resolution 1737 condemned Iran and
imposed sanctions, followed by Resolution 1747, which tightened those sanctions, in March
2007. Bush II considered Resolutions 1737 and 1747 to be major successes; they banned arms
exchanges, froze assets, and prohibited sale or transfer of nuclear equipment. “Persuading the
Europeans, Russians, and Chinese,” he later boasted, “was a diplomatic achievement.”922
Not all of the players in the Bush II White House thought diplomacy was the right road to
take. On October 9, 2006, President George W. Bush publically accused North Korea of
transferring missile technology to Syria and Iran. Vice President Dick Cheney hoped for a more
forceful U.S. stance. “I believed that our intelligence would have a far greater chance of being
effective if the North Koreans and Iranians understood that they faced the possibility of military
action if the diplomacy failed.” 923 To the contrary, the bottom line for the Bush II “Vulcans”
was expressed by Condoleezza Rice: “It was well understood that we didn’t have the bandwidth
for unilateral confrontation with Iran and North Korea, given the situation in Iraq.”924 Thus, the
gap between capabilities and desire imposed realistic limitations on action.
The United Nations Security Council voted five times to sanction Iran for its pursuit of a
nuclear weapons capability during the 2006-2008 period.925 The objectives of these sanctions
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were to stop WMD-related trade; freeze Iranian assets associated with nuclear development;
inhibit Iranian arms exports; monitor international travel by Iranians; subject Iranian sea and air
cargo shipments to inspection; and restrict Iranian banking and financial activities.926 The longrange success of the policy of isolation and sanctions against Iran seemed to bear fruit as of
November 23, 2013, with the tentative agreement with the United States and P5+1 partners,
whereby Tehran agreed to suspend uranium-enrichment activities and centrifuge production.927
By 2008, the Bush II White House was attempting to reassemble the diplomatic coalition
against Iran, push sanctions on “dual-use technologies” (materials and equipment that could be
diverted for weaponry development), and proposing a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe
(Poland and Czech Republic). “I worked to speed the reform clock by meeting with Iranian
dissidents, calling for the release of political prisoners,” among other activities, including
propaganda against the Islamic Republic’s regime. “I regret [leaving the presidency with] the
Iranian issue unresolved,” Bush recalled.928
The Bush II administration primarily worked on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program
through the P5+1 group, an ad-hoc cooperative consisting of the United States, United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Russia, and China. At a P5+1 meeting with Iranian envoys in Geneva, July
2008, Undersecretary of State William Burns conveyed the Bush II administration’s position that
Iran must suspend uranium-enrichment before negotiations would proceed.929 The Bush II brain
trust made ending Iran’s enriched-uranium production its policy priority.930 This policy
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comprised disincentives and inducements to alter Iranian behavior and to coax them into
suspending uranium-enrichment and committing to a verifiable civilian nuclear program.
Secretary of State Rice reiterated Bush II’s preference for a diplomatic approach to Iran, while
also insisting that “President Bush never took any of his options [regarding Iran’s nuclear
program] off the table.”931 According to Rice, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah “somehow held out
hope George W. Bush would ‘take care of Iran’ before leaving office.”932 Instead, the Secretary
of State told foreign ministers at the Gulf Cooperation Council: “We’re not in a position of
strength right now.”933 Thus, by January 2009, outgoing National Security Adviser Hadley
identified Iran as the most serious foreign policy challenge that the next administration would
face in the Middle East.934
The reason for Bush II’s failure to resolve the Iranian situation was simply that the
United States was precluded from utilizing military force or a credible threat of doing so because
of its overextension in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. posture had been based on the use of force
since 2001, but the situation had changed to the effect that concepts such as the Bush Doctrine,
pre-emption, and the long war were no longer practicable. Once again, the gap between
capabilities and desire was apparent. As the memory of 9/11 receded into history, the more
frustrating the war in Iraq and the less likely the United States became to intervene anywhere
else, especially when the threat was distant rather than immediate.
II.

National, domestic, or internal political:
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While lessons learned from prior interventions affected Bush II’s range of options, at the
same time we ought not rule out the influence of public opinion (casualty sensitivity and
intervention fatigue) and potential partisan opposition.
By the second half of Bush II’s second term, the logic of military intervention against
Iran was implicit in the Bush Doctrine, War on Terrorism, and long war policies. At an October
2007 press conference, a reporter asked about Iran and the President responded: “I’ve told people
that if you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in
preventing them from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.” There
followed a hailstorm of criticism for the World War III reference. “They all missed the point. I
wasn’t looking to start a war. I was trying to hold our coalition together to avoid one.”935 Be that
as it may, George W. Bush understood the point: There would be no “rally round the flag” this
time. The media and informed public were not inclined to accept Bush II’s third intervention on
blind faith.
Among the general public’s concerns about Iran, an existential threat to Israel loomed as
ominously as nuclear weapons and sponsorship of terrorism. After Bush II left office, the
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)
found that Americans were still very concerned about Iranian development of nuclear weapons.
An overwhelming majority of opinion believed Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons, which
presented a real threat to U.S. national security. They doubted that the prospect of nuclear
retaliation would be a deterrent against Iran’s attacking Israel with a nuclear weapon.936
Nevertheless, U.S. public opinion favored sanctions over military force. Only 33 percent of
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respondents favored imposing sanctions to stop Iran from uranium-enrichment, but even fewer,
13 percent, supported military action and fewer still, 8 percent, would accept a nuclear-armed
Iran. A German Marshall Fund (GMF) survey revealed that a near majority, 49 percent, of U.S.
opinion would support military action as a last resort.937 Yet a clear-cut majority of the U.S.
public preferred engagement with Iran through diplomacy, 55 percent, rather than action, 15
percent.938 According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, public opinion was pessimistic
about the consequences of military strikes and unconvinced they would deter Iran’s nuclear
weapons program.939 Other polling results indicated over 80 percent of Americans believed that
military strikes alone would fail to stop Iran’s nuclear program, increase support for the Iranian
regime, and potentially lead to retaliation in the form of terrorist attacks. By an overwhelming
majority, 74 percent of the American public thought the United Nations Security Council should
deal with Iran, compared with 20 percent that preferred the United States acting unilaterally.940
Important to note is that most polling questions assumed bombing or a similar “surgical” strike
could effectively eliminate Iran’s nuclear weapons stockpiles, whereas, in reality, there were no
such guarantees.941
Public opinion on hypothetical military intervention against Iran followed an evolution
from support for the use of force to a decline of support and increased distrust of the Bush II
administration. In April 2003, a Los Angeles Times poll found 50 percent of respondents
supporting the use of force if Iran continued to pursue developing nuclear weapons and 36
percent opposed. Support was strongest among Republicans (59 percent) and Democrats (52
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percent) as compared with independents (45 percent).942 In 2006, a Fox News survey found 54
percent support for using air strikes versus 35 percent opposed, but only 42 percent support for
using ground troops versus 48 percent opposed. In addition, support for “whatever military force
is necessary” dropped from 59 percent (with 33 percent opposed) to 50 percent (with 42 percent
opposed) between January and March 2006.943 When registered voters were asked whether they
supported the United States taking military action if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon before Bush
II left office, 48 percent said yes, 44 percent said no, and 8 percent were unsure, as of May
2006.944 The next month, a similar question produced an even stronger result: 52 percent in
favor, 37 percent opposed, and 12 percent unsure in a Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg survey.945
Here support for military intervention to halt the Iranian nuclear program peaked and began to
decline, even as the Bush II administration increasingly focused attention on the issue during the
summer of 2006. By autumn, a Newsweek/Princeton poll found that a majority (54 percent)
would not support air strikes against suspected nuclear sites, while 38 percent would support
them. More tellingly, a mere 18 percent supported sending in ground troops and an
overwhelming 76 percent said they would not.946 In 2007, on the issue of the Iranians supplying
insurgents in Iraq with explosive technology, 55 percent supported taking military action and 45
percent did not.947 However, a similar poll asked respondents if they trusted the Bush II
administration. Only 14 percent believed the administration was telling the “entire truth”; 24
percent thought they were “mostly lying” and 56 percent thought they were “hiding
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something.”948 By late 2007, 54 percent of those surveyed preferred that Bush II should “let the
next President deal with Iran,” while 29 percent supported military action and 16 percent were
unsure.949 The public mood concerning Iran in Bush II’s final year expressed a preference for
diplomacy (61 percent) rather than military action (10 percent) and some 20 percent thought
Iranian WMDs were not a threat.950
Israeli diplomatic pressure and the pro-Israel lobby (such as the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee, APIC) had been repeating the mantra that Iranian nuclear weapons
represented an existential threat to Israel.951 However, whether it was the responsibility of the
United States or Israel to do something about it was another matter. Clearly, U.S. public opinion
had recoiled from attacking Iran. Although the polls did not survey the underlying psychology of
the shift in opinion, our intuitive assumption is that intervention fatigue, intolerance for
casualties, and a generalized distrust for the Bush II White House contributed to the public’s shift
in attitude. The “cry wolf” syndrome would appear to have undermined Bush II’s credibility and
constrained the administration’s ability to shape public opinion.
Overall, Congress was compliant on Bush II’s policy toward Iran and the issues of
sponsoring terrorism, proliferating nuclear weapons, and assisting the insurgency in Iraq were
virtually nonpartisan at this time. In 2004, the House of Representatives passed Resolution 398,
urging the administration “to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade and prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons” by a vote of 376-3.952 As of 2006, Congress passed the Iran Freedom
Support Act (IFSA), which reinforced previously imposed sanctions and expressed support for
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“independent human rights and peaceful pro-democracy forces in Iran.”953 Congress also passed
the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2006 (INKSA), a statute which
prohibited the sale of equipment and technology that could be used for nuclear weaponry or
missiles by penalizing foreign “individuals and entities” involved in such transactions.954 In
September 2007, the Senate declared the Quds Force a terrorist organization and in a separate
resolution called for a diplomatic approach to the Islamic Republic.955 These measures passed the
Senate 75-22 and 75-23, respectively, wherein the opposition comprised a minority of dovish
Democrats averse to Bush II’s interventionism.
In the 2004 presidential election campaign, George W. Bush stated, “On Iran, I hope we
can … continue to work with the world to convince the Iranian mullahs to abandon their nuclear
ambitions,” at the debate in Coral Gables, Florida. Democratic candidate John Kerry, for his part,
agreed Iranian nuclear development was the most serious emergent threat.956 Four years later, the
issue of Iran was not a point of partisan contention in the 2008 campaign, as both Democrat
Barack Obama and Republican John McCain said military action would remain an option if
Iran’s uranium-enrichment program continued.957
III.

Individual, personal, and ideological factors:
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In 2005, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran, George W. Bush
said, “This guy could be nuts.”958 The chief executive set the tone for U.S. policy toward Iran in
his “Axis of Evil” conceptualization. Five years later, President Bush charged that the Quds
Force was interfering in Iraq. At a press conference in early 2007, he stated: “I can say with
certainty that the Quds Force, a part of the Iranian government, has provided these sophisticated
IEDs that have harmed our troops. And I’d like to repeat, I do not know whether or not the Quds
Force was ordered from the top echelons of government. But my point is what’s worse – them
[sic] ordering it and it happening, or them not ordering it and it happening? ... My job is to
protect our troops. And when we find devices that are in that country that are hurting our troops,
we’re going to do something about it, pure and simple ... [D]oes this mean you’re trying to have
a pretext for war? No. It means I’m trying to protect our troops.”959

There emerged a division of opinion in the Bush II administration over the correct
approach to Iran. Vice-President Cheney and others called for a hardline policy, arguing that the
Iranian regime could not reform and conditions would soon be primed for a democratic
revolution. A more realistic assumption was that the Islamic Republic was stable and firmly in
control, and the United States ultimately must deal with the existing regime.960 Nevertheless,
Bush II proceeded on the assumption that the Ayatollah and mullahs could be toppled in Tehran.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice requested $75 million in “emergency funding” from
Congress “to promote political change inside Iran,” in February 2006.961 Two-thirds of the
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funding ($50 million) was earmarked for radio and satellite television broadcasting of
propaganda in Farsi into Iran.962
By spring 2007, Cheney was concerned about Iran’s reported joint venture with Syria in
nuclear weaponry. The Vice-President recalled: “Much of our conversation focused on the bad
intelligence about Iraq’s stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. That experience made some
key policy makers very reluctant to consider robust options for dealing with the Syrian plant.”
He lamented that such gun-shyness was “regrettable,” as there was “no question…in the Syrian
desert was a clandestine reactor, built by two terrorist-sponsoring states.”963 Cheney insisted Iran
“had a robust program underway based on uranium-enriched centrifuge technology…”
(estimated to be 3,000 centrifuges, circa 2007). Also, Cheney could not discuss nuclear weapons
without linkage to terrorism (that is, his “mushroom cloud” nightmare scenarios). Iran was
providing money and weapons to foreign insurgents in Iraq, while Iran and Syria were
supporting Hezbollah against Israel and Lebanon. “They constituted a major threat to U.S.
interests in the Middle East.” Subsequently, Cheney became the “lone voice” calling for air
strikes on Syria. At the National Security Council, the President asked: “Does anyone here agree
with the Vice-President?” Cheney pointed out bitterly that nobody supported him, including a
number of advisers who had enthusiastically promoted the intervention in Iraq a few years
earlier.964 Nevertheless, Iran’s persistent nuclear development efforts sufficiently concerned the
President to repeat: “all options were on the table.” This statement prompted the U.S. regional
commander, Admiral Fox Fallon, to label Bush II’s rhetoric: “bellicose” and “unhelpful.” Not
surprisingly, Fallon later quit, but other voices echoed a similar aversion to a tough line on Iran.
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Robert Gates, who succeeded Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary, allegedly told the Saudi king that
George W. Bush would be “impeached” if he hit Iran.965 Rice’s version of the comment is that
Gates said Bush II “would face the wrath of the American people over such a decision.”966 Was
Secretary Gates speaking for himself, or was he dramatically expressing the negative lessons
learned from Iraq redux? Regardless, the cumulative effect of Bush II’s preceding interventions
defined a clear set of limitations for the administration.
Vice President Cheney was not inclined to let the “alleged” mistakes in Iraq circumscribe
what he saw as the right course in Iran. Cheney was critical of the 2007 National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) that maintained Iran had halted its nuclear quest four years earlier. Cheney
contended the NIE only referred to “covert” uranium-enrichment and weaponization, but not
the production of nuclear (fissionable) material and reported “significant progress” in Iran’s
“declared centrifuge enrichment activities.” According to Cheney, “As it was, the NIE clearly
gave a false impression.” Also, Cheney asserted, the Director of National Intelligence, Mike
McConnell, “later testified that he would have presented the key findings differently if he had it
to do over again.”967 Thus, the lone wolf howled solo.
Meanwhile, Condoleezza Rice was at first extremely skeptical with respect to the “troop
surge” in Iraq in 2007. Rice changed her mind because of (1) David Petraeus’s
counterinsurgency strategy; (2) U.S. pressure on Iraqis to end sectarian bickering; and “if we
didn’t double down,” she believed, “[t]he US would be toast in the Middle East.”968 As
discussed in Chapter 6, internecine strife began early in the Bush II era. Rice battled over
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policy and process with Defense chief Rumsfeld as well as with Dick Cheney. Rice and the
vice president locked horns over Iran as early as August 2002 when she complained to the
president about Cheney’s “declaration of war” speech on Iran.969 Rumsfeld, somewhat
arrogantly, opined on Rice: “From 2001 to 2005, I sent Rice a series of memos suggesting ways
I thought the [NSC] process might be strengthened … No one likes to have his or her style of
management questioned. Rice was a person whose general performance over the years had
undoubtedly been seen as above reproach. She seemed unaccustomed to constructive
suggestions, and not much changed for the better.”970 Rumsfeld was more respectful and
deferential after Rice became a cabinet member, which her biographer, Bumiller, suggested
was due to the weak National Security Adviser having become a “forceful” Secretary of
State.971 Rice also had become Bush II’s top adviser. Her personal bond with the president,
always strong, deepened as she supplanted Cheney as Bush II’s “go-to” person during the
second term.972

When Donald Rumsfeld had served as Ronald Reagan’s emissary to Iraq in the 1980s, he
saw promise in Saddam Hussein as the “bitter adversary” of Syria and Iran. In Rumsfeld’s
view, U.S.-Iran relations were “poisoned” by Khomeini’s radical regime and the Tehran
hostage crisis (1979-1981); to contain Syria and Iran was “our mutual interest” with Iraq; and
“Iran’s leadership,” wrote Rumsfeld, “remained unapproachable.”973 At this time (circa 1984),
“I was troubled by the unreal expectations some in the region had of the United States, of the
ways and how rapidly we could assist them if their neighbors took aggressive actions … [in
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response to] looming dangers posed by Iran and Syria and potentially Iraq … to undertake
planning to deter aggression … Many leaders seemed to believe that American forces would be
able to appear magically from over the hill and deliver them from Iran’s or Iraq’s clutches.”974
Rumsfeld’s dour assessment of the post-Cold War era was that the United States took a
“holiday from strategic thought” and “overconfidence had spurred complacency. U.S.
intelligence capabilities had atrophied, and abortive U.S. operations from Somalia to Haiti had
communicated uncertain American resolve. The problems of Islamist extremism, the nuclear
weapons programs of North Korea and Iran … had been exacerbated.”975 Like Cheney, the
Pentagon czar was skeptical of a diplomatic approach to Iran. “Beginning with Ambassador
Zalmay Khalilzad [Afghanistan-born American diplomat] in December 2001, the Bush [II]
administration also authorized American diplomats to hold discussions of one type or another
with representatives from Iran …” Nothing came of this idea. Of the proposed U.S.-Iranian
talks, April 2006, Rumsfeld said: “I think they are a disaster. We’re stepping on a rake.”976
Again, Rumsfeld emphasized, nothing came of this initiative. “To the contrary, Tehran seemed
to have accelerated its illegal weapons programs, continued to fund Hezbollah in Lebanon,
crushed its domestic dissidents, threatened to erase Israel from the map in another Holocaust,
and escalated their attacks against American service [men and women] in Iraq.”977 We may
assume that Rumsfeld would certainly have been a hawkish voice during the crucial 2006-2008
period had he still been at the table. Thus, Gates represents a change in policy and viewpoint as
well as personnel.
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According to Rice’s biographer: “Well into 2007, Rice and Cheney were on opposite
ends of the administration’s attitude to stop the nuclear threat from Iran. Rice was the chief
advocate of diplomacy and Cheney the chief skeptic and by June [2007] a furious debate had
broken out between Rice and her deputies and Cheney’s staff. Dick’s staff warned of air strikes
… Rice was dismissive of the saber rattling.” However, Rice tried to gloss over their
disagreement, saying, “we’re probably a lot closer than people think on this issue … I am
skeptical one day and optimistic the next.”978 Did Rice’s worldview differ greatly from
Cheney’s? Her biographer writes: “Rice would say ‘transformational diplomacy,’ her Bushinspired vision of spreading democracy around the world. But in reality—and by instinct,
training, and experience—she is a pragmatist who for four overwhelming years got swept away
by her devotion to the president and to the hawks who held power.”979 By 2008, the Secretary
of State was working on the chronically crisis-ridden Lebanon and supported Israel’s renewed
talks with Syria, a move that Cheney and his staff opposed because Bashar al-Assad was allied
with Iran and Hezbollah. Secretary Rice also made overtures to Ahmadinejad. In July 2008,
Rice refused to meet unless Iran stopped uranium-enrichment and she dispatched
Undersecretary of State William J. Burns to Geneva to conduct fruitless discussions with the
Iranians.980 The metaphorical window of opportunity had closed.

IV.

Criteria for the use of force:

The foregoing criteria apply to Iran if and only if plausible military contingencies could
be determined and evaluated. Was Iran a “no-go” because the Bush II administration
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determined the United States could not win? Were U.S. resources spread too thin and the
military overextended? Were the limits of military intervention realized under Bush II, brought
on by imperial overreach?981 Intuitively, we suspect military factors must have been decisive in
keeping direct intervention against Iran off the table: although there was an established
operational base in the region, it is not clear whether a surgical strike against Iranian nuclear
facilities would have been effective by itself; the scope and scale of an Iranian intervention
would be far greater than the Iraq and Afghan operations; the possibility of counteraction by
other states, particularly Russia; and the ongoing campaigns, including troop surges, in Iraq and
Afghanistan precluded opening up a third theatre in the war-ravaged Middle East. Additionally,
the difficulty of targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, whether singularly or as part of a larger
scale operation, had to have been a major question, such that “surgical air strikes” were
probably a fiction. This case echoes Allison’s analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis in which the
Air Force could not guarantee 100% effectiveness.982 Hence, the potential blowback would
comprise everything from counterattacks against U.S. forces or allies in the region or retaliation
against “soft targets” elsewhere. A computer simulation mapping of the fallout from a Trident
D-5 warhead, the largest U.S. nuclear weapon (455 kilotons), showed that a detonation in the
middle of the desert would bring radiation to within 100 kilometers of major Iranian cities.983
The Israelis previously had hit Iraqi and Syrian facilities, but these were much smaller. Admiral
William Fallon, former CENTCOM commander, judged that the Iranian installations were
hardened and eliminating them would not be “a one-time job.” According to U.S.M.C. General
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James Cartwright, former JCS vice-chairman: “Not even a 30 thousand pound ‘bunker buster’
could knock out the Iranian uranium-enrichment unit, such as Fordow, built 250 feet under a
mountain.”984 As General Michael Hayden, Bush II’s CIA and NSA Director, related: “When
we talked about this in the government, the consensus was that [attacking Iran] would
guarantee that which we are trying to prevent — an Iran that will spare nothing to build a
nuclear weapon and that would build it in secret.” Former CIA official John McLaughlin had
also been quoted as saying that an attack on Iran “would be a very bad option.”985

#1—Have all other options been explored, such as diplomacy, sanctions, or negotiation?
The United States developed a military posture through cooperative security arrangements in
the Persian Gulf region directed at containing Iran. In 2000, the United States organized the
Cooperation Defense Initiative (CDI) with Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to facilitate active defense, passive defense, early
warning systems, crisis management, and medical countermeasures.986 By June 2004, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had developed the “front-end of
a nuclear fuel cycle,” leading to speculation that the Iranians could acquire a nuclear weapon as
soon as 2007 or 2008.987 In May 2006, Condoleezza Rice initiated her overture to Tehran and
subsequently the United States pushed sanctions through United Nations Security Council in a
series of resolutions. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates participated in the Gulf
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Security Dialogue (GSD) to cooperate on conventional, unconventional, asymmetric, terrorist
threats, and regional stability related to Iran.988 Previously, Rice hoped the GSD would bolster
the defense of regional allies to stabilize the region.989 In June 2009, Secretary Gates stated that
regional cooperation and intelligence sharing would contain Iran and aid “the interdiction of
illegal shipments of weapons or [nuclear] material.”990 In the end, Bush II “kicked the can
down the road” to the Obama administration.

#2—Are the political, diplomatic, or military objectives clearly understood? A report by
the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), titled Iran: Time for a New Approach (July 2004),
advocated limited dialogue with Iran because the regime was firmly entrenched and U.S.
military intervention to bring about regime change would be ill advised. Iran had triple the
population of Iraq and promised a fierce response to a U.S. invasion and occupation. The CFR
study acknowledged the U.S. military was overextended by its commitments in Afghanistan
and Iraq, and called on Bush II officials to devote their energy to winning Iranian cooperation
in areas of mutual interest. The study urged the administration to open a dialogue with Iran that
could lead to normalizing diplomatic relations.991 According to Soeren Kern of RIE (Madrid):
“the massive projection of U.S. power on Iran’s periphery has led a critical segment of Iran’s
power brokers…to reconsider the value of a rational relationship with Washington.” Reformers
and pragmatists, led by former Iranian president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, were convinced
the regime must revise its foreign policy to end Iran’s isolation and exclusion from the world’s

988

Gates, Robert, Remarks at the Manama Dialogue in Bahrain, December 8, 2007.
Rice, Condoleezza, Statement on Assistance Agreements with Gulf States, Israel and Egypt, Washington, D.C.,
July 30, 2007.
990
Kruzel, John, “Gates: Gulf Nations’ Support of Iraq Contains Iran,” American Forces Press Service, June 23,
2009.
991
Maloney, Suzanne, Iran: Time for a New Approach, Council on Foreign Relations, July 2004, Executive
Summary, pp. 1-7.

989

225

economy. Therefore, a rapprochement with Washington was in Tehran’s interests, but could
only occur if the Iranians addressed the issues of nuclear weapons, terrorism, and aiding the
Iraqi insurgency.992 After a period of stasis, a new, more moderate Iranian President, Hassan
Rouhani, responded positively to overtures from the Obama administration.993

#3—Is the battle plan realistic and can the military objectives be effectively maintained?
Let us ask whether the strategy and tactics were “doable” and “winnable.” A one-dimensional
strategy of precision air strikes against Iran’s nuclear development program held limited
promise. Even if the air strikes destroyed Iran’s uranium-enrichment and weaponization
capacity, they could be reconstituted elsewhere and would do little to change the regime’s
behavior. As George W. Bush himself acknowledged, “a foreign military intervention would
stir up Iranian nationalism and unite the people against us.”994 A more robust air and naval
assault on Iran would have four major targets: Iran’s economic infrastructure, including oil
refineries; Iran’s military infrastructure, including defense electronics; the regime’s political
leadership; and enforcing an external blockade and sanctions.995 An air and sea campaign could
eliminate Iran’s nuclear weapons program, or at the very least set it back by years. If the Bush
II administration’s objective was regime change or long-term transformation of Iranian political
culture, the United States would need to follow up the “shock and awe” bombardment with an
invasion by combat forces.996 A conservative estimate of troop levels might be 450,000 to
750,000, based on the deployment in the two Iraq wars, adjusted for Iran’s proportionally larger
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population. Those troops would have had to come from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the “backdoor
draft” of the National Guard and Reserves.

The United States Strategic Command carried out an exercise in November 2004 to test a
global strike plan code-named “Global Lightening.” The simulated attack used both
conventional and nuclear weapons against a fictitious enemy, a thinly disguised Iran.
According to Hans Kristensen, of the Nuclear Information Project, Global Lightening is “an
actual plan that the Navy and the Air Force translate into strike package for their submarines
and bombers.” The Strategic Command declared an advanced state of readiness following the
Global Lightening exercise. CONPLAN was the operational global strike plan and CONPLAN
8022 was “the overall umbrella plan for sort of the pre-planned strategic scenarios involving
nuclear weapons.” CONPLAN 8022 was designed for the “new” threats from proliferators Iran
and North Korea as well as sub-state terrorists.997 In May 2004, National Security Presidential
Directive #35 (NSPD-35), on Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization, landed on the
President’s desk.998 The classified report covered the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in
the Middle East as part of CONPLAN 8022.999 The use of both nuclear and conventional
weapons was assumed by CONPLAN 8022 under the Bush II administration’s pre-emptive war
policy. This assumption predated the Iraq War. An earlier directive, NSPD-17, dated December
2002, explicitly states, in the event of an attack on U.S. forces: “The United States will
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continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—
including potentially nuclear weapons.”1000

By 2008, Bush II announced plans to construct ten long-range interceptors and a fixedsite radar in Eastern Europe to defend against Iranian long-range missile threats.1001 The Bush
II administration appeared to be dramatizing its linkage of WMDs with terrorism. Additionally,
Bush II authorized the deployment of an aircraft carrier, Patriot missiles, and intelligence
sharing with Gulf allies.1002 The missile defense sites in Eastern Europe were later canceled by
the successor Obama administration. Ultimately, it was not clear whether the anti-ballistic
missile program ever served legitimate counterterrorism purposes.
#4—Are there sufficient resources to accomplish the mission, in effect, going in with
“overwhelming force”? A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
recommended an initial strike against nuclear research facilities, missile bases,
mobile missile launchers, and missile production facilities. The CSIS study determined
that only the United States had the firepower and logistics to launch a campaign of such a scale
and scope.1003 As early as 2003, the Pentagon was conducting an analysis of a war scenario
with Iran, called Theatre Iran Near Term (TIRANNT). The President asked the Strategic
Command for a global strike plan for an attack against Iranian nuclear facilities in conjunction
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with CONPLAN 8022. According to William Arkin, a U.S. Army intelligence expert,
TIRANNT commissioned Pentagon planners to examine all aspects of a major combat
operation in a war with Iran, including mobilization and deployment of forces for invasion,
occupation, and postwar political operations.1004 Arkin wrote in the Washington Post that
TIRANNT called for a land invasion by Marines, targeting the Iranian missile force, and a
global strike plan against Iranian weapons of mass destruction. An additional study, titled
Ballistic Missile Defense—Iran (BMD-I) examined scenarios involving Iranian missile
capacity. In June 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld alerted the Strategic Command to
be prepared to implement CONPLAN 8022. “The new task force,” Arkin said, “mostly worries
that if it were called upon to deliver ‘prompt’ global strikes against certain targets in Iran under
some emergency circumstances, the president might have to be told that the only option is a
nuclear one.”1005
Because the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had dragged on interminably, U.S.
intervention in Iran by ground troops was a nonstarter by 2007. Apart from limited Special
Operations, the United States did not have the ground force numbers to invade and occupy Iran.
As a result, the only feasible operation would be the limited use of air and naval forces.1006
#5—Is there an exit strategy and timetable in place for the withdrawal of personnel
once the mission’s goals have been achieved? Would an invasion and occupation of Iran have
devolved into a protracted guerrilla insurgency as had been the case in Afghanistan and Iraq?
General Yahya Rahim Safavi, commander of the Revolutionary Guards, threatened the United
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States not to attack Iran, warning that U.S. troops in the region were “vulnerable” in 2006.
“You can start a war but it won’t be you who finishes it,” Safavi said.1007 The Iranian Quds
Force or surrogates, such as Hezbollah, were definitely capable of diversionary attacks on
American, British, Israeli, or Saudi targets. The Sunday Times (London) reported the Iranians
had formed squads of suicide bombers to retaliate against American and British targets if Iran’s
nuclear installations were attacked. Members of the Martyr Seekers of the Revolutionary
Guards marched in a military parade in Tehran in March 2006.1008 The special unit appeared to
be wearing explosive packs and holding detonators. The director of the Centre for Doctrinal
Strategic Studies of the Revolutionary Guards, Hassan Abbasi, gave a public speech, promising
that: “We are ready to attack American and British sensitive points if they attack Iran’s nuclear
facilities.”1009 Therefore, it is very unlikely that an Iranian intervention could have been
resolved in a brokered diplomatic and political settlement on the order of Haiti, Bosnia, and
Kosovo.
Bush II hawks postulated that an attack on Iran would create a political upheaval,
presenting the opportunity for regime change, but it was equally likely to bolster hardliners and
enflame a nationalistic backlash, leading to an extended occupation and insurgency, as had
been the result in Afghanistan and Iraq.1010
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An array of compelling reasons inhibited the Bush II administration from military
intervention against Iran. The United States was overextended in Afghanistan and Iraq and
continued involvement eroded public support for military action as well as respect for the
administration in general. The issues of WMDs and support for terrorism resonated negatively
for the Bush II White House, whose credibility was seriously undermined by the history of
manipulated intelligence data in the prelude to the second Iraq War. In addition to weak support
in public opinion, key members of the administration were chastened as a result of the
intelligence failures in the case of Iraq, as Cheney complained in his memoirs. Military assets
were stretched thin owing to the strains of the ongoing Afghan and Iraqi interventions, as
Rice’s reflections had revealed, thus limiting the credibility of the threat of force. Most
importantly, the scope of the Presidential Directives NSPD-17 and NSPD-35, TIRANNT, and
CONPLAN 8022, particularly the presumptive involvement of nuclear weapons, made the war
plans for Iran more daunting than any intervention since the Persian Gulf War. Until 2006,
there might have been the momentum for a “go” decision, reinforced by perceived positive
outcomes in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, but by 2007-2008 both the momentum and
perception of success had reversed and become negatives. Therefore, Bush II ruled out
intervention and pursued a combination of diplomatic pressure and sanctions because U.S.
resources were stretched too thin to make a credible threat of military force.

As suggested late in Bush II’s reign, a nuclear Iran was a problem left to the next
administration. As journalist Fareed Zakaria wrote in early 2013: “President Obama will face a
crisis on Iran. He has categorically ruled out living with a nuclear-armed Iran under a Cold
War-style policy of containment. That means either Iran will capitulate to U.S. demands or the
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U.S. will go to war with Iran.”1011 Political scientist Robert Jervis has pointed out that coercive
diplomacy had not worked in several recent cases. The United States used sanctions, diplomatic
pressure, and the threat of force in Panama, Kuwait, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, but each
time had to make its threat real and went to war. Jervis argues that coercive diplomacy requires
a mixture of threats and promises.1012 Although all issues of contention between the United
States and Iran were still unresolved, diplomatic overtures emerged at the United Nations
General Assembly gathering in September 2013. The recent discussions leading to a tentative
agreement might suggest that diplomacy works best if detached from threat or crisis scenarios,
where U.S. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry credit the value of
international sanctions while Iranian President Hassan Rouhani hailed the agreement as a
victory that had forced the “collapse of the sanctions regime.”1013 At the time of this writing,
we leave the subject as an ongoing dilemma.
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ANATOMY & TYPOLOGY OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MAKING
INTRODUCTION
This final chapter reviews the selected case studies (Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Rwanda,
Kosovo, Iraq, and Iran) and a range of additional cases of U.S. military intervention since the end
of the Cold War, including Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan, as well as the recent cases
of Libya and Syria, in order to build an anatomy and typology of presidential decision making.
We will refer to our focused, structured comparison, using the same four categories (systemic,
national, individual, and strategic) and the same four questions in applying conclusions from our
“go” and “no-go” case studies.
The original impetus for this study was the observed increased frequency of U.S. military
intervention since the end of the Cold War. This trend could be shown empirically (see Tables 1,
2, 3, and 4) and merely accelerated and increased in scope after 9/11, as it was demonstratively
evident well before that unprecedented event. In Table 1, during the Cold War era, the United
States intervened militarily ten times in forty-five years, from 1945 to 1990. Thus, the frequency
with which the U.S. administrations decided to use force was an intervention every 4.5 years.
(Intervention = 10/45 years; frequency = 4.5) By comparison, in Table 2, the United States
intervened militarily eleven times in twenty-three years, from 1990 to 2013. Thus, the Post-Cold
War frequency was an intervention every 2.1 years. (Intervention = 11/23 years; frequency =
2.1). Alternatively, if we do not count the Iraqi and Afghan troop surges as discrete decisions,
nine interventions in twenty-three years equals a frequency of 2.55 years. Of significance is the
cumulative number of years in wars (if not “at war”) during the Cold War period was 21/45
years = 42% of the time. Even if we use the extended dates of 1960-1975 for the Vietnam War,
the United States armed forces were in wars 62% of the time. By contrast, the cumulative
number of years in wars during the Post-Cold War period equals 30/23 = 130% of the time. Note
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that we have rounded off the beginning and ending dates of the interventions, counting a day as
one year (for example, the Mayaguez engagement consisted of three days of action, but we count
it as one year).
TABLE 1—COLD WAR ERA INTERVENTIONS*
Korea
Truman-Eisenhower
1950-1954
Lebanon I
Eisenhower
1958
Cuba (Bay of Pigs)**
Kennedy
1961
Dominican Republic
Johnson
1965
Vietnam***
Johnson-Nixon
1965-1973
Cambodia (Mayaguez)
Ford
1975
Iran I (Desert One)
Carter
1980
Lebanon II
Reagan
1983
Grenada
Reagan
1983
Iran II (Nimble Archer & Praying Mantis) Reagan
1987-1988
*Excluded events (by definition) are Greece 1948, Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954, Chile
1973, as well as El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan in the 1980s, since these
actions did not involve “boots on the ground.”
** Some may question the Bay of Pigs as example, since U.S. troops were not directly
involved on the ground.
***The beginning of U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War arguably could be dated as
early as 1960 (Eisenhower) or 1961 (Kennedy) and the end point as late as 1975 with the
fall of Saigon.
TABLE 2—POST-COLD WAR INTERVENTIONS
Panama
Bush I
1990
Iraq (Persian Gulf War)
Bush I
1990-1991
Somalia
Bush I-Clinton
1993
Haiti
Clinton
1994
Bosnia (Phase II)
Clinton
1995
Kosovo
Clinton
1999
Afghanistan
Bush II
2001-2014
Iraq Redux
Bush II
2003-2011
Iraq (Troop Surge)*
Bush II
2007
Afghanistan (Troop Surge)* Obama
2010
Libya
Obama
2011
*The decision-making for the “troop surges” in Iraq by Bush II and Afghanistan by
Obama involved similar considerations as the original intervention decisions, although
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there is a fundamental difference between initiating an intervention and expanding or
contracting the operation.

If we consider a subcategory of “fail” apart from “go” and “no-go,” three of the listed
cases would fit that designation: Cuba (Bay of Pigs), Iran I (Desert One), and Lebanon II. Table
3 presents a subjective listing of non-interventions in the Cold War era. It is important to note
that Berlin Crisis I (1949), Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and Arab-Israeli War IV (1973)
involved proactive actions akin to intervention short of the use of force and led to acceptable
outcomes. These actions were the Berlin airlift, Cuban “quarantine,” and Soviet-American
mutual deterrence and “shuttle diplomacy.”

TABLE 3—COLD WAR ERA NON-INTERVENTIONS*
Berlin Crisis I
Truman
1948-1949
Vietnam
Eisenhower
1954
Hungary
Eisenhower
1956
Suez Crisis
Eisenhower
1956
Berlin Crisis II
Kennedy
1961
Cuban Missile Crisis
Kennedy
1962
Czechoslovakia
Johnson
1968
Arab-Israeli War IV
Nixon
1973
Angola
Ford-Carter
1976-1978
Table 4 presents a list of “no-go” decisions in the Post-Cold War period. As in the
preceding era, the list of non-interventions could be expanded indefinitely, but the
abovementioned events would seem to be the most prominent cases.

TABLE 4—POST-COLD WAR NON-INTERVENTIONS
Bosnia (Phase I)
Bush I-Clinton
1992-1993
Rwanda
Clinton
1994
Afghanistan (al-Qaeda)
Clinton
1998
Iran
Bush II
2004-2008
North Korea
Bush II
2006
Syria
Bush II
2006
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Darfur (South Sudan)
Bush II
2007
Georgia (South Ossetia War) Bush II
2008
Syria*
Obama
2013
*The case of Syria went from “no-go” to “go” and back to “no-go” for the Obama
administration in September 2013.
We selected the case studies in the preceding chapters on the basis of the following
criteria: to have a “go” and “no-go” decisions from each of the three consecutive—Bush I,
Clinton, and Bush II—in order to compare different decisions made by an administration and to
compare decisions across administrations. The Persian Gulf War was selected because the
intervention to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait was the most traditional intervention of the postCold War period and the largest U.S. military undertaking since the Vietnam War. The nonintervention in Bosnia was significant because the successor administration decided differently.
The non-intervention in Rwanda was important because it was colored by previous intervention
experiences and influenced subsequent decisions. The intervention in Kosovo was notable in
comparison to the previous decisions for Bosnia and in contrast to the case of Rwanda. Bush II’s
Iraq decision making was selected for its obvious comparison with Bush I’s decision making in
the Persian Gulf War. Lastly, Bush II’s policy toward Iran illustrates how the gap between
capabilities and desire imposed realistic limitations on action.
TABLE 5–SELECTED CASE STUDIES
DECISION
FACTORS
CASE
Persian Gulf War
Go
I. International, IV. Military
Bosnia
No-Go
III. Individual
Rwanda
No-Go
I. International, III. Individual, IV. Military
Kosovo
Go
I. International, III. Individual, IV. Military
Iraq
Go
I. International, III. Individual
Iran
No-Go
IV. Military
Table 5 illustrates the selected case studies and prioritizes the variables that factored into
the intervention or non-intervention. Each “go” decision entailed international or systemic
factors (category I), while two of three “no-go” decisions involved individual or ideological
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factors (category III) and two of three “no-go” decisions were influenced by military uncertainty
(category IV). Two “go” decisions were facilitated by a realistically optimistic military strategy,
whereas two of the three “no-go” cases (Bush I, Bosnia and Clinton, Rwanda) were determined
by individual factors in which the commander-in-chief and his key aides saw little to gain and
much to lose by intervening (category III). Importantly, no case of intervention was found to be
driven by the force of public opinion, political constituencies, or domestic interest groups
(category II).
An anatomy of presidential decision making will emerge from a review of our focused,
structured comparison by reviewing our four questions and four categories of factors.
1. Why had some intrastate or regional conflicts become international crises (by definition),
where decision-makers came to believe they were compelled to act?
Given the absence of a countervailing force or major power to serve as deterrent, such as
the Soviet enemy in the Cold War period, there are potentially two types of military
interventions: (1) humanitarian intervention designed to stop potential genocide and other
atrocities and (2) the pre-emptive reaction to terrorism or other threats, regionally or globally,
such as under the Bush doctrine. Note that Antizzo categorizes three types of interventions:
active, reactive, and restorative/humanitarian.1014 The “go” decisions of the post-Cold War
period, including the detailed case studies considered herein, all involved a U.S. leadership or
hegemonic role, triggered by alliance pressure, coordinated response with IGO (i.e., NATO or
UN) member states, or a policy paradigm, such as the Bush doctrine or War on Terrorism. The
Persian Gulf War (Bush I) entailed the strangest of bedfellows, the Saudis and Israelis, as allies;
Bosnia and Kosovo (Clinton) interventions and diplomatic efforts had been urged on by NATO
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partners; and the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars (Bush II) fit under the umbrella of the Bush doctrine
and War on Terrorism. The interventions in Panama (Bush I) and Haiti (Clinton) did not
represent international crises on the order of the Persian Gulf War, nor did they entail pressure
from alliance partners or international organizations, such as the UN or NATO, but both cases
were located in the backyard of the United States. Geography counts!
Furthermore, to some extent, all intervention decisions involved a moral argument (at
least, for propaganda or “spin”). Nonetheless, we distinguish between morality and legality; in
the Panama scenario, the legality of invading and apprehending the titular head of government of
a sovereign state was dubious—however odious that individual might be. Corruption was
widespread during Manuel Noriega's rule, and he was able to use his power to imprison and
sometimes kill any who opposed him. In 1987, a former officer of the Panamanian defense force
publicly accused Noriega of cooperating with Colombian drug producers. The United States
responded by imposing strict sanctions that took an extensive toll on the country. On December
15, 1989, the Panamanian legislature declared Noriega president (he had previously ruled
informally without such a title) and that the United States and Panama were in a state of war.
Following the shooting of a U.S. Marine, President George Bush I ordered Operation Just Cause,
December 20, 1989, an invasion consisting of more than 25,000 soldiers. The mission was
controversial due to the resulting loss of hundreds of Panamanian lives and the subsequent
damage to Panama City and El Chorillo. The military was quickly able to achieve its goals as
Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990.1015 He was taken to the United States, tried, convicted,
and jailed on drug trafficking charges and subsequently served a 40-year sentence in Miami.1016
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The foremost outcome of the Panamanian adventure was demonstration of U.S. resolve to use
force.1017 As a quintessential realist, it is doubtful that National Security Adviser Brent
Scowcroft had much faith in the United States being able to install democracy and demolish the
drug trade in Panama.1018 For President Bush I, the primary importance of Panama was
diminishing, though not quite “kicking,” the Vietnam syndrome.1019
In Haiti, a coup d’etat overthrew President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, September 1991.
Subsequently, Aristide fled into exile and supporters of his party, Lavalas, were subjected to
repression at the hands of the police and military.1020 The Clinton administration moved covertly
and publicly against the military junta, October 4, 1993. U.S. task force commander and staff,
numbering six people, secreted into Port-au-Prince and joined Special Forces “trainers” already
there. Defense Secretary Les Aspin had delayed deployment of Psy Ops teams “on the ground.”
Attachés (right-wing paramilitary militia) carried out small “probes,” while Haitian military junta
leader, Joseph Raoul Cédras, called the dispatch of the USS Harlan County, under UN
authorization, an “invasion.”1021 The warship attempted to dock in Port-au-Prince with U.S.
Special Forces and Canadian troops onboard, November 11, 1993. Pro-junta operatives chanted:
“Somalia! Dead American soldiers.” Unprepared for a hostile landing, the USS Harlan County
withdrew.1022 Given long-term cooperation and short-term verbal support from the United States
for the Haitian army, “Cedras found it impossible to believe that the U.S. would actually
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invade.”1023 Diplomatically, the Clinton administration had “brokered” the failed Governors
Island Agreement, July 1993. According to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the
agreement “floundered on the cynicism and brutality of the Haitian regime.”1024 National
Security Adviser Anthony Lake advocated a “force-based strategy,” but Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili had “doubts.” Vice President Albert A. Gore, Jr. supported
intervention on the basis of a moral argument, saying that returning Haitian refugees would be
like “throwing crabs back into a barrel.”1025 The Clinton White House benefitted from successful
diplomacy at the last minute, and the Haitian operation proceeded with a bloodless intervention.
The case of Haiti involved no clear and present danger to the United States and was largely
motivated by humanitarianism (refugees) and political concern for democracy in the region.
Moreover, sending troops to Haiti in 1994 was reminiscent of U.S. interventionism under the
Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine a hundred years ago.1026
The non-intervention in Rwanda was a stillborn humanitarian operation that may or may
not have prevented or minimized bloodshed if it had occurred. The most profound result of the
“no-go” in Rwanda was that decision makers hence thought twice about hesitating in
humanitarian crises to follow.
The non-intervention in Iran was determined by a confluence of domestic and external
factors that proscribed the Bush II administration from fully engaging the issue of Iranian nuclear
weapons development as a threat to international stability. One could imagine few issues being
so crucial, but Bush II was unable to act effectively due to declining support at home, decreased
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prestige abroad, and overstretched military resources. Thus, the gap between capabilities and
desire imposed realistic limitations on action. Once again, we are reminded of Lincoln’s dictum:
one war at a time!1027
The South Ossetia War could be characterized as a “near-miss” or “no-go” in the Bush II
administration. Geography cuts both ways! Russian regional hegemony deterred overt
deployment of U.S. forces in the South Ossetia-Georgia War. The Bush II White House accused
Russia of “bullying and intimidation” and described the conflict as an “incursion by one of the
world’s strongest powers to destroy the democratically elected government of a smaller
neighbor.”1028 Bush II decided against military action to defend Georgia because it would
inevitably lead to a confrontation with Russia and therefore limited U.S. interference to lending
Georgia humanitarian aid.1029 Although the Cold War was no longer the operative context,
Russia’s regional presence was sufficient to limit U.S. involvement in the South Ossetia-Georgia
conflict.

The case of Barack Obama’s approval of the Afghan troop surge is an example of the
difference between initiating an intervention and modifying, indeed escalating, an ongoing
operation. A premature withdrawal or perpetual stalemate would likely have contributed to
further regional instability. Obama’s “go” decision for Libya in 2011 and “no-go” decision for
Syria in 2013 derived from U.S. hegemonic leadership and continuing military presence in
Western Asia (a.k.a. Middle East) since 2001. The positive outcome of the “lift and strike” and
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“lead from behind” strategy in Libya proved cost-free in terms of U.S. casualties. The Libyan
action became a model for the abortive “go” in Syria, September 9, 2013. This case emerged
from the ongoing political instability in the Arab Middle East since the so-called “Arab Spring”
of 2011. United States hegemonic leadership would compel action. Otherwise, U.S. credibility
and President Obama’s competence would be called into question. Nevertheless, Obama initially
resisted going into Syria for more than two years. Unspoken was the impediment of considerable
Russian investment and property (including port facilities) in Syria. The humanitarian
component came to the fore because of Bashir Assad’s regime reportedly using chemical
weapons against unarmed civilians. The commander-in-chief then framed the need to respond in
international terms: “I didn’t set a red line. The world set a red line.”1030 Hence, U.S.
Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power explained that a limited strike (“no boots on the
ground” became a mantra) “to degrade Assad’s capacity” to use chemical or biological weapons
again. Failure to act would mean “our will to lead is compromised.” Ambassador Power invoked
lessons of the past (i.e., Holocaust) and founding principles of the United Nations that dictated
U.S. responsibility to stop such crimes against humanity. Power explained, since Russia would
veto any UN Security Council action, the United States had to lead an ad-hoc coalition.1031 The
Syrian case illustrated the tension between rivalry and cooperation with Russia. Hence,
acknowledgment by the United States (Obama) that Russia (Putin) had a role to play, as well as
allowing the Russians to protect their stake in Syria, gave the Obama administration “wiggle
room.” (That is, if a “red line” could have wiggle room.) However, the bottom line was that
Obama’s “go” decision in Syria ran aground on the rocks of unexpected domestic opposition and
lack of international support, most crucially the British failure to back the plan. Regardless, an
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intervention in Syria in 2013 could have been justified for reasons of hegemony,
humanitarianism, and regional stability. As casualties mount and negotiations falter, the current
presidential administration (or the next) might well be faced with a similar decision-making
scenario in the near future.
2. Why did a president decide to intervene where his predecessor or successor may have
weighed largely identical considerations in the same scenarios at a different stage?
“Since the 1990s and the end of the Cold War, decisions on whether or not to intervene
militarily have become, in many ways, more complex,” one scholar has observed. “Yet,
paradoxically, it is easier for the U.S. to intervene.”1032 Thus, a consistent and truly predictive
theory of presidential decision making in terms of military intervention eludes us.1033 Decision
making is pushed or pulled to change direction by new perceptions and a convergence of
contributing factors; i.e., no single factor is imperative. The protracted length of a crisis (such as
Bosnia or Iraq) or recurrence in a troublesome region (Kosovo) seem to have been attractive for
intervention. Military action appears more likely if it had occurred before and if troops were
already in the region or nearby. Therefore, continuity and momentum are important keys.
The Bush I administration’s intervention in the Persian Gulf War represented a reversal
of the “tilt” toward Iraq, as illustrated by the Reagan administration’s Nimble Archer and
Praying Mantis operations, 1987-1988. Nevertheless, a precedent of involvement had been
established. Hence, Clinton followed continuity and momentum with four major retaliatory raids
on Iraqi targets, 1993, 1996, and 1998, ultimately setting the stage for Bush II’s second Iraq War
in 2003.
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Somalia represented continuity, initiated as one of Bush I’s final acts and carried on by
Clinton with generally agreed-upon unsatisfactory results. The operation went badly when the
mission changed from humanitarian aid and rescue to an offensive operation (“Get Aideed!”). In
the case of Somalia, beginning in August 1993, U.S. Army Rangers attempted to capture
Mohammed Farah Aideed for attacking UN peacekeepers; Aideed eluded capture for months, set
a trap for the U.S. peacekeepers, and ultimately killed eighteen troops in the well-known “Black
Hawk Down” incident at Mogadishu (October 3-4, 1993).1034
Rwanda was not on Bush I’s radar, but Clinton’s reluctance to intervene became a critical
aspect of the story. The president himself believed his reputation had been damaged by the
Mogadishu debacle and hence was resistant to the idea of going into Haiti or Rwanda. To avoid
repeating one kind of mistake, Clinton made another, ineffectually standing by as thousands
were slaughtered. Afterward, the Clinton administration reversed course and moved
diplomatically and militarily in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
Haiti was characterized by initial hesitation as a direct consequence of the failed
operation in Somalia. Bush I had initially opted for a diplomatic track (circa 1993), whereas
Clinton attempted a show of force (USS Harlan County), but pulled back in the face of
orchestrated opposition. Clinton soon declared: “I’m never going to wimp out like I did in Haiti
again.”1035 Hence, concerns for regional (hemispheric) stability, moral or humanitarian concern
for refugees, and domestic political pressure combined to convince Clinton to intervene.
Nevertheless, the macho factor persists in questions of the use of force. Bush I shed his “wimp”
image with his actions in Panama and Kuwait.1036 Clinton was accused of employing a “Wag the
Dog” strategy by a few conservative voices when he launched the tomahawk missile attacks in
1034

Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 199.
Halbertsam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 273.
1036
Oakes, John B., “Bush in Panama: A Tragicomedy,” New York Times, January 26, 1990.
1035

244

Sudan and Afghanistan (August 1998) and air strikes against Iraqi targets (December 1998)
allegedly in order to divert attention from his impeachment proceedings.1037
Bosnia represented continuity from Bush I to Clinton, with both presidents preferring
diplomacy and a European solution during what we refer to as Phase I (1992-1995), but changed
course in the face of alliance pressure and humanitarian concerns. Initially, the Bush I
administration did not consider the intra-state conflict in Bosnia to be a destabilizing
international event, nor one that threatened U.S. alliance partners. Alliance pressure (through
NATO and UN) and worldwide outcry over ethnic cleansing and atrocities approaching genocide
prompted the Clinton White House’s reaction in Phase II. The U.S.-led NATO bombing raids
and the negotiated Dayton peace accords exemplified Clinton’s successful diplomacy backed by
force.
Kosovo followed the perceived success of Bosnia, facilitated by continued presence in
the former Yugoslavia, continuity of alliance and organizational obligations, and humanitarian
concerns. In this case, momentum and continuity derived from success in Bosnia seem to have
driven the Clinton White House, led by Madeline Albright, toward pro-active intervention in
Kosovo.
A more militant Clinton not only struck al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan (and
Sudan), but also had the Pentagon draw up the Afghan war plan later implemented by Bush II.
Two U.S. embassies were bombed in Kenya and Tanzania, August 7, 1998. Director of Central
Intelligence George Tenet (who served as DCI from 1996 to 2004) informed the Joint Chiefs of
Staff about Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, August 14, 1998. The decision made by Clinton was
to hit targets in Afghanistan and Sudan with tomahawk missiles. The Congressional leadership
(i.e., Newt Gingrich, Dick Gephardt, Trent Lott, and Tom Daschle) was briefed regarding the
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strikes on al-Qaeda. One explanation for a higher level of consultation was because Clinton’s
argument for retaliating against al-Qaeda was stronger than the reasons for the actions against
Iraq in 1993 and 1996 due to the terroristic attack on property, loss of lives, and two “fatwahs”
on the United States.1038 This action served as a precedent for Bush II’s 2001 invasion of
Afghanistan, establishing momentum from one administration to the next.
Richard Haass, adviser for both the Bush I and Bush II administrations, contrasted the
two wars against Iraq. Bush I’s Persian Gulf War was a “traditional war” to oppose aggression
and restore equilibrium to the regional order. (See Chapter 2.) Bush II’s Operation Iraqi Freedom
was a “radical” pre-emptive war designed to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s government and
invent a new democratic Iraq to serve as a model to transform the Arab Middle East. (See
Chapter 6.)
Continuity of policy constrained the Obama administration’s decision making in setting a
terminal date for Iraqi operations (2009) and the Afghan troop surge (2010) and timetable for
withdrawal (2014).1039 Conversely, momentum can operate in reverse as well, as witnessed by
Obama’s “no-go” decisions for Iran and Syria, influenced by the specter of flawed if not quite
failed interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq under Bush II’s watch. (See Question #4 on lessons
learned.)
Bush II pursued a policy based on “two ticking clocks” in Iran: one counted down to an
Iranian nuclear weapon; the other marked time for the strengthening of domestic opposition to
the Iranian regime. Both clocks ticked away as Bush II’s attempts failed to engage Iran
diplomatically while squeezing the regime with sanctions. The military option ruled itself out by
the time Bush II passed the baton to Obama. On Iran, former CIA Director and Defense
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Secretary Leon Panetta ominously prophesied: “They are not likely to give up nuclear
enrichment … We will have to use military force.”1040 Therefore, the Obama administration had
nothing to lose and everything to gain by opening up a dialogue with the Islamic Republic in
2013. As Secretary of State John Kerry put it: “When you’re dealing with nuclear weapons, it’s
not an issue of trust. Verification is the key.”1041 In the final analysis, the Iranian government
perceives its nuclear development in the context of sovereign rights and security.1042 The United
States and the United Nations can identify steps to be taken to resolve the nuclear issue, but the
United States should not be solely responsible for resolving the crisis. As long as the Obama
administration avoids the military option, the United States can continue a more constructive
dialogue.
3. How much do individual human factors (psychology, ideology, worldview, or
management style) have a determinative effect?
Are decisions determined by the leadership (or management) style of the commander-inchief, or mostly shaped by the self-motivated players participating in the decision-making
process (i.e., what Condoleezza Rice called the “rarified staff”1043)? If the style and personality
of the chief executive are the drivers, should we seek answers in personal ideology (e.g.,
“nontraditional” and “altruistic” goals;1044 “rhetoric of justice”;1045 and “legality” versus
“morality”1046), generational experience (e.g., World War II and Vietnam War analogues in the
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Persian Gulf War, as noted by Woodward1047), and reasoning by historical analogies,1048 or, as
Greenstein1049 puts it, the President’s “vision of public policy” and “cognitive style”? To this we
might add the environment and perception of threat as context for presidential decisions. Insider
extraordinaire Condoleezza Rice has engaged the discussion: “Early in his administration,
President Barack Obama would say that in the days after the attacks on New York and
Washington, the Bush [II] administration ‘made decisions based on fear.’ Well, yes, we did, but
not from irrational fear or paranoia.”1050 According to Greenstein, “the matter of who occupies
the nation’s highest office can have profound repercussions.”1051 Greenstein further asserts: “the
president’s latitude for independent action is even greater in the unstructured post-Cold War
world than it was during the Cold War when the threat of mutual destruction concentrated minds
and constrained actions.”1052 Therefore, the absence of “mutually assured destruction” as a
constraint might explain the general trend toward increasingly frequent military intervention
since the Cold War ended. However, each of the Oval Office’s occupants in the current era
(Bush I, Clinton, Bush II, and Obama) have encountered the limitations of projected power. For
example, Bush I cut off Desert Storm without continuing on to Baghdad; Clinton shied away
from Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda in the aftermath of Somalia; Bush II lacked the wherewithal
(though perhaps not the will) to intervene militarily against Iran; and Obama agonizingly labored
over the decisions on Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria.
Historical analogies invariably come into play, whether or not the lessons are applied
rationally. Bill Clinton’s historical reference point in the Haitian crisis was Ronald Reagan’s
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invasion of Grenada following his “cut and run” from Lebanon. Clinton wanted his people to
give him a “win” after fumbling Somalia.1053 Clinton was “furious” and thought the NSC had put
him in a “lose-lose” situation and decried the “lack of positive spin his White House was putting
on events.” White House Chief of Staff George Stephanopoulis met with Lake and Sandy Berger
after Clinton’s “tongue lashing.” Stephanopoulis was aghast: “Grenada? That’s how we should
handle things? Like Reagan?”1054
The management style unavoidably influences the quality of decision making. The
collegial style of the Bush I decision makers supported a successful small-scale intervention in
Panama and another successful intervention on a massive scale in the Persian Gulf War, whereby
the institutional (Baker, Cheney), military (Powell, Schwarzkopf), and personal advisers
(Scowcroft) all “owned” the decisions made by the President. The improvisational or ad-hoc
approach of Clinton’s key players led to “messiness” and a chaotic process so that the decisions
to act militarily or not were reversed in the cases of Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. The “no-go”
decision in Rwanda, to some extent, was the result of the fact that middle managers such as
Prudence Bushnell and Susan Rice lacked direct access to the Secretary of State and President,
and the Canadian field commander, Romeo Dallaire, stood outside the normal chain of command
and communication. The “go” decision in Kosovo was affected by change of personnel, as
cautious Warren Christopher was replaced by Madeline Albright, an outspoken advocate of the
“indispensable nation.” The influence of prominent advisers permeated the Clinton ad-hocracy,
where the Secretaries of State Christopher and Albright and National Security Advisers Lake and
Berger strongly influenced the President’s thinking.
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The Bush II administration was dominated by strong-willed politicos—Cheney,
Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, and Perle—with a coherent agenda and a penchant for “office
politics.” Important players, including Powell, Rice, O’Neill, and others carried out policies with
which they had serious reservations and suffered in the midst of a conflict-ridden environment.
Whereas, early on, the Vice President emerged as a dominant personality, Cheney was later
superseded by Condi Rice. Yet, throughout the Bush II years, decisions were made privately,
behind the scenes, and rubber-stamped at formal meetings. This practice led to narrow input and
flawed decisions.
Paradoxically, the very different profiles of the Clinton administration, dominated by the
chief executive’s personality, and the Bush II administration, where the boss was often
overshadowed by some of his own key players, yielded outcomes heavily influenced by the
President’s team.
In the case of Rwanda, more than one key player, including the Secretary of State and the
ambassador in country, seem to have been blinded by their policy preference for a political
settlement and a belief that the situation was no worse than normal for an African civil war,
while those in a position to see how drastic the Rwanda case would become, such as Prudence
Bushnell, operated in the shadows of the policy-making structure, without access to, or influence
on, the POTUS. Just as an intervention in Haiti, like Rwanda, was initially feared as a potential
reprise of the Mogadishu disaster (circa 1993), the later “go” decision on Haiti (circa 1994) was
heavily influenced by remorse over not acting in Rwanda.
Iraq redux was the result of a policy process that was a backformation, whereby the
decision was predetermined in search of an acceptable rationale. As has been well documented,
key figures, including Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, among others, had Iraq in their crosshairs a
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matter of days after 9/11 and sought justification for their preferred course in any intelligence
that suited their predetermined narrative. They saw decapitating Saddam’s regime as a perfect fit
for their “long war” on terrorism.
On the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, initiated by Bush II and inherited by Obama, the
crossover player was Robert Gates. The Defense Secretary considered Bush II “a mature leader
who had walked a supremely difficult path,” and called Obama “the most deliberative president I
worked for.” Gates was critical of Bush II’s adversarial attitude toward traditional allies that
were skeptical of the Iraqi venture, such as Germany and France, and lamented that Obama had
no “passion” for the Iraqi and Afghan wars.1055 The other transitional figure was David Petreaus,
even though his tenure as CIA chief was aborted by personal scandal. Anomalously, Obama
initially relied on a National Security Adviser with a military background, Jim Jones, a retired
Marine Corps General. Jones was succeeded by a Beltway insider, Thomas E. Donillon, who had
“no credibility with the military” and no rapport with NSC staff.1056 Therefore, not until Susan
Rice became National Security Adviser in June 2013 would the job be filled by someone with a
strong personal or political relationship with the POTUS, which should be a prerequisite for that
most sensitive position.1057
Momentum from the success of the “lead from behind” strategy in Libya was countered
by Obama’s aversion to over-commitment in the manner of Bush II. Thus did Obama deploy
naval and air forces against Khaddafi’s regime instead of ground combat troops. The views and
influence of key players—Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, Samantha Power, Bob
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Gates, Leon Panetta, Admiral Mullin, and General Petreaus would be fruitful ground for further
study. Hence, a similar approach was proposed in the case of Syria—military offshoring with
limited objectives (i.e., punishment of Assad for use of chemical weapons and the eventual
ouster of Assad, or “slow motion” regime change).
On the question of Iran, if there had been a division between hawks and doves in Bush II,
an array of factors reinforced the latter, most prominently the rise of Condoleezza Rice’s
influence versus the decline of Cheney’s. Subsequently, an inclination toward personal
diplomacy and summitry was evident in Barack Obama’s enlisting of Putin’s intercession in the
case of Syria and reaching out telephonically to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in 2013 to
open discussions. A great investment of moral suasion on the part of Obama or Kerry in conflict
resolution on Syria, Iran, or, more recently, Ukraine, would inevitably exact a high cost in
personal credibility and run the risk of floundering under the riptides of domestic politics.
4. How did lessons learned, positive or negative, from previous intervention or
nonintervention scenarios tend to have a cumulative effect within the life span of an
administration and from one presidency to the next?

“The highly personalized nature of the modern presidency makes the strengths and
weaknesses of the White House incumbent of the utmost importance,” as Greenstein puts it.
More specifically, he posits, “presidents who steep themselves in the record of their predecessors
will be better equipped for their responsibilities if they are able to do so. Members of the public
are likely to make wiser electoral choices if they are able to place presidential contenders in a
historical context.”1058
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The cumulative effects of interventions are apparent in Panama serving as a test case for
the Persian Gulf War for Bush I. Unlike Panama and the first Iraq War, Bush I saw no vital
interests at stake in the former Yugoslavia, but agreed to join a multilateral humanitarian
operation in Somalia. The dramatic events in Rwanda followed a parallel timeline as the political
crises in Somalia and Haiti.1059 For Clinton, a bad outcome in Somalia poisoned the well in the
cases of Haiti and Rwanda, leading to an aversion to involvement, until each of those crises
continued and worsened. Henceforth, Rwanda suffered from bad karma due to Haiti and
Somalia.1060 The failure of the non-intervention in Rwanda prompted the Clinton White House to
move on Haiti, with a more than credible threat of force in the form of a massive invasion flotilla
that entered the country peacefully after a negotiated settlement.1061 Hence, the Clinton
administration demonstrated its hesitance after Somalia and the emptiness of its resolve to
intervene. Not without irony is the fact of the U.S. intervention in Haiti by way of a diplomatic
initiative and bloodless invasion in September 1994, following the seeming “mistake” of nonintervention in Rwanda. The “win” in Haiti made a change of course in Bosnia (Phase II) in
1994-1995 seem less out of the question. The fruitful sanctions, military action, and negotiation
in the Bosnian conflict cleared the pathway for a more resolute determination to make a
commitment to Kosovo by 1999, even as that commitment ruled out “boots on the ground.”
Bush II’s comparatively easy toppling of the Taliban regime and casting its al-Qaeda
allies into disarray in Afghanistan, 2001, provided a promising precursor for the Iraq War,
launched in 2003. The expected trajectory of Iraq redux was reasonably assumed to reprise the
experience of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1990-1991. Notwithstanding the order of
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magnitude greater difficulty of regime change and besieging Baghdad, the active combat of the
second war was expected to take merely three weeks, just as the first war had.1062 Subsequently,
the prolonged insurgency, difficult nation-building, and accumulating numbers of casualties
overwhelmed the initial popularity of both the Bush II presidency and its wars, in the end
scuttling hypothetical plans for military action against Iran, North Korea, Syria, or anywhere
else. The cumulative effect of Bush II’s preceding interventions defined a clear set of limitations
for the administration. In addition to intervention fatigue and tolerance for casualties, U.S.
military resources were overstretched by 2006-2008. As Condoleezza Rice stated most
succinctly: “It was well understood that we didn’t have the bandwidth for unilateral
confrontation with Iran and North Korea, given the situation in Iraq.”1063

I.

International, systemic, or structural factors:

The Persian Gulf War of 1991-1992, as a prototypical case, was precipitated by an action
most readily defined as a destabilizing event in the international system, at least regionally,
threatening the equilibrium of order and power. Additionally, Desert Storm was the most
traditional and conventional war for control of territory of the post-Cold War era; other military
operations in which the United States had engaged would be classified as wars of attrition,
counterinsurgency, and peacekeeping.
The origin of the war in Afghanistan, 2001, traced back to Osama bin Laden’s formation
of al-Qaeda (translated as the base in Arabic) in 1990.1064 Taliban rose to power in Afghanistan
in 1994, capitalizing on the mujahideen’s factional conflicts after defeating the Soviets and a
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pro-communist Afghan regime.1065 The systemic objectives of the United States in Afghanistan
were twofold: to root out a terrorist enemy and overthrow a rouge state’s regime. However, Bush
II’s identification of a “new kind of enemy” in a “different kind of war” was contradicted by the
deployment of conventional combat forces and what could be described as a minimalist
approach. As historian Terry Anderson points out, “To catch bin Laden at Tora Bora, therefore,
General [Tommy] Franks sent only about 40 Special Operations troops and a dozen Special
Forces soldiers by early December, aided by about 110 CIA officers.,” followed by 4,000
Marines for a total of “less than 5,000 ground troops.”1066 Given the Afghan population of 26
million, Anderson notes, fewer troops were sent to Tora Bora than the number of police officers
on the force in a major U.S. city.1067
The Bush II administration’s second Iraq War, launched in 2003, was conceived as a
repeat of the Persian Gulf War and a sequel to the Afghan campaign still underway. Operation
Iraqi Freedom was advertised to the world community and U.S. public as vital to international
stability—alluding to Saddam Hussein’s noncompliance with twelve years of UN directives and
intransigence in the face of international sanctions plus the twin perils of WMDs and state
complicity with Islamist terrorists. The assumption that pressure or support from allies should act
as a crucial factor in military intervention decisions would be disproved by the case of Iraq
redux, as the United States went ahead despite the unexpected and unfavorable reaction of
alliance partners, such as Germany, France, and Canada, which had supported the Afghan
campaign.
Also noteworthy during Bush II’s tenure were the limited humanitarian mission in the
South Ossetia-Georgia conflict and positive diplomatic pressure, including acknowledgement of
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“genocide,” in the Darfur-Sudan scenario, leading to the independence of South Sudan. In these
two cases, the Bush II team was either constrained from more overt military action, or simply
avoided the perception of crisis that pervaded their decision making regarding Afghanistan, Iraq,
and Iran. Perhaps acting in scenarios that did not present a direct threat to U.S. interests could
produce more favorable and less costly outcomes.
II.

National, domestic, or internal political:
At the national or domestic political level, in each of our case studies, we tried to weigh

the scope and quality of information available to decision makers,1068 the role of institutional
players (for example, perceived pressure from Congress)1069 and bureaucratic politics,1070 as well
as the impact of public opinion, interest groups, and other constituencies.1071
How much did institutions factor into their decisions after 9/11? Unilateralism and
interventionism may go hand in hand with executive decision making without recourse to
Congress and the legal mechanism of the War Powers Resolution.1072 To illustrate, members of
Congress may at one point in time be calling for intervention in a particular case, but later may
join the chorus of opposition. Therefore, while the institution of Congress tries to exercise
influence over the chief executive, the legislative branch probably acts mainly as a loose or
intermittent brake rather than a significant or truly influential player. When the House and Senate
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take a vote on a president’s military initiative, it might be close, but there has never been a vote
to halt an ongoing operation. A no vote on Obama’s planned action in Syria would have been
unprecedented, despite the opposition of a collection of liberal and conservative doves.1073
Bureaucratic politics could also subvert effective policy if different governmental players
act at cross purposes. In the case of Haiti, for example, President Clinton had negotiated a deal at
Governors Island (July 3, 1993), but he would not act to enforce the agreement.1074 Meanwhile,
the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency had organized and trained
militias (Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti, FRAPH) to attack Aristide supporters
as well as engaging in drug trafficking and other illegal activities in support of the Armed Forces
of Haiti (FADH).1075 This subverted Clinton’s policy toward Haiti, not only by enabling the
junta’s foot soldiers, but also by subtly implying that the U.S. administration’s public opposition
to the regime masked support behind the scenes.
The so-called “CNN effect” played a crucial role in the way the Bosnian drama played
out.1076 According to the CNN effect: the news media set the agenda; impede achieving policy
goals; and accelerate decision making. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the worldwide media
framed the issue as genocide, a moral imperative.1077 Although the idea that media had driven
foreign policy in cases such as Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo had been exaggerated,1078
worldwide news coverage might have a significant effect.1079 Hanson has determined that the
global media largely respond to issues raised by other actors rather than setting the agenda for
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the public.1080 Moreover, Strobel has contended that policy makers are unlikely to be dissuaded
by alternative courses proposed in the media.1081

The weight of public opinion varies between short-term and long-term effects. In the first
Iraq war, Bush I kept his finger on the country’s pulse, making sure the people were with him.
As the venture against Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was quickly victorious, the public’s support
remained high. Conversely, in the second Iraq war, initial support waned and ultimately cast a
shadow over the Bush II’s administration as the conflict wore on for eight years. The rally effect
also revealed itself in more than one case. Clinton’s intervention in Kosovo should be instructive
as public opinion opposed sending American troops into the former Yugoslavia by a slight
margin when it was a hypothetical possibility, but, within a matter of days, when the decision to
do so became a reality, the scales were tipped in support of intervening (see Chapter 5).1082

Perhaps, the cumulative effects of intervention fatigue contributed to the Obama
administration’s “no-go” in Syria following action in Libya two years earlier. A Pew survey
found only 27% of the public believed the United States had a responsibility to do something
about the fighting in Libya in March 2011 with 63% disagreeing. In the same survey, while 51%
supported increasing sanctions against Libya, only 16% supported bombing raids and 13%
supported sending troops.1083 A majority of those opposed to intervening in Libya stated the
reason was that U.S. armed forces were already overcommitted.1084 This shift in opinion is
clearly a long-term trend. A Quinnipiac survey showed disapproval of Obama’s foreign policy,
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52% to 40%. Majorities of 61% percent said that involvement in Syria was not in U.S. national
interest and 59% opposed aiding Syrian rebels.1085 A recent USA Today/Pew Institute poll
showed a majority (52%) thought the United States failed to achieve its goals in Iraq. By
contrast, 56% said the United States had largely succeeded when most troops were pulled out in
November 2011. On Afghanistan, 52% of Americans believed the United States had mostly
failed to achieve its goals. A majority considered the war in Afghanistan successful, according to
a similar survey in 2011.1086 In general, public support for military intervention has shown a
steep decline since 9/11, if not throughout the entire post-Cold War period, precisely because of
the increased frequency of these wars.
Tolerance for casualties is unquestionably a factor, but a difficult one to quantify. For
example, the Persian Gulf War’s toll of 150 killed in action was considered minimal, whereas 18
Army Rangers lost at Mogadishu was received as a large number. Over time, the impact of
casualties could become decisive, as the Bush II administration well understood, barring media
coverage of caskets bearing Afghanistan and Iraq war dead deplaning at Dover Air Force Base.
Our case studies did not reveal decisive influence by domestic constituencies, such as the
Israel lobby pushing intervention against Iraq and Iran, the Congressional Black Caucus calling
for intervention in Haiti and Rwanda, or conservative PACs and think tanks promoting a
militarized idealistic agenda in the Middle East. Each of those interest groups made their
opinions known, but none of them carried sufficient weight to drive policies or decisions of a
Democratic or Republican White House.
III.
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Greenstein has posited that presidential job performance derives from six qualities: (1)
public communication; (2) organizational capacity; (3) political skill; (4) vision of public policy;
(5) cognitive style; and (6) emotional intelligence.1087 While Clinton excelled in knowing how to
use Teddy Roosevelt’s “bully pulpit,” Bush I and Bush II were decidedly weak communicators.
Bush I and Clinton were open to vigorous debate within the decision-making circle, but their
approaches were worlds apart. However, Bush I’s formal organization and Clinton’s chaotic adhocracy both produced favorable outcomes in the Persian Gulf War and Kosovo, respectively.
Clinton was the most skilled politico of the three presidential personalities studied in our selected
cases. Whereas Bush I lacked “the vision thing,” mirroring the pragmatic realism of his top
aides, Baker and Skowcroft, Bush II’s policy-making was infused with his neoconservative
idealism, just as Clinton’s liberal idealism underscored his policies. Greenstein proposed that
Clinton possessed considerable capacity to synthesize information, but lacked emotional
intelligence.1088 Thus, according to Greenstein, Clinton took actions that were rationalizations
rather than thoughtfully reasoned decisions.
Foreign policy decision makers are susceptible to “reasoning by historical analogies.”1089
Vietnam War and World War II analogies pervaded Persian Gulf War decision making.1090 The
president, a former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, was “optimistic,” but uncertain about the
prospects for decisiveness from the UN Security Council, where a Cold War “stalemate”
persisted for years.1091 “We should not repeat the mistakes made at the beginning of World War
II,” stated former naval aviator Bush, which he understood to mean “appeasement of
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aggression.”1092 Top decision makers in the Bush I administration used a “story model” mode of
problem representation in “armed humanitarian intervention” in Bosnia, according to
Peterson.1093 The conventional wisdom is that the former Yugoslavia splintered because of ageold ethnic rivalries, after the long reign of Tito. Thus, they missed the impact of Slobodan
Milosevic’s quest to consolidate his power by exploiting the force of Serbian nationalism. Brent
Scowcroft, the President’s alter ego in foreign policy, practiced “conservative realism” in
diplomacy, but his conservatism was less ideological than it was simply cautious.1094 Scowcroft
quoted John Quincy Adams: “We are the well-wishers of all who seek freedom. We are the
guarantors only of our own.”1095
In the case of Rwanda, the Clinton administration was loathe to speak the word
genocide.1096 Clinton’s inaction fit Janis and Mann’s concept of unconflicted inertia leading to
defensive avoidance.1097 Romeo Dallaire claimed that “moral relativism” pervaded the Clinton
administration’s thinking. “Risk-free warfare” was humanitarian aid and rescue, not
peacekeeping or peace enforcement, and stressed avoidance of “mission creep” in Rwanda. In
Kosovo, however, Clinton was not initially inclined to intervene directly with ground or combat
forces. Advisers Lake and Berger were similarly dovish. Secretary of State Albright and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Shalikashvili saw the issue through the lens of culture, formative
experiences, and ideology owing to their family, personal, and ethno-cultural histories. In league
with General Wesley Clark, they pushed Clinton in a more active direction, toward direct
intervention. Their motivations were humanitarian and out of concern for political stability.
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Mann has analyzed that the decision to invade Iraq derived from the ideology and
worldview of the key Bush II foreign policy mavens, known as the Vulcans. The Bush II foreign
policy makers envisioned something of a new world order well before 9/11 as a function of the
new post-Cold War reality.1098 Unquestionably, the Bush II White House envisioned a “new”
Arab-Muslim Middle East.1099 This vision resulted from “America’s historic missionary zeal to
‘enlighten’ other societies,” in short, “exceptionalism.”1100 Unfortunately, Bush II’s crusade
mentality invited acquiescence, if not instigation, of actions at variance with liberal democratic
values.1101
The chief executive, George W. Bush, set the tone for U.S. policy toward Iran in his
“Axis of Evil” conceptualization. Bush II proceeded on the assumption that the Ayatollah and
mullahs could be toppled in Tehran. His two objectives for Iran—halting nuclear weapons
development and strengthening internal democratic forces—failed. A credible threat of force was
ultimately not an option, as the cumulative effect of Bush II’s preceding interventions defined a
clear set of limitations for the administration.
IV.

Criteria for the use of force:
Antizzo categorizes three types of direct military interventions—active, reactive, and

restorative (peacekeeping/humanitrian).1102 However, Antizzo’s conceptualization distinguishes
conditional circumstances in the first two types and a policy distinction in the third case. This
distinction would appear to be a logical inconsistency, insofar as peacekeeping or humanitarian
operations may be called either active (for example, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti) or reactive (for
example, Somalia, Rwanda, or Syria). Therefore, our typology differentiates two broad
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categories: humanitarian intervention designed to stop potential genocide and other atrocities,
including peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and the pre-emptive reaction to terrorism or
other threats, which might also be called “wars of choice.” Either type of military intervention
could be fought as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, war of attrition, air and naval strikes
(offshoring or virtual war), or conventional territorial combat. Thus, the two Iraq wars,
Afghanistan, and the non-intervention against Iran fall under these categories as well as the
regional “teacup wars” in Panama and Haiti. Regardless of the tactics employed, pre-emptive
interventions implicitly derive from U.S. hegemony.
#1 – Have all other options been explored, such as diplomacy, sanctions, or negotiation?
United States intervention in the Persian Gulf War might be the sole case study where the
criteria of the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine were fully engaged: diplomacy; clear-cut political
objectives; sufficient resources, money, and personnel; doable strategy and tactics; and an
activated exit plan.
In the case of Haiti, the Carter-Powell-Nunn diplomatic mission was not only successful,
but also “reassuring” to Latin American nations in contrast to overt “gunboat diplomacy.”1103
Negotiations were drawn out in the case of Bosnia through phase I (Bush I’s non-intervention)
and phase II (Clinton’s turnabout). In the end, Clinton brokered a settlement after NATO air
strikes forced the Yugoslav-Serb regime to come to the table. This favorable outcome smoothed
the path for a brokered peace in Kosovo, where the opinion of Ignatieff, Keegan, and Halberstam
was that Russia’s de facto alliance with NATO, withdrawal of support for Milosevic’s regime,
and collaboration with NATO peacekeepers comprised the “game changer.” (See Chapter 5.)
Bush II’s interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq followed the barest minimum of diplomacy, if
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ultimata could be called diplomacy—demanding that Taliban leader Mullah Omar surrender
Osama bin Laden and convincing the UN to give Saddam Hussein “a final opportunity to comply
with its disarmament obligations” and to renew weapons inspections.1104 Indeed, Bush II did not
even wait for the inspections and cast doubt on the efficacy of the UN inspectors.
#2 – Are the political, diplomatic, or military objectives clearly understood?
Colin Powell reflected the military’s institutional memory of Vietnam—a limited war
spelled disaster.1105 Powell further recalled the ill-defined objectives in the Lebanon
peacekeeping mission that climaxed in more than two hundred “shattered bodies” of U.S.
Marines in 1983 whenever he heard the “well meaning” urgings to intervene in such bloody
scenarios.1106
In the cases of Somalia and Rwanda, the desired political outcomes were poorly
understood, as was the situation in Bosnia for Bush I as well as for Clinton until the genocidal
“ethnic cleansing” became compelling. Hence, in Bosnia and later Kosovo, stopping the fighting
meant stopping the slaughter of innocents. In both instances, NATO intervention, led by
Washington, ended the civil warfare.
The most profound miscalculation of the Bush II administration in Iraq was not their
failure to predict the insurgency—because the architects of the War on Terrorism conspicuously
invited it. Bush II’s war hawks should have expected infiltration, based on intelligence about
Iraqi links to Islamist militants, even if they exaggerated the threat to “hype” or “sell” the war.
Rather, the Bush II team failed to anticipate that the media and public would see the infiltration
of Fedayeen (Ba’ath guerrillas), foreign militants affiliated with al-Qaeda, and Iranian-backed
Shi’ia and other Islamists as evidence of a “hopeless and unwinnable” quagmire like Vietnam.
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Perhaps Bush II erred by prematurely shifting the focus of the War on Terrorism from
Afghanistan before the Karzai government had sufficiently stabilized the country, not to mention
the spillover of the Taliban’s guerrilla war into neighboring Pakistan. The 9/11 Commission
stated, “the global conflict against Islamist terrorism became a different kind of struggle. The
apparently successful model of Afghanistan, where the CIA employed intelligence, covert
capabilities, and cash while the U.S. military supplied firepower and logistics against a
counterinsurgency, was applied to Iraq” with deleterious effects.1107
#3 – Is the battle plan realistic and can the military objectives be effectively maintained?
According to Van Evera, in the post-Cold War era, the most prominent condition that
increases the risk of interstate war is false optimism with respect to the outcome.1108 As
discussed in Chapter 3, intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 would have satisfied none of
the criteria of the Powell Doctrine. Von Hippel identified three critical issues pertinent to Bosnia
in the early 1990s: first, military intervention and use of force; second, peace support operations;
and third, nation-building.1109 If any one of these factors were to fail, the mission would fail.
Additionally, Von Hippel suggests that inconsistent policy precedes intervention.1110 Under Bush
I, the United States initially supported Yugoslavia remaining intact, but, when all but two of the
constituent republics acted (or made noises) toward independence, some of the European allies
backed them, prompting the United States to follow suit.
Had the Clinton administration decided to intervene in Rwanda, how could the United
States have effectively done so? An effective strategy would have emphasized nation-building
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and economic development, not only “fire-power intensive strategies.”1111 An African task force
investigating the Rwandan debacle found that the genocide could have been prevented, or, at
least, significantly curtailed.1112 The United States rejected the UN field commander’s “peace
enforcing” proposal as “unworkable.” The Clinton White House touted an alternative “outsidein” plan to create “protected routes” for refugees on Rwanda’s borders without use of air cover.
The problem with the plan, backed by Tony Lake and Dick Clarke, was that most refugees were
not fleeing to the borders, but were trapped or hidden inside Rwanda. Clarke insisted the U.S.
plan was “feasible, doable … in the short term,” but it was not, insofar as refugee camps
remained vulnerable to attack, even after the Rwandan genocide and civil war were considered
over.1113
According to Martel, NATO’s credible threat of combat troops on the ground after the
protracted bombing campaign led to victory in Kosovo.1114 Yet history does not repeat itself, as
generals and civilian policy-makers continue to fight the last war! The NATO Commander in
Libya (2011), Canadian General Charles Bouchard, observed that each scenario is unique:
“Doctrine wasn’t written for Libya. It was written for Kosovo … You can’t try to adapt Libya to
these other theatres. You have to adapt.”1115
In the case of Iraq redux, “shock and awe,” the post-modern reincarnation of blitzkrieg,
aims at demolishing the enemy’s morale as much as its infrastructure. The variant directed by
Tommy Franks missed both targets. “I had decided to leave Iraq’s electric power grid
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untouched,”1116 said Franks. In contrast to the top-to-bottom dismantling of the Iraqi
government, military, and police under Saddam Hussein, this would seem equivalent to leaving
the lights on to illuminate an empty house.
In the hypothetical case of Iran, a one-dimensional strategy of precision air strikes against
Iran’s nuclear development program held limited promise. Even if the air strikes destroyed Iran’s
uranium-enrichment and weaponization capacity, they could be reconstituted elsewhere and
would do little to change the regime’s behavior. As George W. Bush himself acknowledged, “a
foreign military intervention would stir up Iranian nationalism and unite the people against
us.”1117 All of the military interventions of the post-Cold War era, with the possible exception of
the Persian Gulf War, targeted small, weak countries. Iran presented a considerably more
formidable enemy. Therefore, Iran’s capacity to withstand an assault and counterattack must
have been a factor in any hypothetical war planning.
#4—Are there sufficient resources to accomplish the mission, in effect, going in with
“overwhelming” force?
Bush I’s Panamanian intervention was one of the few “short but victorious” interventions
since Vietnam. Operation Just Cause was based on a new concept for the U.S. military: a single
commander using overwhelming force comprising conventional and special operations to full
capabilities and in total secrecy (insofar as possible with a free press and media). At the outset,
Colin Powell’s criteria would seem to have been met, but despite some complicating events (one
U.S. Marine killed, another wounded), the first “completely integrated” military strategy for the
U.S. turned out to be an “almost perfect operation.”1118
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In Bosnia, Clinton originally continued Bush I’s policy, which was based on the criterion
that the turmoil in the former Yugoslavia was a European problem. In subsequent years, the
Clinton administration, led by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and United Nations
Ambassador Madeleine Albright, argued that the United States should lift the UN arms embargo
and initiate air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff at the time, dismissed the “lift and strike” option, whereas Britain and France argued that
their peacekeeping troops on the ground would be targets of Serb retaliation.1119 (“We do deserts,
not mountains,” Powell allegedly said.1120) Thereafter, variants of “lift and strike” have been
employed in Kosovo, Libya, and were proposed for Syria.
In Rwanda, Option 1 was immediately reinforcing the peacekeepers (UNAMIR), beefing
up its manpower to 5,000 troops. Option 2 was downsizing the international force from 1,500 to
170 and trying to broker a ceasefire. Option 3 was total withdrawal.1121 UNAMIR Commander
Romeo Dallaire’s plan called for an added 5,000 combat troops to secure the capital, then “fan
out” to protect tens of thousands of refugees and displaced persons, and “create safe havens” for
them. Only the United States had the capability to bring the air power and logistics called for by
this plan. At the White House, Richard Clarke and Anthony Lake rejected Dallaire’s “inside-out”
plan as unworkable.
By contrast, General Wesley Clark points out that NATO deployed 60,000 troops in
Bosnia for a population of four million and 40,000 troops in Kosovo with a population of two
million.1122 After six years of Balkan crisis management, Clinton sent in air power against Serbia
and was ready, despite his oft stated reluctance, to follow up with a ground invasion of Kosovo,
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but he did not.1123 Serb-Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic believed the threat of U.S.
combat troops was real. This outcome demonstrated that a credible threat of force could be as
effective as the real thing.
Bush II conducted the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as two steps in a worldwide War on
Terrorism by utilizing conventional military forces with the comprehensive objective of regime
change, pacifying the country, and rebuilding it as a model for the future. Counterterrorism
expert Kilcullen questioned the relevance of classical counterinsurgency theory to modern
conflict, arguing that the strategy for the War on Terrorism should be best understood as a
“global Islamic insurgency,” initiated by a diffuse group of Islamists with conflicting goals.1124
The absence of such a culturally specific political track illustrated one of the major shortcomings
of Bush II’s handling of Iraq redux: the wrong strategy in the wrong war at the wrong place.
The war plan for Iran, TIRANNT, called for a land invasion by Marines, targeting the
Iranian missile force, and a global strike plan against Iranian weapons of mass destruction. In
June 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld alerted the Strategic Command to be prepared to
implement CONPLAN 8022. The Pentagon task force considered global strikes against Iranian
targets in Iran, “where the president’s only option might be a nuclear one.”1125 Wisely, Bush II
chose not to do so.
#5—Is there an exit strategy and timetable in place for the withdrawal of personnel once
the mission’s goals have been achieved?
In the Persian Gulf War, the last criterion was satisfied by Bush I, but has often been
criticized for leaving Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq as what some critics saw as “unfinished
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business.” Panama had been Bush I’s test run, apparently short and sweet. Somalia had ended in
an embarrassing withdrawal. On the eve of the invasion of Haiti, presuming that the big-name
peace mission would fail, Clinton met with key advisers to ask: What happens after U.S. troops
enter and overthrow regime? Would there be “substantial resistance” by “small groups of people
lightly armed”? How do we prepare for occupation? What would be the “rules of engagement”
(ROE)—“military imperatives” versus “domestic police work”?1126 The “immaculate invasion”
rendered these considerations moot. Unfortunately, such scrutiny was absent in 2003 in Iraq.
United States troops participated in NATO peacekeeping in Bosnia, starting in 1995. In
response to pressure from members of Congress, President Bill Clinton announced U.S. forces
would be there for only a year, but those troops were still in place during the 2000 presidential
campaign, overlapping the Kosovo campaign.1127
Because the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had dragged on too long, U.S. intervention in
Iran by ground troops was a nonstarter by 2007. Apart from limited Special Operations, the
United States did not have the ground force numbers to invade and occupy Iran. As a result, the
only feasible operation would be the limited use of air and naval forces.1128 In the eighth year of
the War on Terrorism and Bush doctrine, the Bush II administration had no exit strategy in place
for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan when it turned over power to the Obama administration. No
timetable for withdrawal was set in either case till after Bush II’s troop surge in Iraq (2007-2008)
and Obama’s uptick in Afghanistan (2011). Never overlook the obvious: U.S. military
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intervention has been hard-pressed to establish exit strategies and end-points. To paraphrase the
theme of a play by Sartre, there is “no exit” from hell.1129
CONCLUSION
The Strategic Landpower Task Force white paper, titled Strategic Landpower: Winning
the Clash of Wills, proposes that warfare begins and ends in the “human domain.” Thus, “armed
conflict is a clash of interests between or among organized groups, each attempting to impose
their will on the opposition. In essence it is a fundamentally human endeavor in which the
conflict is determined by both parties.”1130
We can categorize two types of interventions: (1) humanitarian aid and rescue,
peacekeeping, and peace enforcement; and (2) pre-emptive reaction, strategic, and hegemonic
(regional or global). The predominance of alliance influences, continuity of policy, momentum,
and lessons learned from prior interventions (categories I and III), weakly tempered by domestic
factors (category II), influenced “go” and “no-go” decisions, while the criteria for the use of
force were rarely applied, as plans of attack followed rather than led decision making.
Presidential administrations tended to decide what they would do before figuring out how they
would do it. No single factor dominated the decisions taken in our case studies. Moreover, as
comparison of Bush II’s Iraq and Iran policies illustrated, even similar imperatives could lead to
different outcomes. Decisions to intervene militarily, including what turned out to be “no-go”
decisions, have been “perfect storm” scenarios, whereby a confluence of variables led to the
outcome and no single factor was determinative.
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All intervention decisions of the post-Cold War era involved a moral argument, at least in
part, to sell the decision to the public.1131 Whereas ideological blinders and perceived policy
imperatives accompanied the Iraq redux intervention, the gap between capabilities and desire
imposed realistic limitations on action for not only Bush II on Iran, but for the Obama White
House on Syria. Decision making is pushed or pulled to change direction by new perceptions and
a convergence of contributing factors (i.e., no single factor is imperative). The protracted length
of a crisis (such as Bosnia or Iraq) or recurrence in a troublesome region (Kosovo) seem to have
been attractive for intervention. Military action appears more likely if it had occurred before and
if troops were already in the region or nearby. Therefore, continuity and momentum are important
keys. The decision-making for the “troop surges” in Iraq by Bush II and Afghanistan by Obama
involved similar considerations as the original intervention decisions, although there is a
fundamental difference between initiating an intervention and expanding or contracting the
operation. In contrast to the initial decision, taking no action would not be an option. Syria could
be seen as a test case on how to intervene and why or why not. All of the factors suggesting a
“go” decision were in place: international crisis, threat to regional stability, coalition partners,
momentum, continuity, humanitarian concern, and lessons learned from previous interventions
as well as the dangers of doing nothing. Conversely, if ever the American public had been in a
“no-go” mood, it was in 2014, whether the target country be Syria, Iran, North Korea, or
Ukraine. Additionally, Russian interest and investment in Syria constituted a factor that was not
present in the cases of Iraq (1990 and 2003), Afghanistan, or the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and
Kosovo). The case of the recent Russian intervention in the Crimean region of Ukraine,
following the overthrow of the pro-Russian regime of Viktor Yanukovych, could be telling. The
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action of Putin in Crimea may have been a “brazen act of aggression,” in the words of John
Kerry,1132 analogous to that of Saddam Hussein in Kuwait,1133 but there was no likelihood of the
United States (under Barack Obama or any U.S. president) resorting to military force to expel the
Russians from Ukrainian territory.1134 The potential reaction of a counterforce has thus emerged
as a factor. On the one hand, Russian regional hegemony deterred U.S. action in the South
Ossetia-Georgia conflict (2008). On the other hand, Russian cooperation with the United States
and NATO brought resolution to the conflict in Kosovo. Therefore, the absence of a counter
force is a prerequisite for U.S. military intervention. Hence, the presence of a counterforce is a
deterrent.
In the final analysis, the expectation of success, whether realistic or “false optimism,” is
the constant in “go” decisions. The military interventions adjudged successful—Panama, Persian
Gulf War, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and Libya—were of limited duration and did not entail
extended commitment and presence (i.e., post-invasion occupation). Regardless of whether the
United States continues to be the sole global superpower or hegemon of the 21st century,
American decision makers have never intervened expecting to fail.
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